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Science has long been the pride of the accidental civilization. 
Science, democracy, and capi talism are regarded by scholars, 
especially by Western scholars, as the three grand pillars 
constructing the edifices of the modern world that no nations are 
supposed to be able to defy them if they want to participate in 
this glorious stage of human development. 
Science has its cradle in the ancient Greece. Al though science, 
generating from the idea of ElTlOlTTHlll of the ancient Greek, is 
supposed to deal with something stable and imperishable, the 
conception of science is by no means unchanged throughout the 
history of Western thought. This can well be recognized from the 
regard of its relation with philosophy. While nowadays people 
generally regard science and philosophy as two disciplines of very 
different nature, science (ElTlOlTTlI111) and philosophy (cplAooocpfa) 
appeared to Plato and Aristotle as two interchangeable terms of 
similar meaning. Actually, the synonymi ty of science and philosophy 
persisted until the nineteenth century that even Sir Isaac Newton 
entitled his physics as "natural philosophy". 
Science and philosophy spli t only in the nineteenth century when 
the sterility of the speculative philosophy for the knowledge of 
reality was full~ revealed compared with the well-established 
method and effective prediction of physical sciences. Philosophy 
began to fall into a formidable crisis that it threatens to be 
banished from the magnificent kingdom of science. Presumably, 
philosophers were to fight back in this battle concerning the "life 
and death of philosophy". 
After outlining the situation of the crisis of philosophy in 
the nineteenth century, the author of the present treatise tries 
to show how Heidegger, one of the most influential and leading 
thinkers of the twentieth century, attempted to step out of this 
impasse of philosophy by reformulating the subject-matter of 
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philosophy and refining the approach to this subject-matter. The 
theme of the present. essay is to work out the reformulation of 
philosophy in Heidegger's early thinking. It shows that when 
Heidegger returned to Freiburg becoming Husserl' s assistant after 
the First World War, he was already preoccupied with two motives, 
"science and life". His first lecture course after the War aims 
precisely at reformulating philosophy as a science of life as such. 
Life is figured out as the proper subject-matter of philosophy. 
And an "utterly new" kind of science different from the particular 
sciences is demanded for this subj ect-matter in so far as Heidegger 
found that the method of physical sciences is "de-living". 
However, according to the analysis of this treatise, Heidegger 
was unable to establish such a science of life. For, science and 
life are actually two contradictory ideas according to the 
tradi tional western thought. It is shown that after turning to the 
historical investigations Heidegger soon picked out the concept 
of "Being" from Aristotle replacing the concept of life to be the 
subject-matter of his reformulation of philosophy. 
However, the motives of life did by no means vanish from the 
thinking of Heidegger, even though Heidegger had explici tly 
formulated philosophy as "the science of Being" . It still directs 
Heidegger's reformulation of philosophy under the rubric of the 
"analytic of Dasein", which, ·the author' supposes, is nothing more 
than the continuation of the idea of a new science of life as such. 
It is shown that the hinge of this reformulation lies in the 
"problematic of Temporali ty" which attempts to establish the 
science of Being from the constitution of human Dasein. 
But this program, Heidegger admitted, had failed. The 
problematic of Temporality is never fully worked out. Thus, the 
science of Being is never established. Nevertheless, this attempt 
of Heidegger to reformulate philosophy in an age of crisis does 
exert a stupendous influence on the following generations of 
western thinkers. In the brief concluding remarks of this treatise, 
it is shown which "revolutionary" elements of Heidegger' s thinking 
in regard of the tradition of western rationalist thought may 
account for this huge influence of Heidegger. 
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And the brilliant scheme of Being and Time 
really meant a total transformation of the 
intellectual climate, a transformation that had 
lasting effects on almost all sciences ... Whoever 
witnessed Heidegger's influence in those early 
years of his teaching in Freiburg and Marburg 
knows that at that time he had the most powerful 
effect on every direction of scholarly research. 
In him too there was an existential passion, an 
emanation of intellectual concentration, that 
made everything that preceded it seem feeble ... 
Today, with the distance of decades, the 
philosophical impulse that Heidegger 
represented no longer has the same infatuating 
relevance. It has penetrated everywhere and 
works in depths, often unrecognized, often 
barely provoking resistance; but nothing today 
is thinkable without it. 
Gadamer, "The Phenomenological Movement" 
(1963)1 
Heidegger is a thinker of epochal 
significance ... Along wi th and in opposi tion to 
Plato, Aristotle, Kant and Hegel, Heidegger 
tried to determine anew in the twentieth century, 
that is, in a time of world-historical 
catastrophes and radical transformations, what 
philosophy is and can be ... One can validly assert 
that by means of Sein und Zeit he decisively 
altered the significant phenomenological 
philosophy of Husserl and Scheler, that due to 
Oskar Becker he brought along the way with him 
Hans-Georg Gadarner, "Die phanornenologische Bewegung", in Hegel, 
Husser 1/ Heidegger / Gesammel te r1erke Band 3, Neuere Philosophie I 
(Tlibingen: Mohr, 1987), S.112f. English translation: Gadarner, 
Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. and ed. David E. Linge (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1976), p.139. 
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a philosophy of mathematics and through Bul tmann 
a new theology, and that wi th new impetus he later, 
above all, decisively determined continental 
European philosophy. 
- P6ggeler, "Afterword to the Second Edition" 
(1983), Martin Heidegger's Fa th of Thinking 2 
Wi th Being and Time, Heidegger proved himself, 
almost overnight, to be a thinker of the first 
rank. Even philosophers at some remove, .such as 
Georg Misch, immediately recognized the 
"indefatigability" and "craftsmanship" of a 
leading philosopher. In Being and Time, 
Heidegger did nothing less than meld and recast, 
in an original way, the competing intellectual 
movements of Diltheyan hermeneutics and 
Husserlian phenomenology, so as to take up the 
pragmatic themes of Max Scheler and bring them 
into a postmetaphysical, historicizing 
overcoming of the philosophy of sUbjectivity. 
The new venture in thought was all the mere 
amazing because it seemed to allow the 
impassioned themes of the Kierkegaardian 
dialectic of existence to engage the classical 
Aristotelian philosophical problematic. From 
today's standpoint, Heidegger's new beginning 
still presents probably the most profound 
turning point in German philosophy since Hegel. 
- Habermas, "Work and Weltanschauung" (1988)3 
2. Otto Poggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, (Stuttgart: Neske, 1994), 
S. 301ff; English translation: Martin Heidegger' 5 Pa th of Thinking, trans. 
Daniel Magurshak and Sigmund Barber, (Atlantic Highland : Humanities Press, 
1989), p.259ff. 
3. JQrgen Habermas, "Work and Weltanschauung: The Heidegger Controversy 
from a German Perspective", trans. J. McCumber, In Heidegger: A Critical 




I think few people, who are more or less familiar wi th the 
human history, would deny the assertion that the twentieth 
century after the birth of Jesus Christ is an Age of crisis. 
\\ I have lived through most of the twentieth century wi thout, 
I must add, suffering personal hardship, I remember it only 
as the most terrible century in Western history", Isaiah 
Berlin said. 1 
Since 1914, almost every part of the globe has been 
incessantly haunted by the breathtaking nightmare of 
involvement with world wars. There had been no world wars at 
all before 1914. But since 1914, it seems that each local 
conflict might -unpredictably occasion a world war that would 
likely bring mankind to total extinction. Already in the 
beginning of the First World War, which was triggered merely 
by the assassination of an Archduke of the Austria Empire, 
people felt that the end of the world had arrived, even though 
at that time there were still no atomic bombs. Nevertheless, 
human beings survi ved. They survived not only the First World 
War, but also the Second. However, even now when the Cold War 
appears to be already over, the threat to radical annihilation 
has not yet been alleviated a little. We all still live under 
the compass of the nucleus weapons in the hands of various 
powers. It could hardly be known when and why if they would 
finally fall into our vicinity from the hazy sky. 
1. Quoted from Eric Hobsbawrn, The Age of Extremes, (New York: Vintage Books, 
1996), p.1. 
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Apart from the political crisis, there were also various 
waves of world economic crisis in the twentieth century. These 
economic crises are all of unprecedented depth and width that 
no single local economical systems could have escaped the 
catastrophes they brought about. They were so fierce and 
untamable that it seems they would in one stroke collapse the 
whole capitalist economy, which is hitherto regarded as one 
of the greatest merits of the modern time. 
Human reason appears to be fragile and impotent before 
these crises, each of which, no matter it is political or 
economical, would have swallowed up not only the "rational 
animal", but also everything on the globe. But are not they 
precisely what were brought about not quite long time ago by 
the meticulous deliberations of human reason? The atomic bombs, 
the nucleus theory, the long-distance missiles, the 
capitalism, and even the communism, which one of these did 
not grow out of the inventions of human reason? What is wrong 
with the human reason that it actually did nothing less than 
put itself to death? 
If it is the nature of mankind to seek for an understanding 
over their environments, the men of the twentieth century will 
hardly ignore tbis stunning phenomenon of the "dialectic of 
human reason". In fact, in the academic circle of the twentieth 
century, there are no times that lack the reflections on the 
various kinds of crisis facing our generations. And apart from 
the political and economical catastrophe that had never 
occurred in such an extent in the human history before the 
twentieth century, there is still another crisis that has 
occupied especially the western intellectuals. This is the 
crisis of science (or theoretical science) , the crisis of that 
which has long been regarded by the western minds as the 
highest merits of human reason. And if science is precisely 
that on which not only the knowledge and thus the control over 
the nature, but also the rational and scientific life of 
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mankind depends, the crisis of science then certainly has 
undeniable connections with the political and economical 
catastrophes. 
Actually, the crisis of science has already appeared to 
the western minds before the political and economical one. 
To the end of nineteenth century, almost all branches of 
science has not only been "subjected to the most profound 
changes in content, but revolutionary movements have actually 
taken place within them that have shaken the foundations upon 
which the sciences had been hitherto built.,,2 Amongst the 
various branches of science, it is precisely philosophy, which 
was once regarded as the "queen of all sciences", that has 
suffered from the greatest crisis. The crisis of philosophy 
is so profound that the discourse on the "end of philosophy" 
has seemed to become commonplace. 
Under this situation, it is not surprising that thinkers 
of the last decades of the nineteenth century and of the 
twentieth century had ventured various paths, trying to find 
out the causes of this crisis and to formulate anew the problem 
of philosophy. It is precisely the task of the present essay 
to work out the reformulation of philosophy of one of these 
thinkers, i.e., that of Martin Heidegger. 
It has perhaps already become a general agreement that 
Heidegger is one of the most influential philosophers of the 
twentieth century. Qui te lots of the intellectual movements, 
and also the particular conceptuality of individual thinkers, 
are hardly "thinkable" without the provocative impact, 
stimulation and challenge of Heidegger' s thinking. 3 Owing to 
2. Cassirer, Das Erkenn tnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft 
der neueren Zeit, Band IV, Von Hegels Tods bis zur Gegenwart (1832-1932), 
(Darmstadt: Wiss. Buchges., 1995), S.25. 
3 The intellectual movement which is most obviously related to 
Heidegger is that of the "philosophical hermeneutics", with which lots 
of . renowned philosophers of the later half of twentieth century, e. g., 
Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, Karl-Otto Apel and Habermas, are involved and 
even take part in its debate. The impact of Heidegger on his students 
is even more apparent, and lots of these students had already become 
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the overwhelming spiritual impact of Heidegger's thinking, 
the name of Heidegger has already been associated with various 
kinds of disciplines, ranging from psychoanalysis, literary 
theory, sociology, history, and theology. 
However, Heidegger's reformulation is chosen to be the 
topic of the present essay not merely because Heidegger is 
one of the most influential thinkers of this century, but also 
because Heidegger's adventure of thinking, I suppose, may 
reveal both the peculiarity and shortcoming of the Western 
rational tradi tion of thinking. Both the limi t and the 
advantage of science as one of the noblest idea of the Western 
culture are clearly unlocked through Heidegger's analysis. 
influential scholars by themselves, e. g., Gadamer, Karl Lowi th, Hannah 
Arendt, Herbert Marcuse, Ernst Tugendhat, Max Muller etc. Habermas, 
though he is not a student of Heidegger and he holds a cri tical attitude 
towards Heidegger's thinking, also admits the influence of Heidegger 
on him. "An intensive engagement wi th the early Heidegger left its mark 
on my own works as well, up to Knowledge and Human Interests," Habermas 
'says. Vide Habermas, op. cit., p.205. The impact of Heidegger outside 
Germany is no less significant. His influence on generations of French 
philosophers, e. g. on Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel 
Levainas, Jacques Lacan, Jean-Fran90is Lyotard, Michel Foucault and 
Jacques Derrida, is consequential. Ref., for example, Luc Ferry and Alain 
Renault, French Philosophy of the Sixties, An Essay on Antihumanism, 
trans. Mary H. S. Cattani, (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts, 
1990). Foucault said: "For me Heidegger has always been the essential 
philosopher. I began by reading Hegel, then Marx and I set out to read 
Heidegger in 1951 ' or 52; then in 1952 or 1953 ... 1 read Nietzsche. I still 
have here the notes I took when I was reading Heidegger. I've got tons 
of them! And they are much more important than the ones I took on Hegel 
or Marx. My entire philosophical development was determined by my reading 
of Heidegger ... It is possible that if I had not read Heidegger, I would 
not have read Nietzsche." See Michel Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, 
Culture, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman, (London: Routledge, 1988), p.250. 
Derrida says: "I do maintain, as you recalled in your question, that 
Heidegger's text is extremely important to me, and that constitutes a 
novel, irreversible advance all of whose critical resources we are far 
from having exploited." See, Jacques Derrida, Positions, trans. Alan 
Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 54. And in the 
article "Letter to a Japanese Friend", Derrida testifies that his 
notorious term "decons truction" arises precisely out of his translation 
of the Heideggerian term Destruktion or Abbau. See Derrida, "Letter to 
a Japanese Friend", trans. David Wood and Andrew Benj amin, in A Derrida 
Reader: Between the Blinds, ed. Peggy Kamuf, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1991), p.270f. Beside continental scholars, a lot of 
famous thinkers in the Uni ted States are also under Heidegger' s influence. 
Richard Rorty, for instance, has regarded Heidegger as one of the "three 
most important philosophers of our century". Vide Rorty, Philosophy and 
the Mirror of Nature, (New Jersey: Princeton Univerity Press, 1979), 
p.5. 
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Besides, an outstanding thinker's intellectual struggle 
between sticking to the noble idea of science and leaving it 
behind for the sake of the subject-matter can also be figured 
out. In the course of the treatment of such reformulation, 
another possibility of philosophy beside the Western 
tradition of theoretical science may well be recognized. 
It is the task of the following essay to elaborate 
Heidegger's reformulation of philosophy. In so far as 
Heidegger's thinking went through a rather long itinerary wi th 
many turnings amidst it, this essay has to be kept within a 
reasonable length to enable a more detailed elaboration of 
some cardinal concepts. To this end, I will confine the 
following essay to Heidegger's early thinking. 
In the first chapter of the following treatise, I will at 
first try to present the relation of the idea of philosophy 
and science in the Western tradition and to figure out the 
background out of which Heidegger's reformulation of 
philosophy arises. Then, in the second chapter, I will give 
an analysis of the first lecture course Heidegger held after 
the First World War. It will be shown that already in this 
lecture course, the two elementary motives of Heidegger's 
early thinking, , i.e., science and life, have already been 
situated at the core of Heidegger's considerations. In the 
third chapter, I will give a treatment of the transitional 
phrase In which the subject-matter of Heidegger's 
reformulation of philosophy changed from the problematic of 
life to that of Being. Finally, in chapter four, Heidegger's 
formulation of philosophy in the period around the publication 
of Sein und Zeit, that is, precisely the period in which 
Heidegger gained his world fame as a "thinker of the first 
rank", will be put under an analysis. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR THE REFORMULATION 
OF PHILOSOPHY: 
THE RELATION OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 
Today, while people generally understand the concept of 
"science" (in German, Wissenschaft) in terms of the prevailing 
and widespread opinions on the modern natural sciences, and 
while these opinions are in a great deal fostered out of the 
powerful and impressive effect or products of the modern 
technology which is closely connected with the modern natural 
sciences, people use to regard philosophy and science to be 
two disciplines of very different nature. It is said that 
science pursues .the knowledge of the "objective" facts, and 
it is based on firmly established method, its theory or its 
result is reliable, universally valid and indisputable for 
various people of various cultural backgrounds. Philosophy, 
on the contrary, is only a kind of "subjective" statements, 
emotional expressions, or "mere fancies, even imbecile 
fancl' es", 1 whl' ch a m y sometimes reveal some illuminating 
aspects of human life, but which after all mean only the 
opinions of particular individuals of particular cultural 
. This is Hegel' s mockery to the philosophy of nature of his rival and 
one-time friend Schelling. Ref. Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and 
Refutations, fifth revised edition, (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 69; also 
idem.' , The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol.2, fifth revised ed., (London: 
Routledge, 1966), p.28f. 
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backgrounds, and therefore can not be regarded as the genuine 
knowledge that is universally valid for all human beings. 
In spi te of the fact that this kind of distinction between 
science and philosophy has been widely accepted nowadays and 
long been taken for granted, it by no means prevailed before 
the nineteenth century. Actually, throughout the history of 
Western philosophy (or, of metaphysics) from Plato, Aristotle 
to Hegel, philosophy had been regarded as science - and not 
only as a science, but was exclusively considered to be "the 
Science", that is, the supreme science. This conviction did 
hold not only for those who were to be regarded as "the 
philosophers". It just generally fell to the educated minds 
of the past days, as much as the widespread opinions on modern 
natural sciences mentioned above fall to those of nowadays. 
The conviction that philosophy is science, or precisely the 
Science, was generally accepted or even taken for granted 
amongst the educated public, from the time of the blossom of 
the ancient Athens four centuries before the birth of Jesus 
Christ up to the time of the national independence movement 
of the Greek from the Turk in the nineteenth century of our 
era. This conviction generally appeared as a kind of "popular 
supersti tion" o~ philosophy that the public tended to expect 
philosophy to know all about everything. 2 
§1.1 Philosophy and Science ~n Ancient Greece 
It is apparent that for Aristotle "science" (ETTlOTTH1T)) and 
"philosophy" (<plAooo<pla) are only two different designations 
for one 'and the same matter. This can easily be proved from 
his writings delivered to us. In one of his major works, which 
acquired the entitlement of Metaphysics (METa Ta <pVOlKcl) 
2. Ref. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol.2, p.30. 
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through the compilation effort of Andronicus of Rhodes almost 
four centuries after Aristotle's death, the two terms 
"science" and "philosophy" are interchangeable. For instance, 
when Aristotle explicated his conception of the 
classification of the theoretical sciences into the physical 
science, mathematics and theology, he also called them "three 
theoretical philosophies".3 
In fact, from the viewpoint of the etymological meaning 
of the two terms ', we can also see that philosophy and science 
are so closely related that they just appear as two different 
expressions for the same matter. The English word "philosophy" 
comes from the Greek cplAoaocpfa. And cplAoaocpta is composed of 
two stems, CPlAElV and aocpta. <DlAElV means to love, or to be fond 
of something. <DlAoaocpfa is one of the words that belongs to 
the group of words that was formed from the combination of 
a substantive or a adj ecti ve wi th the prefix cplA(O)-; tha t 
combination generally means the favour, preference or love 
towards definite things or realms. The Greek word aocpfa, which 
is combined wi th the prefix CPlAO- in the word cplAoaocpia, is a 
common expression in ancient Greek that has similar meaning 
with the 'English word "knowledge" (or with the German Wissen, 
Kenntnis) .4 Therefore, the Greek word cplAoaocpia generally means 
the love of knowledge, or the Eros towards knowing. 5 This 
meaning of cplAoaocpia as love of knowledge can also be recognized 
in Plato's dialogue Symposium. 
The English word "science", which lS accustomed to be used 
to translate the Greek term ETIlaTn~n (for instance, in the 
3. See Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book r, 1026a 8ff. Ref. also F.E.Peters: 
"In Aristotle ... philosophia has now become a synonym for episteme in the 
sense of an intellectual discipline seeking out causes. " See Peters, Greek 
Philosophical Terms, (New York: New York University Press, 1967), p.156. 
4. Since those who have knowledge were regarded as having wisdom, oO~la 
thus became an expression for "wisdom" too. 
s. On the etymology of <P1Aooo~ia, see article "Philosophie", in Historisches 
Wdrterbuch der Philosophie, Bd 7, hrsg. von Joachim Ritter and Karlfried 
Grunder, (Basel: Schwabe & Co., 1984). 
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translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics) 6 comes from the Latin 
scientia, which simply means knowledge, that is, ETIlOTn~n in 
Greek. 7 Hence, from the viewpoint of etymology, the meaning 
of "science" and "philosophy" can respectively trace back to 
the Greek words ETIlOTnllTJ and oocpfa, both of which contain the 
meaning of "knowledge", and so it becomes clear that the two 
terms "philosophy" and" science" carry the same meaning. They 
are so closely related that "philosophy", if to be translated 
literally, simply means the love of "science". To see it from 
this regard, it is rather absurd to think that philosophy would 
be something that is opposite to the science. 
In the ancient Greece, philosophy was not contrasted wi th 
science. But philosophy, synonymous with science (or 
knowledge) as in the case of Aristotle, was instead opposed 
against "opinion" (oosa) . This contrast between knowledge and 
opinion was first thematically elaborated by Plato, and then 
was inherited, though at the same time totally transformed, 
by Aristotle. 
According to Plato, knowledge lS concerned with the 
subj ect-matter itself, for example, the just itself, the 
beautiful itself, or the good itself. 8 Plato called this matter 
itself "the idea" (or "the form", elOo)). 9 The opinion, on the 
contrary, attaches to "the sensible" (alo8T}Ta). Plato thinks 
that the idea is what is purely, whereas the sensible is only 
something intermediate between what purely is and what is not. 
The sensible is only through its participating into the idea 
and its name also merely derives from the idea in which it 
participates. The idea is eternal, invariable, and original, 
6. For example, see the English translation of Metaphysics by W . . D. Ross, 
in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes, (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), pp.1552-1728. 
7. Ref. The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, ed. T. F. Hoad, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
8. See, for example, Plato, Phaedo, 65d ff. 
9. See, for example, Plato, op. cit., 102a ff. 
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whereas the sensible transient, variable, and derivative. 
Therefore, the opinion, as that which is about the sensible, 
turns out to be something between knowledge and ignorance. lo 
It is in no ways real knowledge as soon as it is concerned 
with something transient, variable and not purely is. However, 
it is not so much ignorance too so long as it still attaches 
to something (the sensible), rather than to utterly nothing. 
Therefore philosophers, as the lovers of knowledge, are 
precisely those who will seek for the pure knowledge and the 
ideas, and disdain the opinion and the sensible. "As for those 
who in each case embrace the thing itself, we must call them 
philosophers [lovers of knowledge] (~lAoao~ovs), not lovers 
of opinion (~lAOOOSOVS)."l1 
Aristotle took over the contrast ·between knowledge and 
opinion from Plato, though it means quite a different matter 
in Aristotle. For Aristotle, to have the knowledge of a subj ect 
matter means to know its cause (or explanation, OlT10), and 
to know that it can not be otherwise. That means that in order 
to obtain knowledge, it has to catch up the cause that is 
necessary (avaYKalos) for the subj ect matter. The opinion, on 
the contrary, only touches on what .is accidental (avllf3Ef3TlKOS) .12 
And besides, Aristotle also told us something about the way 
of getting into the knowledge. He pointed out that we obtain 
knowledge though the scientific deduction (ovAAoYlOIlOS). 13 
Whatever the difference between Plato and Aristotle on the 
contrast between knowledge and opinion, there is little doubt 
that they both conceived philosophy on the side of ~TIlOT~IlTl, 
that is, science, or knowledge. As we have mentioned above, 
it is clear that philosophy and science mean quite the same 
in Aristotle. And while science and philosophy are equivalent 
10. See, Plato, Republic, 476b ff. ' 
11. Pl~to, Republic, 480 a, trans. G.t-1.A. Grube, in Plato, Complete Works, 
ed. JohnM. Cooper, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), p.ll07. 
12. See, Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 71 bl0 f, 88 b30 f. 
~. Ibid., 71 b18. 
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for Aristotle, physics, or the physical science, as one of 
the theoretical sciences, is subordinated to philosophy in 
general (or science in general) as one of its divisions. 
Notwi thstanding what was studied by Aristotle under the ti tle 
"physics" is, to use the terms of modern time, not so much 
physics as metaphysics of nature. 14 But indeed, to consider 
from the history of Western philosophy, physics had still been 
regarded as a branch of philosophy at least up to the 
seventeenth century, when physics had yet gained its 
independence against the metaphysics. This will become more 
apparent when one reminds of the fact that one of the greatest 
figures in modern physics, Sir Isaac Newton, entitled his 
major work precisely as Philosopiae Naturalis Principia 
Mathematica (Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy) . 
Apparently the so-called "natural philosophy" in this title 
is equivalent to "natural science". It is evident that in the 
time of Newton, "science" was still interchangeable with 
"philosophy" as well as in the time of Aristotle. And, 
therefore, it is by no means surprising that Newton himself 
has for a long time endured the reputation as a great 
"philosopher" .15 
Philosophy and science generally appear to be equivalent 
ln the writing of Aristotle. And what is considered under 
philosophy (or metaphysics) today, was by Aristotle called 
"first philosophy" (cptAoaocpta npwTll) .16 It is designated as 
"first philosophy" because it is ranked the first amongst the 
various branches of philosophies or sciences. 
14. Ref. Hegel, Vorlesungen uber die Geschichte der Philosophie, Band 11, 
(Stuttgart: Frommanns, 1928), S.337. 
15 Ref. Hegel, Enzyklopadie der philosopischen Wissenschaften im 
Grundrisse (1830), Erster Teil, Die Wissenschaft der Logik, Werke 8, 
(Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), S.50; Also, E.A. Burtt: "Newton was 
constituting himself a philosopher rather than a scientist as we now 
distinguish them." See Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern 
Science, (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954), p. 33. 
16. See Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1026 a 30. 
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Aristotle, in the first book of his Metaphysics, 
precisely that book, its entitlement, though not by Aristotle 
himself, brought forth the term "metaphysics" and its 
dissemination as a name for the discipline of the same sort 
as elaborated by the work under it - having scrutinized the 
inquiries of the philosophers earlier than himself , delimited 
that kind of philosophy, of which Thales is the founder,17 
namely first philosophy, as "the science which theorizes the 
first principles and the causes". 18 And at other place, 
Aristotle also delimited it as "a science which theorizes 
being qua being and that which belongs to it in itself.,,19 
Aristotle called this kind of science (or philosophy) "first 
philosophy" because it maintains a priori ty amongst the "three 
theoretical philosophies" by virtue of the superiority of its 
subject-matter. Aristotle says: 
But if there is something which is eternal and immovable 
and separable, clearly the knowledge of it belongs to a 
theoretical science, not, however, to natural science20 (for 
natural science deals with certain movable things) nor to 
mathematics, but to a science prior to both ... We answer that 
if there is no ~ubstance other than those which are formed 
by nature, natural science will be first science; but if there 
is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior 
and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, 
because it is first. And it will belong to this to consider 
being qua being - both what it is and the attributes which 
belong to it qua being. 21 
Aristotle thinks that a science that deals with the eternal 
and immovable substance, if there is any such substance, and 
17. Ibid., 983 b 20. 
18. Ibid., 982 b 9. 
19. Ibid., 1002 b 18. 
20 Or "physical science". 
21 
. Aristotle, Ope cit., 1026 a 10 ff. 
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deals wi th being qua being, shall be accorded a more advanced 
posi tion than the science that deals wi th movable substance. 
It must be prior to the physical science and mathematics, and 
so that, to name by its ranking, it is designated to be the 
"first philosophy" (or, first science) . Furthermore, because 
of the superiority of its subject matter, Aristotle claimed 
that this science shall be "the most exact", "the most capable 
of teaching" , "the most knowable" , and "the most 
authoritative" amongst the sciences. Hence Aristotle also 
called it "the highest science".22 
§1.2 Christian Theology and the First Philosophy 
The superiority of first philosophy over the physical 
sciences had been maintained through the Middle Ages to the 
dawn of modern times. It is commonly agreed that in the Middle 
Ages, philosophical reason was subordinated to the revelation 
of Christianity and was shackled by it. Therefore philosophy 
(metaphysics) became the handmaid of the Chr.istian theology. 
However, to look it upon a different aspect, philosophy did 
owe a good deal , to the Christianity for maintenance of the 
superiority over the physical sciences in Europe at an 
interval of more than one thousand years of time. 
It all started with the early Christian theologians of the 
Roman Empire when they tried to recruit the philosophical 
doctrines, which had already been well established at that 
time through centuries of development since the age of Plato 
and Aristotle, to explicate the religious revelation of 
Christianity. The "first philosophy" of Plato and Aristotle 
was likely to be the most preferable amongst the different 
schools of philosophy that flourished at that time. For they 
22. Ibid., 982 a 25f. 
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both concentrates upon the supra-sensible (or, meta-physical) 
substance which can well be compared to the Christian God, 
and their theories were widespread enough and were organized 
in a considerably systematic way. As mentioned above, the 
science that deals with the immovable, eternal, and 
supra-physical substance, was conceived by Aristotle, to be 
the "first philosophy". It is worthy noticing that in addi tion 
to this honorable title, namely the "first philosophy", 
Aristotle also called it "theology" . 23 Al though the "theology" 
conceived by Aristotle in no ways coincides without further 
qualifications with the theology enacted by the Christianity, 
the existence of this very name inside the system of Aristotle 
more or less facilitated the conflation of Christianity with 
it. 
At first Plato played a decisive role in the systemization 
or "philosophization" of the Christian faith through the 
intermediation of the neo-Platonic thinkers such as Plotinus. 
But soon Aristotle outstripped Plato. The "metaphysical" 
thought of Aristotle was then taken into the Christian 
theology and formed the notorious Aristotelian-Scholastic 
tradi tion, which eventually turned out to reign the minds of 
the medieval Europeans. 
As soon as the "first philosophy" (or metaphysics) was 
taken up by the Christian theologists to explicate their fai th, 
it was then structurally incorporated into the Christian 
theology and became part of its dogma. And as long as the 
Christian faith still hold sway over the European minds, the 
philosophical doctrines that had already been integrated into 
it would be entrenched together by the Catholic Church as much 
as the other components of the Christian dogma. Therefore, 
philosophy (or metaphysics) was able to sustain its 
23. See ibid., 1026 a 19. In so far as the subject-matter of the "first 
philosophy" is considered to be eternal, it is considered to be "divine" 
too. A science that inquires about the divine is aptly to be called 
"theology". 
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superiority over other kind of sciences, remarkably over the 
physical sciences, throughout the Middle Ages, at which time 
the Christianity took hold of all directions of European life. 
In fact, the rebellion of the physical sciences, with 
astronomy as their vanguard, against the tyranny of the 
metaphysics, which was sanctioned by the Christian Church and 
therefore by the possession of "di vine right", concurred wi th 
the Reformation in the sixteenth century. As soon as the 
"divine" fortification of the Christian dogma was broken down, 
the physical scientists raided upon the scholastic 
metaphysicians in the battlefield of "science" no slower than 
the Protestant upon the Catholic Church in the field of 
Christian faith. If one takes notice of the interweaving 
relationship between the first philosophy and the Western 
Christiani ty, he can easily see that it is by no means sporadic 
that the disruption of the dogma of the Christiani ty and the 
rise of modern physical sciences occurred precisely in the 
same era. 24 
Yet, we cannot neglect that just beside the battlefield 
of the rebellion of physical sciences against the scholastic 
metaphysics, a revolution had also started to take place 
inside the realm ,of first philosophy itself. There were those 
"revolutionary" metaphysicians who tried to dispense with the 
constraint of the religious revelation. Instead of awaiting 
the grace of revelation, they attempted to reach the truth 
automatically through "rightly conducting" the reason, 25 with 
which all human beings are equally gifted, and thus which are 
ready to be used for every human beings. This revolution is 
24. Cf. Alfred N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, (New York: A 
Mentor Book, 1948), p.1ff. However, the rise of the modern physical 
sciences can not be counted as the merit of the Protestant. For, the 
Protestant actually despised and suppressed the sciences as much as the 
Catholic Church. 
25. See Descartes, Discourse on the l'1ethod of rightly conducting the reason 
and seeking for truth in the sciences, in The Philosophical Works of 




distinctive that it tried to lay the foundation for "first 
philosophy" by resort to the subject of thinking and by 
recourse to the method of reasoning. Hence, to name by its 
distinctiveness, it is suitably entitled as the 
"subjectivistic first philosophy", or simply the 
"subjectivistic philosophy". It has been commonly agreed that 
this revolution began with Rene Descartes, whose two principal 
works, the Discourse on Method, and the Medi ta tions on First 
philosophy, are monuments to this revolution and the revival 
of first philosophy. 
§1.3 Hegel's For.mulation of Philosophy 
Hegel is one of the most important, and probably the most 
symbolical, figure of the above-mentioned subjectivistic 
first philosophy as a revolution inside the first philosophy 
initiated by Descartes. For its culmination was achieved 
precisely in the dialectical system of Hegel and its decline 
then followed immediately Hegel' s death. The influence of the 
system of Hegel was tremendous as a philosophical school, 
though it shall be noticed tha tit was not wi thout the support 
of the political authority. But actually its frontier extended 
far more remote than that of the Prussian crown which backed 
its domination in Germany. It reached the soil, upon which 
Hegel's patron, the King of Prussia Friederich Wilhelm Ill, 
and also his descendents in the following decades, including 
Wilhelm 11 and Adolf Hitler, were never able to put a finger. 
The influence of the system of Hegel crossed over the English 
Channel, which the invincible armada of Spain, the naval force 
of the Sun king of the Frankish kingdom, and even the fleet 
of Napoleon the great, the mightiest emperor of Europe at the 
time -of Hegel, were all the same not able to surmount. The 
idealistic system of Hegel predominated the philosophical 
- 18 -
I 
scene of England in the nineteenth century and even survi ved 
its counterpart in the continent. 26 
The superiority of philosophy over the physical sciences 
was kept hard in the system of Hegel, though, in the meanwhile, 
since the rise ,of the modern physical sciences, there had been 
many reflections about the "scandal of philosophy". The 
predecessor of Hegel, Kant, has already lamented over the 
tendency that it had at his time become fashionable to treat 
with disdain metaphysics, which was once regarded as "the 
queen of all the sciences". 27 Nevertheless, the emergence of 
German idealism, especially the absolute idealism of Hegel, 
presumably due to its impressive ambitions towards absolute 
knowledge, the dazzling plenitude of its terminology, and the 
incomparable extensiveness of its well-structured system, 
did in certain extent succeed to mask the feeble character 
of the assertions of the first philosophy (or metaphysics) 
with regard to the complexity and stubbornness of the factual 
world. But now, when the first philosophy had got free from 
the patronage of the Christiani ty, despi te its vehement 
attempts to extol the superiority of the knowledge of 
philosophy over against that of physical sciences, it could 
no longer put t0e rein over the physical sciences again. 
Hegel, in the first part of his Enzyklopadie der 
philosophischen Wissenschaften ~m Grundrisse (1930), Die 
Wissenschaft der Logik (Die Lesser Logie) , following the route 
of Aristotle, expounded that philosophy is superior to the 
"empirical sciences" (empirische Wissenschaften) on two 
aspects, both on its objects (Gegenstanden) and its form 
(Form) . According to Hegel, philosophy is a kind of "thinking 
26. The founder of the Positivism in England, J.S. Mill, thus described 
the philosophical milieu of England in the 19th century: "The German or 
a priori view of human knowledge ... is likely for some time longer (though 
it may be hoped in a diminishing degree) to predominate among those who 
occupy themsel ves wi th such enquiries, both here and on the continent. 11 
See Rlidiger Bubner, Modern German Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), p.ix. 
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inspection of the objects" (denkende Betrachtung der 
Gegenstande) .28 It is a distinctive mode of thinking that 
through which thinking becomes "knowing and concei ving 
knowing" (Erkennen und begreifendendes Erkennen). 29 Hegel 
also called this kind of thinking the "after-thinking" 
(Nachdenken) , or "reflective thinking" (das reflektierende 
Denken) , which is more than just general thinking. Hegel 
asserted that the empirical knowledge is inferior to 
philosophical knowledge, so long as on the one hand, in regard 
to the objects, the former does not embrace certain realm of 
objects, such as freedom, spirit and God (Freiheit, Geist, 
Gatt) . This circle of objects is distinguished from the other 
circle, by no means because they do not belong to the realm 
of "experience" (Erfahrung). For, according to Hegel, they 
can also be experienced, though not sensibly (sinnlich) 
experienced, so long as they are presented in consciousness. 
This circle of objects is distinctive, rather because such 
objects present themselves as something "infinite" 
(unendlich) according to their content. 30 On the other hand, 
in regard to the form, philosophical knowledge is superior 
to empirical knowledge, because the subjective reason demands 
a satisfaction more than that can be offered by the empirical 
knowledge. It demands the form of "necessity in general" 
(Natwendigkeit uberhaupt), which can never be satisfied with 
the empirical knowledge. The reflective thinking, insofar 
as it is directed to accomplish the satisfaction of this demand 
of subjective reason, is the authentic philosophical thinking, 
27 See Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A Vlll. 
28. See Hegel, Werke 8, Enzyklopadie der philosopischen Wissenschaften 
im Grundrisse (1830), Erster Teil, Die Wissenschaft der Logik, 
(Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), S.41. I use the English word 
"inspection" to translate the German term "Betrachtung", for both have 
the meaning of "looking at something", and are thus related to the Greek 
term 8Ewp(a. And in fact, Betrachtung is the German translation of the 
term 8Ewp(a. See, for example, Metaphysik, Obers. von Franz F. Schwarz, 
(Stuttgart: ~eclam, 1970). 
29. Hegel, op. cit., S. 42. 
30. Ibid., S.51. 
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that is, in another words, the "speculative thinking" (das 
spekulative Denken) .31 As long as philosophy is the science 
that is concerned with "overcoming finite knowing in the 
acquiring of the infinite knowing", Hegel considered it to 
be superior to the empirical sciences. Therefore, Hegel simply 
designated it as "the Science" (die Wissenschaft). 32 
Concerning the superiority of first philosophy, Hegel 
stood qui te on the same line wi th Aristotle. They both 
underscore the inquiry that is concerned with the supra-
physical object, either conceived as immovable or infinite, 
and both ranked this kind of inquiry ove~ the inquiries 
concerned with physical obj ects, which are per contra movable 
and finite. They both superimpose the supra-physical (or 
meta-physical) science on the physical sciences by virtue of 
its subject matter. And they both insist on necessity. They 
demand that genuine knowledge shall carry the character of 
necessity, which can only be assured through pure deduction. 
It is therefore a demand that can hardly be fulfilled by the 
physical sciences. 
§1.4 The Estrangement of Philosophy and Science 
Indeed, Hegel and Aristotle stood quite on the same line, 
but what makes difference to the dissemination and hospi tali ty 
of their theories consists in the fact that they lived in 
different ages. The metaphysics of Aristotle was absorbed into 
the Christian dogma and the outcome of this absorption, the 
Aristotelian-Scholasticism, dominated the European minds 
throughout Middle Ages. But at the time of Hegel; the ambi tion 
to master the physical world had outstripped the religious 
zeal for the other world. Hence, the modern physical sciences, 
31. Ibid., S. 52 . 
32. Ref. Heidegger, GA32, S.15£. 
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which through two centuries of development have proved 
themselves to be able to provide the effective technique to 
control the environment, now appeared to surpass the 
metaphysics. The reference to the actual world that prornises 
instantaneously frui tful and useful effort became more 
important than the establishment of an empty logical necessi ty, 
which can satisfy no more than merely intellectual interest. 
This is, to use Max Weber's word, an age of "disenchantment" 
(Entzauberung) ;33 or, to use Heidegger's word, an age of 
"undeification" (Entgottung) .34 The "superstition on 
metaphysics" was going to be disenchanted too, following the 
destiny of its former patron. 
Although Hegel in his system of subj ecti vistic philosophy 
tried hard to uphold the superiority of philosophy over the 
physical sciences, he by no means succeeded to retrieve the 
chiefdom of philosophy in the kingdom of science. Furthermore, 
his efforts turned out unintentionally and unexpectedly to 
bring about the total breakdown of not only the subj ecti vistic 
philosophy, but also philosophy (as metaphysics) in general. 35 
The situation of philosophy (or metaphysics) after the death 
of Hegel can aptly be characterized as "the decline of 
philosophy", in . the sense that its domination amongst the 
various branches sciences was lost and its influence to the 
"cultivation" (Bildung) of the ordinary people had gradually 
diminished. The crown left by philosophy was taken over at 
first considerably by the "historical school" and then 
completely by the physical sciences. 36 
No sooner after the death of Hegel than the physical 
33. Ref. David Held, Introduction to Critical Theory, Horkheimer to 
Habermas, (8erkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 65. 
34. See Heidegger, Hz, S.76. 
35. Karl Popper said: "Ever since the rise of Hegelism there has existed 
a dangerous gulf between science and philosophy." See, Popper, ibid., 
p.69. Herbert Schnadelbach asserts that the discredit of the German 
Idealism had brought about the crisis of philosophy, see Schnadelbach, 
Philosophie in Deutschland 1831-1933, 5. Aufl., (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkarnp, 
1994), S.18. 
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sciences displaced philosophy and made themselves become the 
very model of "science" (or knowledge) . The feebleness of the 
speculative thinking of philosophy in face of the complexi ty 
of the actual world is thoroughly betrayed when it is compared 
with the promising progress and overwhelming effect of the 
physical sciences, especially with regard to the latter's 
capacity to "control the environment" and to "predict future 
experience".37 Philosophy, which had for a long time been 
regarded as "the Science", has now not only been subordinated 
to the physical sciences, but even become suspect in regard 
to its ability to achieve the status of "science". 
This intellectual milieu in question can suitably be 
described as "the estrangement between philosophy and 
science" (Entfremdung zwischen Philosophie und 
Wissenschaft) .36 It implies both the estrangement of 
philosophy with physical sciences and the estrangement of 
philosophy with knowledge. The physical sciences were 
unleashed from the yoke of theology and metaphysics. They try 
to know the world from the facts that appear to them rather 
than from the authorized holy books. And no sooner than they 
were released, they proved themselves to be the genuine 
knowledge. They then rapidly became the dictator of knowledge 
and started to exclusively define what is knowledge. In so 
far as philosophy (or -metaphysics) fails to meet the 
definition prescribed by physical sciences, it threatens to 
be deprived of the status of knowledge. 
Since the thirties of the nineteenth century, philosophy 
as an aged and once superior human achievement has fallen into 
an unprecedented "crisis". It has been compelled to prove its 
own legitimacy to be a kind of knowledge, as contrary to bare 
36. Ref. Schnadelbach, ibid., S.22f. 
3 7 f 
. Re . A.J.Ayer, for example, Language, Truth and Logic, (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1971), p.65. 
38. Ref. Gadamer, Vernunft im Zel tal ter der Wissenschaft, (Frankfurt/Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1976), S.137. Vernunft im Zeltalter der Wissenschaft, 
(Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1976), S.137. 
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opinion or imbecile fancy. 39 Philosophy seems to become 
dispensable, so long as the individual sciences have become 
"self-examination and autonomy", 40 and no more require a kind 
of absolute knowledge to be its premises or its grounding. 41 
Furthermore, the validity of the knowledge of empirical 
sciences even seems to be more evident and apparent than that 
of philosophy, that is, their former authority, which was once 
considered to be prior to them in the order of knowledge. 
Insofar as philosophy is no longer regarded as "the 
Science" and it is suspected of its scientific character, the 
relation and difference between philosophy and science (in 
the sense defined by physical sciences) has gradually become 
a main theme of the philosophical discourse in the nineteenth 
century. It is actually nothing less than a matter of the "life 
and death of philosophy". 42 For, knowledge, ElTlOTTU1T}, is the 
very ideal of European minds since the time of Ancient Greece . 
. If philosophy is not knowledge at all, it is questionable that 
whether it deserves to survive much longer. 
§l.S Reformulation of Philosophy ~n the Nineteenth 
Century 
In order to overcome this "crisis", and to fix what is the 
~ppropriate subject matter of philosophy, philosophers - or 
those who were still convinced that philosophy is still 
39. ef. Schnadelbach, ibid., S. 89. Schnadelbach formulates this as 
"Identitatkrise u of philosophy. 
40. Vide Ernst Cassirer, Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und 
Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit, Band IV, S.18. 
41. Ref. Stegmuller, ibid., S.xxxi. Also, A. J. Ayer, for example, pointed 
out that the validity of empirical sciences solely consist in the fact 
that they "enable us to predict future experience, and so to control our 
environment U and it is a mistake for the philosophers to think that it 
is th~ir business to justify the validity of the knowledge of empirical 
sciences. SeeA.J.Ayer, Language, TruthandLogic (New York: Penguin Books, 
1971), p.65 ff. 
42. Ref. Heidegger, GA56/57, S.63. 
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viable - in the last century, had ventured various paths and 
developed various theories to reformulate the problem of 
philosophy. There were on the one hand those whose minds were 
infused with . the success of physical sciences, and who felt 
confirmed with the knowledge of modern physical sciences as 
the model of whatever possible kinds of human knowledge. 
Therefore they tried to reformulate philosophy wi th in their 
mind the presupposi tions solely of the validi ty of the 
physical sciences and its method as universally applicable 
to all fields of human knowledge. Philosophy, for them, turned 
out to be nothing other than the "philosophy of science". 
Philosophy becomes, for instance, merely a discipline aimed 
at the clarification of the scientific statements. 
There were on the other hand those who felt dissatisfied 
with the physical sciences that, as Hegel had observed, some 
objects which are no less deserving to be studied than the 
physical world, for instance, life, value, and morality, are 
to a large extent neglected or even totally excluded by the 
physical scientific method. And even if these obj ects are to 
.be studied, it is for them very questionable that whether the 
physical scientific method; though profitable at the fields 
of the physical world, is applicable to the fields so 
heterogeneous to the physical ~ Therefore, they tried, rather 
than to · subjugate philosophy to the physical sciences as the 
former attempt did, to reformulate philosophy as a rival 
science of the physical sciences, to deal with those fields 
falling outside the inquires of the latter. 43 
43 b 
. Her ert Schnadelbach proposes that four types of such endeavors of 
reformulation of philosophy can be distinguished: "First, philosophy may 
seek to assimilate itself to science and to find a place in the spectrum 
of recognized research-sciences: it concentrates on historical and 
hermeneutical research and defines itself as a Geisteswissenschaft. A 
second way leads to the recognition of science itself as the philosophy 
of the age: the result is scientism (Szientismus) in a different form. 
A third type involves rejection of the traditional model of philosophy 
and the redefini tion of philosophy as cri tique, which also comes to include 
a fundamental critique of philosophy. Fourthly, and the finally, it is 
worth glancing at the various attempts to rehabilitate philosophy by 
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It was out of this chaotic situation of philosophy that 
Heidegger started his philosophical thinking, and therefore, 
his reformulation of philosophy. If one does not have certain 
understanding of this situation of philosophy, one can, I 
suppose, by no means understand the orientation of Heidegger' s 
thinking, and therefore the significance of his own effective 
transformation of this chaotic situation of philosophy before 
him. It is by virtue of this regard that I am now going to 
give a brief treatment of the situation of philosophy in 
question. And for the sake of pertinence and brevi ty, I shall 
concentrate myself on three comparably important trends that 
molded the philosophical situation at issue as well as exerted 
a considerable influence on Heidegger. These trends are 
positivism, neo-Kantianism, and phenomenology. 
1.5.1 Positivism 
The time of the rise of the positivism overlapped with the 
time of the differentiation and breakdown of the system of 
Hegel. Already in. 1930, three years before the death of Hegel, 
Auguste Comte, the founder of the positivism or positive 
philosophy, had published the first volume of his notorious 
Cours de philosoph.ie positive (1830-42). And then in 1943, 
just after the Cours of Comte was finished, J.S. Mill, both 
a friend and an adherent of the positivism of Comte, published 
his major work, A System of Logic, ratiocinative and inductive, 
which spread the seeds of posi ti vism into England, though not 
without significant nuances with Comte's version. 44 
Positivism took over and put forwards as its · basic 
finding a new foundation of its take and methods." See Schnadelbach, ibid., 
S.119: English translation, Philosophy in Germany 1831-1933, trans. Eric 
Matthews, p.93. 
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principles what has in the nineteenth century already been 
widely accepted and long-time practiced by the physical 
sciences. Hence its doctrines are basically determined by the 
mode of knowing of the modern physical sciences. It sets out 
with the presupposition of the universal validity of the 
physical scientific knowledge and its method. It is from this 
point on that Comte conceived a history of human knowledge 
(ironical enough to his "positive" claim, this may well be 
regarded as a "philosophy of history" (Geschichts-
philosophie) ) ,45 which is composed of three stages, starting 
from theology, mediated with metaphysics and ending with 
science. Comte asserted that the first stage "must be 
comprehended as merely provisional and preparing", and the 
second stage, that is, the metaphysical stage, which "actually 
only presents a dissolving variant of the first stage", always 
carries a "transitional determination to lead gradually into 
the third stage".46 The third stage, namely the scientific 
stage, contrary to the two stages before it, is "alone 
completely normal (according to norm)", and amounts to the 
"final reign of the human reason". 47 
The third stage is distinctive that it confines itself to 
the inquiry about the "region of genuine observation 
(Beobachtung) , namely, the unique possible foundation of the 
actually accessible knowledge and the knowledge appropriate 
to our factual demand", 48 as contrary to the inquiry dominated 
by the imagination in metaphysics. That which is accessible 
and determinable in the observation is called the "positive", 
a term that comes from Latin, and generally means the "given 
facts" (das Gegebene, die Tatsachen). It is this insistence 
44. Ref. Cassirer, op. cit., p.6 ff. 
45. Ref. Habermas, Erkenntnis und Interesse, 11. Aufl. (Frankfurt/ Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1994), S.92. 
46. Auguste Comte, Discours sur l' espri t posi tif, quoted from Geschichte 
der Phi1osophie in Text und Darste11ung, 19. Jahrhundert, hrsg. von 
Manfred Riedel, (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1991), S.270. 
47. Ibid., S. 270. 
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on the "positive" as the foundation of all genuine human 
knowledge that gave rise to its name "posi ti v-ism". In so far 
as the positivism asserted that science as the genuine 
knowledge shall be confined to the inquiry on the "posi ti ve", 
the concept of "science" for the posi ti vism therefore depends 
on its conception of the "posi ti ve". Comte provided a detailed 
analysis of the meaning of the word ~'posi ti ve" in his discourse 
on the spirit of positivism. With the "positive", Comte 
referred to the factual in opposite to the merely imaginary 
(reel - chimerique); to that which can claim certainty in 
opposite to indecision (certitude - l'indecision); to the 
precise in distinction to the vague (le precis - le vague) ; 
to the useful in opposite to the vain (l'utile - l'oiseux); 
and to what claims relative validity in opposite to the 
absolute (le rela tif - l' absol u) .49 
The "positive", according to Comte, is the sole source, 
or foundation, of genuine scientific knowledge. It is 
precisely the limitation to the inquiry about the "positive" 
that distinguishes science from the metaphysics, which 
treasures as its object freedom, spirit, and God, which are 
by no means accessible to observations. Hence, in accordance 
with this restriction to the relative facts as the sole source 
of knowledge, Comte rejected any inquiry about the "origin" 
and "ultimate causes", which are the traditional topics of 
metaphysics, as formulated by Aristotle, and precisely by 
virtue of which metaphysics was granted his prestige. 
Metaphysics, which was ambitious to achieve the knowledge of 
the ultimate causes, was thus discriminated by Comte as the 
"negative philosophy" from those "positive" inquiries that 
\ 
confine themselves to the field of relative facts. And the 
principles of metaphysics - for instance, "the principle of 
sufficient reason" (der Satz von Grunde) were then 
48. Ibid., S.281. 
49. Ref. Jlirgen Haberrnas, Erkenntnis und Interesse, S.95f. 
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disregarded as "meaningless".5o 
It is worthy noticing that it is by virtue of the criterion 
of the restriction to the positive that metaphysics, which 
was once regarded as the "first philosophy", or first science, 
was deported from the realm of "science", and became a 
despicable discipline, which was considered to have carried 
the relics of the more antiquarian religion, and thus, to 
represent the incomplete development of human reason, as 
contrary to its complete development in the science. It was 
said from the very beginning of this treatise that the 
separation between philosophy and science by no means 
prevailed before the nineteenth century. Actually, the rlse 
of the positivism is a landmark of this separation . 
. Although the positivism of Comte set forth as its major 
tenet the rej ection of metaphysical knowledge, it by no means 
implies that it is in complete accord with the doctrines of 
the "empiricism". Comte pointed out that "it is important to 
rightly understand that the authentic positive spirit is 
basically far away from the empiricism so much as from the 
mysticism".51 Rather than just attaching to the individual 
facts, it aims at acquiring "the laws (Gesetze), the constant 
relation which subsists between the observed phenomena.,,52 
Besides, in spite of its depreciation of the metaphysics, 
the positivism, as formulated at first by Comte, actually 
shares some ideas with the metaphysics, which was supposed 
to fall short of the character of science, or knowledge. Above 
all, they both embrace the idea of a unified system of all 
human sciences, though their approaches to realize this idea 
are quite different. Whereas the metaphysics tried to 
50. Ref. Reidel, Geschichte der Philosophie in Text und Darstellllng, 19. 
Jahrhundert, S.268; Also Habermas, Ope cit., S.103 f. 
51. Reidel, Ope cit., S.285. 
52. Riedel, Ope cit., S.282. The aiming at the "law" between phenomena, 
according to Cassirer, precisely distinguishes Comte from Mill. For Mill, 
there · are only aggregate held together by the induction rather than 
constant connections between facts. Vide. Cassirer, Ope cit., S.14. 
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construct such a unified system as the grounding of all 
sciences solely through the speculative thinking, the 
positivism presupposed the validity of the modern ' physical 
sciences as the model of human knowledge, and thus tried to 
construct a formal and universal methodology for all possible 
kinds of knowledge by extending the physical-scientific 
method to the fields outside the physical: Comte had tried 
to establish sociology as the basic science through the 
application of the method of physical sciences into the human 
and social phenomena. 
And J.S. Mill, on the sixth book of his System of Logic, 
"On the Logic of the Moral Sciences", following the conception 
of David Hume, tried to transplant the way of thinking, or 
the method, of the physical sciences, especially, the 
inductive logic, to the "moral sciences", and to develop a 
logic for the latter. By the "moral sciences", 'Mill does not 
mean the study of the morality, but it is precisely what is 
excluded from the class of moral sciences, so long as it 
contains normative elements. Mill used the term "moral 
sciences" to refer to "those branches of study which deal with 
man, provided that they are n~ither strictly normative in 
character nor classifiable as parts of physical science".53 
In short, "moral sciences" was generally referred to those 
disciplines which are today accustomed to be called human 
sciences or humanities, including psychology, ethnology, 
sociology, history et cetera. And as a matter of facts, the 
German term for the "human sciences", Geisteswissenschaften, 
which has already become a fashionable term nowadays even in 
the English-speaking world, was introduced into German 
through the translation of Mill's System of Logic. 54 
53. Vide Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. VIII (London: 
Burns and Oates, 1966), p.78. 
54. Ref. Gadamer, Wahrhei t und Methode, 6. Auflage, (Tlibingen: Mohr, 1990), 
s. 9. Also see Kbhnke, Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantianismus, 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1993), s. 137; English transi tion: The Rise of 
Neo-Kantianism, trans. R.J.Hollingdale, (Cambridge: Carr~ridge 
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1.5.2 Neo-Kantianism 
The neo-Kantianism, which held a dominant posi tion in the 
academic circle of Germany in the second half of the nineteenth 
century , despite its internal variety, can be generally 
regarded as the "German counterpart" of the positivism. I call 
it the "German counterpart" of the positivism because it 
presupposed, so well as the positivism, the knowledge of the 
modern physical sciences as the model of human knowledge, and 
thus tried to reformulate philosophy in face of this very 
paradigm of human knowledge. This presupposition may well be 
corroborated by the watchword of Marburg School, which 
asserted to set out from the "fact of science".55 And, like 
the positivism, the neo-Kantianism also rejected the 
metaphysical tradition of philosophy, especially the 
Hegelian Idealism, which just preceded the neo-Kantianism to 
dominate the Germany intellectual scene. It tried to bury the 
queer speculation, which is by no means compatible with the 
evidence of modern sciences and appears to be nothing but the 
"craziest mystifying nonsense",56 and thus to make room for 
a new "scientific philosophy", which will establish its 
footing on nowhere but the facts of modern sciences~ 
The heo-Kantianism endeavored to overcome the speculative 
metaphysics by returning to the critical philosophy of Kant, 
which, they think, was conceived out of the presupposition 
of the Newtonian physics as the model of human knowledge. This 
interpretation of the approach of Kantian philosophy is to 
certain extent conformed by the Prolegomena, in which Kant 
seems to have gone out from the facts of the physical. 
University Press, 1991),p.88. 
55. Ret. Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke, Bd.10, S.358. 
56. The comment of Schopenhauer on Hegel, quoted from Popper, Open Society 
and its Enemies, Vol.2, p.33. 
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sciences. 57 It is by virtue of this appeal to retrieve the 
Kantian approach that these reformers of philosophy gained 
the name "neo-Kantianism". Under the watchword "Back to 
Kant" (Zuriick zu Kant) ,58 the neo-Kantianism attempted to 
reformulate philosophy as the "knowledge-theory" (or 
epistemology, Erkenntnistheorie), which was conceived as the 
inquiry about the "source of our knowledge", 59 or more 
precisely, the condi tion of the validi ty of the human 
knowledge. It tried to replace the metaphysics with the 
knowledge-theory to be the foundation of philosophy. The 
neo-Kantians proclaimed that the knowledge-theory, as it is 
exemplified by the first half of the Kri tik der reinen Vernunft, 
is the real core of the critical philosophy of Kant. Hence 
they regarded such concepts as "thing in itself" (Ding an sich) 
as only the remnants of metaphysics, and tried to dismiss them 
from the system of critical philosophy. 
The concept "Erkenntnistheorie", which has already been 
taken for granted today as one of the basic components of 
philosophy that as if it had long been the case in the remote 
past of philosophy, is actually only a terminology recently 
coined in the nineteenth century. Although the emergence of 
this concept could well be traced to the 20s of the nineteenth 
century, it was largely by virtue of Eduard Zeller' s inaugural 
lecture at Heidelberg in 1862, "Uber Bedeutung und Aufgabe 
der Erkenntnistheorie" (On the meaning and task of the 
knowledge-theory), that it became widespread as a thematic 
57. Ref. Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science, p.152. 
58 Hermann von Helmhol tz was amongst the first to provoke the watchword 
"Back to Kant" through his celebrated lecture on Kant, "Ober das Sehen 
des Menschen", delivered in 1955. Ref. Cassirer, Ope cit., S.ll, p.3; 
Also Schnadelbach, Ope cit., S.132; and Kohnke, Ope cit., S.151 f, p.96f. 
And this was brought to its climax by Otto Liebmann, each chapter of whose 
book Kant und die Epigone of 1865 is ended with the motto "Also muE auf 
Kant zuriickgegangen werden. " See Schnadelbach, op. ci t., S. 308 n328; Also 
Kohnke~ Ope cit., S.214 f, p.138 f. 
59. Von Helmholtz, "Ober das Sehen des Menschen", quoted from Schnadelbach, 
Ope cit., S.133. 
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program of the neo-Kantianism. 60 This address can well express 
the content of the program of the Erkenntnistheorie. Zeller 
says therein: 
How we have to proceed in order to obtain correct 
representations can only be judged according to the 
conditions under which the formation of our representations 
is bound up by the nature of our spirit. It is just these 
conditions that the Erkenntnistheorie ought to investigate 
and to determine, accordingly, whether and under which 
presuppositions the human spirit is capable of reaching the 
knowledge of the truth. 61 
At first, the neo-Kantianism concentrated itself to find 
out the conditions of the knowledge solely of the physical 
sciences, as represented by the approach of the Marburg School. 
This approach actually turned philosophy into the "philosophy 
of science" with little difference to the approach of the 
posi ti vism, except that the former laid its claim on the name 
of Erkenntnistheorie rather than on methodology. 62 Therefore, 
some scholars of the neo-Kantianism could say that "Kant the 
epistemologist stands so closely related to it that Comte 
could have been his pupil"63 and that it turned out to be "a 
synthesis out of the Kantianism and positivism".64 But soon 
a turning took place wi thin the neo-Kantianism. This turning, 
which was led by the representative of the Southwest German 
School, Wilhelm Windelband, a "former positivist and 
60. Ref. Kohnke, op. cit., S.175, p.113; Also, article "Erkenntnistheorie", 
in Historisches Wdrterbuch der Philosophie, Band 2: D-F, hrsg. von Joachim 
Ritter (Stuttgart: Schwabe & Co, 1972). 
61. Zeller, "Ober Bedeutung und Aufgabe der Erkenntnistheorie", quoted 
from Cassirer, op. cit., S.13; See also Schnadelbach, op. cit., S.134f. 
In this treatise, for the sake of coherence, all English quotation from 
German texts, except for further indication, are translated anew from 
the German text, with constant reference to the extant English 
translation. 
62. Ref. Riedel, op. cit., S.330. 
63. Vide Kohn ke , op . c it., S. 395 , p. 25"7 . 
64. Ibid., S.406, p.263. 
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relativist",65 sought to extend the Erkenntnistheorie inquiry 
into other fields of knowledge apart from the physical 
sciences. 
Windelband tried to reformulate philosophy as the 
"critical science of universally valid values", 66 rather than 
the theory of the physical scientific experience. This 
approach brought about a close relation between the neo-
Kantianism, mainly the Southwest German School, with the 
recently emerging historical (or cultural, or human) sciences. 
However, its emphasis on the cultural sciences as well as the 
physical sciences notwi thstanding, this school of neo-
Kantianism tried to found a critical axiology that governs 
the "scientific knowledge", no matter physical or cultural, 
rather than to probe into the reality of the different sciences 
and distinguish the principles for their differentiation. 
Therefore, its theories turned out to be nothing other than 
an empty logical structure. 67 Besides, the working out of this 
axiology remains largely determined by the mode of knowing 
of the physical sciences, in so far as the Southwest German 
School actually affirmed the paradigmatic status of the 
knowledge of the modern physical sciences as much as the 
Marburg School. The "condition of knowledge", which they tried 
to work out, through claims to be the "presuppositions" of 
the scientific knowledge, both physical and cultural, 
actually are derived out of the "fact of science" rather than 
from the reality itself. What they tried to work out as the 
"presuppositions" of the scientific knowledge is actually 
something which is already presented by the special sciences 
as their result. They just tried to judge which are the 
presuppositions out of these results by setting up a so-called 
65 Ibid., 8. 407, p. 264 . 
66. Ibid., 8.416, p.269. 
67. Ref., for example, Heidegger, GA20, 8.20 f; Also, Charles R. Bambach, 
Heidegger, Dil they, and the Crisis of Historicism, (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1995), p.57 ff. 
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"cri tical method". 68 
Hence, we can still consider the neo-Kantianism as a whole, 
including both the Marburg School and the Southwest German 
School, to be the "German counterpart" of the positivism, in 
so far as they both pose the knowledge of the modern sciences 
as their premises, and tried to set up the concept of "science", 
and the idea of philosophy, on the basis of them. 
1.5.3 Phenomenology 
Phenomenology is the first anti-positivist philosophical 
trend that gained far-reaching influence in the academic 
circle of Germany after the death of Hegel. Its significance 
can well be understood for everyone who is ready to put an 
eye on its ambition and in certain sense succeeded attempts 
to break a new road out of the positivistic mist that in the 
second half of the nineteenth century almost covered all 
scientific domains. What seems to ,be more significant than 
just its anti-positivistic character is that phenomenology 
also claimed itself to be a science (and even a "rigorous 
science") and, astonishing enough, at the same time 
disregarded (or more precisely, suspended) the validity of 
the modern physical sciences from the very beginning. The 
success of phenomenology illustrates that the educated minds 
of Europe started to feel dissatisfied with the positivism, 
and tended to accept another kind of scientificality 
(Wissenschaftlichkeit) , which is not determined by the mode 
of knowing of the modern physical sciences. 
Phenomenology was found by Edmund Husserl. It began with 
his groundbreaking book, the Logische Untersuchungen, the 
66. For the dependence of the "teleological-cri tical method" of the 
Southwest German school on the "material-giving" (Materialvorgebung) by 
the psychology and history, ref. Heidegger, GA56/57, 8.38ff; see also 
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first volume of which was published in 1900, and its second 
volume published a year later was entitled precisely as 
" untersuchungen zur Phanomenologie und Theorie der 
Erkenntnis" (Investigations to Phenomenology and theory of 
the knowledge). This work starts with the discussion of the 
problematic of logic and the idea of pure logic, and is then 
developed into a "pure phenomenology of the thinking- and 
knowledge-lived-experience (reinen Phanomenologie derDenk-
und Erkenntniserlebnisse)", which was supposed to be the 
ground of the pure logic that it "discloses the 'source' 
(Quelle) out of which the basic-concepts and the ideal law 
of the pure logic spring". 69 This so ini tiated "pure 
phenomenology" was then considered by Husserl to be not only 
the ground of pure logic, but also the grounding science of 
all special sciences, in so far as they are knowledge and arise 
out of the "knowledge-lived-experience". In short, 
phenomenology was conceived by Husserl to be the ultimate 
foundation (Letztbegrundung) of all human knowledge. 
The "pure phenomenology", contrary to the positivism, 
which regards the sensibly observable "fact" (Tatsache) as 
the sole source of human knowledge, is concerned with the 
"lived-experience, which is graspable and analyzable in the 
intuition, in pure essence-universality", as the source of 
knowledge. 70 It wants to bring the abstractly used and 
gradually worn-out concepts back to their intuitive source, 
and thus to "knowledge-theoretical clarity and 
distinctness".71 The insistence of intuition as the source of 
knowledge was formulated out by Husserl in Ideen I as "the 
principle of all principles": 
Chapter Two of this treatise. 
69. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, 7., Aufl., (TUbingen: Niemeyer, 1993) 
[hereafter, abbv. as "LU"], Vol. 11/1, S.2 f. 
70. Ibid., S. 2 . 
71. Ibid., S. 5 . 
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that every originally giving intuition is a 
legitimate-source (Rechtsquelle) of knowledge, that 
whatever presents itself to us originally in the "intuition", 
is to be simply accepted as what it gives itself. 72 
Yet, it is worthy noticing that the concept of intuition 
as used by phenomenology hereby can not be understood in a 
narrow sense of the "sensible intuition",73 but must rather 
be understood generally as "the manner of the confirming of 
a meaning on the meant things themselves", 74 so that it could 
encompass both the intuition of a concrete thing and the 
intui tion of the ideal or the essence. This approach to confirm 
the abstract concepts on the intui ti ve things themselves was 
succinctly summarized under the famous slogan of 
phenomenology: "To the things themselves" (Zu den Sachen 
selbst) .75 
The inquiry into the source of knowledge led Husserl into 
the development of phenomenology as a science of "pure 
consciousness", which is developed out of its contrast the 
psychology, which is concerned with "empirical 
consciousness".76 However, in so far as both of which are 
concerned with the same phenomena, namely, the psychical 
. 
phenomena, the - distinction between phenomenology and 
psychology consists actually not so much in their objects than 
in their respective attitude towards the object. 
Phenomenology tried to approach the psychical phenomena 
72. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen 
Philosophie, Allgemeine EinfiJhrung in die reine Phanomenologie, 5. Aufl. , 
(Tubingen: Max Niemeyer, 1993) [hereafter, abbv. as "Ideen I"], S.43 f. 
73. Vide GA20, S.64. 
74. Vide GA32, S.28. 
75. Vide Husserl, LU, Vol.II/1, S.6; Also Heidegger, SZ, S.27, 34. For 
the implication of this slogan, see also Eugen Fink, "The Phenomenological 
Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Cri ticism", in The 
Phenomenology of Husserl, ed. and trans. R. O. Elveton, (Chicago: 
Quadrangel Books, 1970), p.79. 
76. Vide, for instance, Husserl, "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft", 
in Husserliana Band XXV: Aufsatze und Vortrage (1911-1921), hrsg. von 
Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp. (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) 
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through the "phenomenological atti tude" (phanomenologischen 
Einstellung) , which takes the phenomena in question as they 
present themselves. Psychology, on the contrary, 
investigates the psychical phenomena by borrowing the method 
of the physical sciences, and is thus completely determined 
by the "naturalistic attitude" (naturalistischen 
Einstellung) .77 It tries to determine the psychical phenomena 
out of their relation wi th the physical phenomena, and 
therefore its determinations are actually "psychophysical" 
rather than merely psychical. 78 
The disclosing of "pure consciousness", namely, of the 
"consciousness in the phenomenological attitude", according 
to Husserl, will open up a sphere which is wholly different 
from the physical sphere,79 and will set forth "a great, 
unparalleled consequential science, which is on the one hand 
the basic-condition for a completely scientific psychology, 
and on the other hand the field of the genuine reason-
critique. ,,80 Hence, in so far as Husserl proclaimed to set forth 
"a great science" on the inquiry of the pure consciousness, 
it is obvious that even if he denunciated the psychophysical 
approach of psychology as an approach determined by the 
physical sciences, it by no means implies that "he was trying 
to repudiate at the same time the claim of science. Husserl 
says: 
To recognize the naturalism (Naturalismus) as a 
fundamentally erroneous philosophy does not mean to give up 
the idea of a rigorously scientific philosophy, of a 
[hereafter,abbv. as "Logos-essay"], 8.17. 
77. Ibid., 8.31. 
78. Ibid., 8.13. 
79. Ibid., 8.28. For instance, Husserl says: "All the psychical have ... 
ordering in a comprehensive connection, in a 'monadic' unity of the 
consciousness, a unity which in itself has nothing to do with hature, 
with space and time, substantiality, and causality, but has its wholly 
unique 'form'." (Ibid., 8.30) 
80. Ibid., 8. 32 . 
- 38 -
"philosophy from the bottom". The cri tical separation of the 
psychological and phenomenological methods shows in the 
latter the true way towards a scientific theory of reason and, 
by the same token, towards an adequate psychology.81 
In fact, Husserl tried to develop newly a kind of science that 
is even more "rigorous" than the physical sciences, all of 
which are bound to the naturalism. And furthermore, this 
to-be-worked-out science, which is concerned with the 
"essence" (Wesen) rather than the "fact" . (Tatsache) , 
according to Husserl, will precisely turn out to be the science, 
upon which all factual or empirical sciences are dependent, 
but not vice versa. 82 Actually, this new science is nothing 
other than a reformulation of the idea of philosophy as 
"rigorous science" , 83 "universal science" , 84 "all-
encompassing science'.', and "the One philosophy". 85 
Husserl, though trained as a scientist before engaging 
himself on philosophy and brought up in an intellectual 
si tuation dominated by the posi ti ve sciences, was amongst the 
first who felt dissatisfied with the "positivistic 
restriction of the science-idea", 86 and tried to overcome this 
"skeptical negativism (which calls itself positivism) "87 by 
the reformulation ' of philosophy as ' ''universal science" -
certainly with a sense of "science" which is utterly different 
from that is defined by the modern physical sciences. 
According to Husserl, the positivistic concept of science is 
81. Ibid., S. 41 . 
82. Vide Ideen I, S.18. 
83. Logos:"essay, S.45, 47, 51 ff. 
84. Vide Husserl, Cartesianische Medi ta tionen, hrsg. von Elisabeth Stroker, 
2., durchges. Aufl., (Hamburg: Meiner, 1987) [hereafter, abbv. as "CM"J, 
S. 3; also idem, "Der Encyclopaedia Bri tannica Artikel", in 
Phanomenologische Psychologie, Husserliana Band IX, hrsg. von WaIter 
Biemel, 2. Aufl., (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968) [hereafter abbv. 
as "EB-article"], S. 296. 
85. Vide Husserl, Die Krisis der europaischen Wissenschaften und die 
transzendentale Phanomenologie, hrsg. von Elisabeth Stroker, 3. Aufl., 
(Hamburg: Meiner, 1996) [hereafter, abbv. as "Krisis"], S.7. 
86. Ibid., S. 6. 
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only a "remnant-concept" (Restbegriff) , which dropped all the 
questions related to metaphysics, namely those questions 
concerning "the highest and ultimate".ss It means that the 
posi ti vistic concept of science, which is precisely the 
concept of science in vogue nowadays, is only a remnant of 
the ancient concept of science, which not only includes 
metaphysics as a branch of science, but even ranks metaphysics 
as the "highest science" on behalf of the superiority of its 
subject-matter. This restriction of the concept of science, 
according to Husserl, brought about the neglect of the 
questions decisive for humanity. Husserl says: 
The exclusiveness with which the total world-view of 
modern man, in the second half of the nineteenth century, let 
itself be determined by the posi ti ve sciences and be blinded 
by the "prosperity" they produced, meant an indifferent 
turning-away from the questions which are decisive for a 
genuine humanity. Mere facts-sciences make mere facts-men 
(BloBe Tatsachenwissenschaften machen bloBe Tatsachen-
menschen) .89 
Those questions, which are decisive for the humanity, or 
more precisely, the "European humanity" (europaische 
Menschentum) , are, for Husserl, the "questiqns of reason". 
For, the European humani ty was established on the distinction 
between "reason and unreason". "What does it hold to be 
essential to the ancient man? After some hesitations, nothing 
other than the 'philosophical' existence-form (Daseinsform) : 
that freely gives itself, its whole life, its rule out of pure 
reason, out of philosophy", 90 Husserl says. The questions of 
reason, including the God-problem (Gottesproblem) , the 
question of immortality (die Frage der Unsterblichkeit) , and 
87. Logos-essay, S.60. 
88. Kr is is, S. 8 . 
89. Ibid., S. 4 . 
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the ,question of freedom (die Frage der Freihei t) ,91 was from 
the dawn of European humanity contained in the questions of 
metaphysics. These questions as the questions of reason was 
regarded as those which "surpass the world as universe of the 
mere facts", and "claim a higher dignity against the questions 
of facts, which were once subordinated to the former in the 
question-ordering" . 92 However, these questions of reason are 
precisely those which are neglected and even rej ected by the 
positivism as the "metaphysical questions". By doing so, the 
positivism not only "decapitates philosophy" (as 
metaphysics), but also the "faith in reason", and the~efore 
eventually, the European humanity. "If man loses this faith 
[in reason], it therefore means nothing other than: he loses 
the faith in himself, in the true Being proper to him.,,93 
The "crisis of philosophy", which was brought about by the 
rejection of the metaphysical questions out of the realm of 
science, according to Husserl, "also implies the crisis of 
modern sciences". 94 For Husserl was convinced that "sciences 
in the plural, all those ever to be established and all those 
under working, are only dependent branches of "the One 
philosophy".95 All Husserl's effort to develop out the 
phenomenology was to newly reformulate the idea of philosophy 
as the "universal science", and thus to overcome this crisis. 
This overcoming is nothing less than "a struggle for Dasein, 
namely, as a struggle of the philosophy which lives out itself 
straightforward in its task - the philosophy in naIve faith 
in reason - with the skepticism which negates or repudiates 
it empirically". 96 
This new science is founded on the disclosing of a field, 
90 Ibid. , S.6. 
91 Ibid. , S. 8. 
92 Ibid. , S. 8. 
93 Ibid. , S .12. 
94 Ibid. , S .12. 
95 Ibid. , S.7 . . 
96 Ibid. , S.13. 
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namely, "the pure consciousness", which is universal to, and 
constructive for, the special sciences. And therefore the 
scientificality of this new science, accordingly, can only 
be accounted out of this field, and never out of the standard 
prescribed by the modern physical sciences. And in far as it 
is the special sciences that are dependent on philosophy as 
universal science, and not vice versa, the method and the 
results of the special sciences are in no ways applicable to 
philosophy, which is prior to them. "However, philosophy lies 
in a completely new dimension. It demands completely new 
departure-point (Ausgangspunkte) and a completely new method, 
which distinguishes it from any 'natural' sciences", 97 Husserl 
says. 
In accordance with its maxim, "To the things themselves", 
phenomenology demands that the appropriate method for the 
investigation of the subject-matter shall be derived and 
developed out of the subject-matter, rather than out of any 
established conceptions and prejudices. "The true method 
follows the nature of the matter to be investigated, but not 
our prejudices and preconceptions", 98 Husserl says. Following 
this. principle, Husserl developed out the renowned 
"phenomenological method", which includes the procedures of 
the "phenomenological ElTOXi) " , the "phenomenological 
reduction", and the "eidetic reduction", through which the 
field for the new science, namely the pure consciousness, is 
"accessible to us" and secured, and the invariable structure 
of it is figured out. 99 
97. Husserl, Die Idee der Phanomenologie, Funf Vorlesungen, hrsg. von Paul 
Janssen, (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986) [hereafter, abbv. as "Idee"], S.24. 
98 L 2 
. ogos-essay, S. 6. 
99 V' d f . 3 
. le, or lnstance, Husserl ,Idee, S. ff ; also, idem., Ideen I, S. 5 6ff; 
idem., EB-article, S.281 ff. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
PHILOSOPHY AS PRIMAL SCIENCE 
As well as his own characterization of the emergence of 
the phenomenological movement, which Heidegger himself is 
considered to be a participant, his philosophical thinking 
also grew out of the "historical situation of philosophy in 
the last decades of the nineteenth century". 1 Heidegger 
himself has aptly pointed out that this situation was 
determined by "the transformation of the scientific 
consciousness".2 Through this transformation, physical 
sciences replaced philosophy (metaphysics) becoming the 
model of science (or knowledge). The scientific status of 
philosophy becomes suspect, so long as its knowledge claim 
and its method is considered to be at variance with that of 
the physical-sciences. This transformation resulted in the 
"the estrangement between philosophy and science". 
Philosophy is bogged down in the predicament. It seems that 
if it i~ to preserve its status as a science, it has to do 
no other things but claim its allegiance to the physical 
sciences and reshape itself as the "philosophy of science".3 
Otherwise, philosophy would threaten to be banished from the 
dignified realm of science. As we have mentioned above, there 
were on the one hand the positivism, emerging in France and 
England, and the neo-Kantianism, as the German counterpart 
. See Heidegger~ GA20, S.13. 
2. See GA20, S.13. 
3. Bubner, for instance, says: "From that time on, philosophy has claimed 
legi timacy for itself largely as the theory of science." See Bubner, op. 
ci t. P. 4. . -
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of posi ti vism, both of which tried to newly found a scientific 
philosophy by setting the knowledge of physical sciences as 
the paradigm of knowledge. And there were on the other hand 
various reactions to this "philosophy of science", amongst 
the most successful attempts of which is the phenomenology 
of Husserl. 
It is the task of the present treatise to give a treatment 
of Heidegger's reformulation of philosophy in his early 
thinking in face of this tumultuous philosophical situation. 
In this chapter, I will concentrates myself on Heidegger's 
first course held after his return to Freiburg from the war 
service, "Die Idee der Philosophie und das 
Wel tanschauungsproblem" ("The Idea of philosophy and the 
world-view problems"), in the "War Emergency Semester" 
(Kr:iegsnotsemester) in 1919. But before going into this, some 
remarks on the divisions of the different periods of 
Heidegger's thinking will be given at first. 
§2.1 Remark on the Division of Heidegger's Periods 
of Thinking 
Since Heidegger' s self-portrait of his Kehre in the Brief 
uber den Humanismus, many discussions about the division of 
the periods of Heidegger's thinking have been provoked. In 
so far as the present treatise attempts a treatment of 
Heidegger's reformulation of philosophy in his early thinking, 
in order to make clear the confine of this treatment, I am 
now going to give some remarks on this issue. 
In this essay, concerning "the early thinking of 
Heidegger" , it generally means a period of Heidegger's 
thinking which approximately extends from the year 1919 to 
1929. And under this general periodization of Heidegger's 
"early thinking", two more concise sub-divisions, I suppose, 
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could also be sorted out. These two sub-divisions are: the 
pre-5Z-period and the 5Z-period. The pre-5Z-period means 
Heidegger's period of thinking extending approximately from 
the year 1919 to 1924. And the 5Z-period means his period of 
thinking from 1924 to 1929. These two sub-divisions are 
further sorted out under the general rubric of "Heidegger's 
early thinking", because, I suppose, although Heidegger's 
thinking from 1919 to 1929 could be well put together to 
distinguish it from his "late thinking", it itself by no means 
follows a straightforward development that it can be further 
divided into two periods of thinking simply in r~gard of their 
various predominant subj ect-matter. And these further 
divisions can, as will be shown below, much enhance our 
understanding of Heidegger's early thinking as a whole, in 
. contradistinction to his late thinking. 
The predominant subject-matter of the pre-SZ-period is 
life (Leben). It is concerned with the establishment of a new 
science of the factical. life, which is supposed by Heidegger 
as utterly different from all the particular sciences. On the 
contrary, the predominant subj ect-matter of the SZ-period is 
Being (Sein) . The main character of this period can be briefly 
described as fol~owing: Its basic question is the question 
of the meaning of Being in general, and it tried to work out 
and answer this question in a fundamental-ontological way, 
that is, by way of an existential analysis of a special kind 
of beings, Dasein, to which always belongs a kind of 
Being-understanding. The representative work of this period 
certainly is Sein und Zeit, which was published in 1927, 
roughly at the middle of the early period in general. Therefore, 
I ca 11 t his pe r i od (192 4 -1 92 9 ) the "S Z (S e in un d Z ei t ) -pe r i od" 
and the period before it (1919-1924) the "pre-SZ-period". 
The year 1919 is chosen to be the starting point of the 
early period in general and ~lso of the pre-SZ-period because 
it is precisely a groundbreaking year both for Heidegger's 
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philosophical and religious development. The details of this 
breakthrough will be discussed only in next section. 
I choose the year 1924 as the approximate ending point of 
the pre-5Z-period and starting point of the 5Z-period because 
it can be seen that in this year several "decisions", which 
would completely direct Heidegger's formulation of 
philosophy in the 5Z-period, had been firmly made. The details 
of these decisions will only be discussed in the following 
chapters. Now, in this section only two indications will be 
pointed out. First, in the July of 1914, Heidegger delivered 
a lecture, entitled "Der Begriff der Zeit", to the Marburg 
Theological Society, and this lecture is regarded by the 
Heidegger scholars as the "primitive form" (Urform) of 5Z. 4 
And besides, in the winter semester of 1924-25, the question 
of Being in general, which would become the predominant 
subject-matter of the 5Z-period, was first posed overtly in 
the lecture course on Plato's 50phists. 5 
The year 1929 is chosen to be the approximate end point 
of the 5Z-period because in this year Heidegger published his 
Kantbuch, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, the division 
four of which is probably Heidegger' s last resort to present 
in a systematic way the idea of a fundamental ontology and 
to work out the question of Being in general out of it. And 
on 24th July of the same year, Heidegger delivered his inaugural 
lecture in Freiburg, which signifies his succession of the 
position of Husserl, both his chair in Freiburg and his leading 
role inside the circle of academic philosophy, and his 
complete and overt detachment from Husserl's phenomenology. 
Already in the treatise Vom Wesen des Grundes presented in 
the same year, which precisely serves as the Festschrift for 
This is the word of Gadarner, see Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of 
Heidegger's Being and Time, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1993) p.315. 
5. Ref. Kisiel, op. cit., p.318. According to Kisiel, Heideggeranalyzed 
the question of Being on February 10, 1925. See, Kisiel, op. cit., p.478. 
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Husserl on his seventieth birthday, Heidegger explicitly 
proclaimed that Husserl's concept of the intentionality of 
consciousness is only possible on the ground of his concept 
of the transcendence of Dasein. 6 Then in next year, in 1930, 
Heidegger delivered a public lecture, entitled "Vom Wesen der 
Wahrhei t", which can be regarded as the breakthrough of 
another period, in so far as Heidegger himself pointed out 
that "a certain insight into the thinking of the turn (Kehre) 
from 'Being and Time' to 'Time and Being'" is given in this 
lecture. 7 
The time of Heidegger' s thinking after the year 1930 till 
Heidegger's death in 1976 is generally referred in this essay 
as his "later thinking", though there was not without signs 
of change wi thin this long endurance of nearly half a century 
of time. The "later thinking" is referred to the thinking of 
Heidegger after the Kehre. It has already been well known that 
there was a "turn" (Kehre) happening to Heidegger In the 
thirties. It led to a very different approach to the 
Being-question from the approach ventured In the 5Z-period. 
According to the testimony of Heidegger himself, the 
"misunderstanding (Verkennung) of the question of Being as 
posed in 5ein l1nd Zei t" had already become clear in 1929. And 
the Kantbuch published in 1929 is precisely the "refuge" 
(Zuflucht) in face of this hindrance against the understanding 
of the question of Being, and thus the interpretation of Kant 
herein is basically arranged into the framework of 5Z. 8 The 
Kehre, as the overcoming of metaphysics, was not achieved 
until the end of thirties. 9 Standing in the middle of the period 
of carrying out the Kehre is the lecture course given in the 
6. See Vom Wesen des Grundes, in Wm, S.135. 
Vide Wm, S.328 . 
. Vide KPM, "Vorwort zur vierten Auflage", S. XIV. 
9. According to Gadamer and Poggeler respectively, the lecture courses 
on Holderlin and on Nietzche in the mid- and late thirties are decisive 
for the Kehre. See Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke Bd 3., S.191f; Poggeler, 
Ope cit., S.104ff. 
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summer semester of 1935, which was later, "without change of 
content", 10 though not without any refinement, published with 
the title Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik in 1953. As it shows 
up from its content, this book actually exhibi ts the thinking 
at the moment of transition. On the one hand, in this book 
the turning away from the posi tion of 5Z has already emerged 
clearly.ll On the other hand, we can still find in this work 
the conception which is characteristic of the early position 
in 5Z. 12 
In short, the early thinking of Heidegger, as will be shown 
in the present essay, can be characterized by the watchword 
"science and life" (Wissenschaft und Leben). 13 The late 
thinking of Heidegger can be characterized as "the thinking 
of Being and the overcoming of metaphysics". Although the 
Being-question had already replaced the problematic of life 
becoming the predominant subject-matter of Heidegger's 
thinking in the 5Z-period, the question of Being in general 
has actually, as can be seen from 5Z and the lecture courses 
held in this period, never been adequately and thematically 
posed out before 1929. In fact, the efforts of Heidegger's 
thinking in the 5Z-period lies mainly on the elaboration of 
the "analytic of .Dasein", which is supposed to prepare for 
the interpretation of the Beingln general, rather than to 
elaborate the Being-question as such. In so far as the analytic 
of Dasein presented in 5Z is, as will be shown later, only 
the continuation of the attempt to establish a new science 
of the factical life in the pre-SZ-period, and in so far as 
the posing of the question of Being in general in the SZ-
period is completely directed by the analytic of Dasein, i. e. , 
10. Vide EiM, "Vorbemerkung". 
11. For example, it no longer recognizes an analysis of a specific kind 
of beings, even it is human being, as a suitable approach to the 
Being-question. See EiM, S.3. 
12. For instance, the problematic of the Being-understanding still appears 
in this book, See ibid., S.62-66 
13. GA19, S.10. 
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by the "fundamental-ontological way", it can well be said that 
Heidegger's thinking in the SZ-period is still directed by 
the problematic of life. 
Science is another motive beside life that dominated 
Heidegger's early thinking. Heidegger usually, as shown by 
his lecture courses in this period, began his formulation of 
philosophy by introducing the demarcation between philosophy 
as science (or, scientific philosophy) and philosophy as 
worldviews. Heidegger tried to maintain philosophy as science 
and frustrate the considerations of philosophy as worldviews. 
In fact, the insistence on philosophy as science can well be 
regarded as one of the criteria to distinguish Heidegger's 
early and late thinking. In the late period, Heidegger no 
longer regardeo philosophy as science. Further more, the view 
of philosophy as science, as something that belongs to the 
tradition of Western metaphysics, is precisely what Heidegger 
incessantly attempted to overcome. 
The aim of the present treatise is to work out Heidegger' s 
reformulation of philosophy in his early period. In so far 
as I suppose that the early thinking of Heidegger can be 
characterized by the watchword "science and life", the 
following analysis will concentrate itself upon these two 
motives. And though the topic of the present treatise is about 
the early thinking of Heidegger, some concepts of Heidegger' s 
"late thinking" may also be enlisted to analysis so long as 
they would enhance the understanding of the problematic at 
issue. 
Concerning the above framework of periodization of the 
thinking of Heidegger, there is still one point worth 
remarking. When we treat of the thinking of Heidegger in regard 
of this division, so well as we treat of any historical events 
in regard of whatever framework of periodization, we can not 
regard it as if there was a sudden and abrupt change happened 
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in ' the year specified as the turning point. For, it is after 
all only a matter of convenience for the course of analysis 
to mark off in a specified year the change which in fact took 
place gradually and which can be discerned out only in a larger 
scale of time. It is true that there may be some special "sign" 
of change in some particular years. But it serves only as the 
"indication" of changing undergoing more than the 
presentation of the complete progress of changing. It still 
needs a much longer time to let the change solidify and let 
it appear as "a change" that can be recognized. 
§2.2 The Background of the Kreigsnotsemester 
Heidegger's philosophical thinking had gone through a 
radical change, when he came back from the wartime service 
at Verdun and replaced Edi th Stein to become an assistant of 
Husserl at the Freiburg University in the year 1919. The 
philosophical ferment haunting his mind was coupled with an 
as much rigo~ous religious tumult that occupied his heart. 
Both are all the same crucial for his following philosophical 
development, and therefore for his life. Certainly, I suppose, 
they should be interrelated, though it seems almost impossible 
to decide whether it is the case that one resul ted in another. 
Having been brought up in a Catholic family, with his 
father serving as sexton in the Church, Heidegger was doomed 
to become a devout Catholics. Actually he had purposely been 
trained to be a priest until he was compelled to leave a Jesui t 
novitiate in 1909 due to reasons of health. Then he turned 
to study theology and philosophy at Freiburg University and 
later he became aspired to become a professor of Catholic 
philosophy_ In 1915, after finishing his 
Habili ta tionsschrift on Duns Scotus and presenting the trial 
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lecture on 27 July, 14 Heidegger got himself a license to teach 
as Privatdozent in the university. He then began to lecture 
at Freiburg from the winter semester of 1915-16. But until 
he became an assistant of Husserl in 1919, all his attempts 
to get a paid chair in Christian philosophy were thwarted. 
Needless to say, Heidegger was much disappointed. 1s 
In March 1917, Heidegger married a Protestant woman, 
Elfride Petri, a former student of him, who attended his first 
lecture course at Freiburg. This is indeed a marked event for 
Heidegger's theological conversion, which would gradually 
become clearer only at the following years. They "have read, 
spoken, thought, and prayed a great deal together", and _the 
result was that they both "think only as Protestants" .16 The 
Protestant theologians, such as Schleiermacher and Luther, 
started to enter into the core of Heidegger's reading and 
thinking in the same year. 17 
In January 1919, Heidegger, after a long period of internal 
conflicts, eventually wrote a letter to Engelbert Krebbs, a 
Catholic priest, a professor of Catholic theology at Freiburg, 
14. At first, Heidegger preferred to wri:te a Habilitationsschrift on "the 
logical essence of the concept of number" than on Duns Scotus. He changed 
his mind under the suggestion of his mentor, Heinrich Finke, that he would 
better to work on a topic in medieval philosophy, in order to get a chair 
in Catholic philosophy. See Thomas Sheehan, "Reading a life: Heidegger 
and hard times", in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. Charles 
B. Guignon, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.73; Also, 
idem., "Heidegger's Lehrjahre", in The Collegium Phaenomenologicum, The 
First Ten Years, ed. John C . Sallis, Giuseppina Moneta, Jacques Taminiaux , 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1988), p.108f. And also Hugo Otto, Martin 
Heidegger, Un terwegs zu seiner Biographie, (Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 1992), 
S.82; English translation, Martin Heidegger, A Political Life, trans. 
Allan Blunden, (New York: BasicBooks, 1993), p.79. 
15. According to Sheehan, this failure "may also help to explain the 
eventual souring of the young Heidegger' s relation to the Catholic Church 
and its vision of philosophy". See Sheehan, "Heidegger's Lehrjahre", 
p.108. 
16 . Vide Thomas Sheehan, "Reading a life: Heidegger and hard times", p. 70. 
Also, see van Buren, The Young Heidegger, (Bloomington: Indiana Uni versi ty 
Press, 1994), p.133f. The marriage of Heidegger with a Protestant woman 
also got the notice of Husserl as expressed in his letter to Natrop, see 
Thomas Sheehan, "Heidegger's Early Years", in Heidegger: The Man and the 
Thinker, ed. Thomas Sheehan, (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1981), p. 8 . 
17. Vide Sheehan, "Reading a life: Heidegger and hard times", p.70, 75; 
Also Hugo Otto, Ope cit., S.101, p.101 f. 
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a close friend, and a supporter of Heidegger, confiding to 
him his decision to abandon "the system of Catholicism". This 
letter signifies a "watershed" both for his philosophical and 
religious life. 18 Heidegger wrote: 
The past two years, in which I have sought to clarify 
my basic philosophical position, putting aside every special 
academic assignment in order to do so, have led me to 
conclusions for which, had I been constrained by extra-
philosophical allegiances, I could not have guaranteed the 
necessary independence of conviction and doctrine. 
Epistemological insights, applied to theory of 
historical knowledge, have made the system of Catholicism 
problematic and unacceptable for me - but not Christianity 
per se and metaphysics~ the latter albeit in a new sense. 19 
Alongside with the theological conversion, the 
philosophical orientation of Heidegger also got a radical 
change. Before the Great War, Heidegger was mainly concerned 
wi th the problem of mathematics, and "the central problem of 
logic and knowledge-theory", as it shows up in his 
dissertation and Habilitationsschrift, and his approach to 
these questions was mainly directed by the Aristotelian-
Scholasticism and the neo-Kantianism. 20 Amongst the neo-
Kantians , it is especially his teacher in Freiburg, Heinrich 
Rickert, one of the major representatives of the Southwest 
German (or the Baden) school of the neo-Kantianism, that 
influenced him most. 21 
However, after his return from the war service, a new theme 
seemed to surpass the old theme of logical and epistemological 
18. Ref. Sheehan, op. cit., p.73. 
19. Quoted from Hugo Otto, op. cit., S.106, English translation, p.106. 
20. Ref. Heidegger's Lebenslauf written by himself, see Otto, op. cit., 
S.85, p.84; Also Sheehan, "Heidegger's Lehrjahre ff , p.117. 
21. In the Preface of his doctoral dissertation, Heidegger wrote that "to 
him (Rickert] I owe the seeing and understanding of modern logical 
problem. ff See van Buren, op. cit., p.59; also ref. Hugo Otto, op. cit., 
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questions. This, as will be shown later, is the topic of "life" 
(Leben). Together with the theological conversion from 
Catholicism to Protestantism, and the change of the 
philosophical subject matter from logic to human life, 
Heidegger appeared at the same time to be no longer satisfied 
with neo-Kantianism, so as with his former mentor Rickert. 
Heidegger tried to make use of Husserl's phenomenology, for 
which he had already shown interest in his study period, to 
overcome the neo-Kantian approach to philosophy, and 
therefore to get a more suitable access to his new 
subject-matter. Remarkably, it is precisely his theological 
conversion that allowed a closer personal relationship to be 
built up between Heidegger and Husserl.22 For, Husserl, who 
regarded himself as a "free Christian", was somehow convinced 
that religious ties would more or less bereave scientific work 
of its freedom.23 Hence, when the first time Natrop wrote 
Husserl to ask whether Heidegger is suitable for the vacancy 
at Marburg, Husserl reported to Natrop that certainly 
Heidegger "has confessional ties" and "stands under the 
protection of our Christian historian", Heinrich Finke. 
Husserl, therefore, could not give a positive reply to Natrop 
stating that He~degger is without "religious narrowness".24 
The largest obstacle between Husserl and Heidegger would be 
removed only after Husserl discovered that Heidegger had 
"freed himself from dogmatic Catholicism".25 
S.85, p.85. 
22. As a matter of facts, Heidegger's "radical changes" in religious 
conviction concurred in the same period with the event that Heidegger 
"come closer to" Husserl personally. See Sheehan, "Heidegger's 
'Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion' , 1920-21", in A Companion 
to Martin Heidegger's Being and Time, ed. J.J. Kockelmans, (Washington, 
D.e.: University Press of America, 1988), p.43. 
23. See Sheehan, "Reading a life", p.76. 
24. See Sheehan, "Heidegger's Early Years", p. 7; idem., "Heidegger's 
'Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion', 1920-21", p.41f; also 
Ot to, op . c it., S. 98, p. 98 . 
25. See Sheehan, "Reading a life", p. 76; idem., "Heidegger's 'Introduction 
to the Phenomenology of Religion', 1920-21", p.44; also Otto, op. cit., 
S.96, p.96ff. Later, when Husserl became clear that Heidegger's way of 
thinking is far different from his own version of phenomenology, He "laid 
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It lS quite uncertain that whether these changes are 
resul ts of Heidegger' s experience wi th the Great War, 26 which 
was so disastrous that already from its beginning it seemed 
to be the signal of the end of the world, and above all, of 
the mankind - it is a war that finally turned out to kill 13 
per cent of the German men wi thin the mili tary age. 27 Amongst 
the victims of this horrible war was Emil Lask, another student 
of Rickert, who had considerable influence on Heidegger both 
"for his philosophical orientation as well as his 
terminology" . 28 But whatever the causes, it remains an 
obvious fact that between the year 1917-19, both Heidegger' s 
heart and mind had undergone radi~al changes. 
§2.3 Philosophy and Worldviews 
The Kriegsnotsemester in 1919 is a groundbreaking course 
for the philosophical career of Heidegger. A lot of his main 
themes in the following years of his philosophical development 
emerged in this semester, for instance: origin (Ursprung) , 
lived-experience (Erlebnis) , environing world (Umwelt) , 
Being (Sein) , temporality (Zeitlichkeit) , hermeneutical 
(hermeneutisch) and even the main themes after the Kehre, such 
as "es gibt" and "Ereignis". 29 Besides, Heidegger in this 
this to Heidegger never having freed himself completely from his 
theological prejudices". See Dorion Cairns, Conversations with Husserl 
and Fink, ed. the Husserl-Archives in Louvain, (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1976), p.9. It can thus be seen that the theological issue was 
continuously an important moment for Husserl's understanding of 
Heidegger. 
26. It is worthy noticing that Husserl assumed that Heidegger, amongst 
others, was driven into mysticism by "the war and ensuing difficulties". 
See Dorion Cairns, op. cit., p.9. 
27. Ref. Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes, (New York: Vintage Books, 
1996), p.22-26. 
28. The words of Rickert from his report on Heidegger' s Habili tionsschrift, 
see Sheehan, "Heidegger's Lehrjahre", p.118; also see Kisiel, op. cit., 
p.25. 
29. It is somewhat amusing that in this semester the "and" has already 
been proposed out as a problem - here, philosophy "and" world-view; in 
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course exerted a relentless attack on neo-Kantianism, 
especially on the conception of philosophy as cri tical 
philosophy of value of the Southwest German school, as 
represented by Windelband and Rickert, with which Heidegger 
himself was once affiliated. And Heidegger also contributed 
to the defense of phenomenology against the cri ticism issued 
from the side of neo-Kantians, mainly by Paul Natrop. Now I 
am going to attempt an analysis of Heidegger' s reformulation 
of philosophy in this significant semester course. 
Remarkably, Heidegger tried to make a demarcation between 
"worldviews" (Weltanschauungen) and philosophy at the very 
beginning of this groundbreaking seminar. Actually, this 
demarcation will continue to be one of the topics of 
Heidegger's thinking in the following years. 30 It actually 
echoes Husserl' s proclamation in the Logos-essay of 1911, in 
which Husserl tried to sharply differentiate his idea of 
phenomenology as "rigorous science" (strenge Wissenschaft) 
wi th the worldview-philosophy (Wel t anschauungsphilosophie) . 
"Thus worldview-philosophy and scientific philosophy are" 
sharply distinguished as two ideas, related in a certain 
manner but not to be confused", Husserl says.31 
Heidegger in the beginning of this seminar enumerated 
three standpoints in regard of the relation between philosophy 
and worldviews. The first one states that philosophy and 
worldviews are basically one and the same thing. "Worldview 
brings the essence and the task of philosophy to sharper 
expression. ,,32 The second one represents a "critical and 
scientific approach" different wholly from the first one. It 
52-period, Being "and" time. See respectively GA56/57, S.8 and GA26, 
S.182. 
30. For instance, vide GA59, S.9ff, GA61, S.44£, GA24, S.5££. 
31. Vide Husserl, Logos-essay, S. 52; English translation, "Philosophy as 
Rigorous Science", in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, trans. 
Quentin Lauer, (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1965), p.136. 
32. GA5 6/57, S. 8 . 
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proclaims that philosophy shall be founded on "the critical 
knowledge-theory". The philosophy thus formulated provides 
the foundation to develop a worldview, "which would be nothing 
other than the interpretation of the meaning of human 
existence and human cuI ture" wi th regard to the system of the 
value of "the true, good, beautiful and holy". 33 But in this 
approach, philosophy itself is not identical with worldview. 
Worldview instead "stands on the limit (Grenze) of philosophy", 
while philosophy as critical science provides the necessary 
foundation for a "critical, scientific worldview". This 
second approach was actually referring to the standpoint of 
neo-Kantianism, especially the system of value of the 
Southwest German School. According to Heidegger, this 
approach has dominated the situation of his time. 
After pointing out these two approaches, Heidegger posed 
the question whether they have exhausted all the possibility 
of the connection between philosophy and worldviews. 
Heidegger pointed out that the history of philosophy actually 
shows that philosophy is always somehow connected with the 
question of worldview. But despite this constant connection 
Heidegger proposed on the contrary that there is still another 
possibili ty tha.t there would be after all no connection 
between them. "Worldvi~w then would be an edifice that is 
comple·tely heterogeneous to philosophy. ,,34, And Heidegger 
asserted that "this radical separation contradicts all 
hi therto conception of philosophy". Therefore, it demands "to 
discover a wholly new concept of philosophy. ,,35 This assertion, 
which recalls Husserl' s similar claim that up to the present 
time, there has been no realization of the idea of philosophy 
as rigorous science, but there were only worldview-
philosophy,36 leads to Heidegger's own reformulation of the 
33. Ibid., S. 9. 
34. Ibid., S. 11 . . 
35. Ibid., S. 11 . 
36. Husserl, Ope cit., S.52 f. p.136. 
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"essence of philosophy", that is, "the idea of philosophy as 
primal science" (Urwissenschaft). 37 
I want to say that in so far as Heidegger intended to 
reformulate and to reassert, according to the ancient ideal 
of ~lAooo~{a, philosophy as science, or even the Science, it 
is by no means arbi trary that he would ini tiate this 
reformulation through coming to terms with the 
worldviews-philosophy. This can enough be confirmed by the 
fact that coming to terms wi th worldviews-philosophy is 
nothing singular to this course, but is a usual approach for 
Heidegger to set forth the idea of philosophy as science. 38 
For, after all, world-views represent the constant threat to 
the searching of Wissenschaft (science), a threat that can 
well be traced to the sophists in ancient Greece. 
However, the term "world-view" does not come from Greek 
or Latin. It is rather a coinage of German philosophy. It first 
appears in Kant's Kritik der Urteilskraft. But in Kant, it 
does not carry the meaning as it carries in the expression 
"worldviews-philosophy", which was a common term in the 
nineteenth century. It is only in the German romanticists, 
especially in F. W. Schelling, that the term "world-view" got 
the meaning of ~ manner to comprehend or to view the whole 
of all beings . Although the term "world-view" is composed of 
the terms "world" and "view", it does not only mean the view 
or the comprehension that is confined to the realm of the 
"world", understood in the sense of "nature". It rather means 
the comprehension of the whole of beings, including natural 
and human beings, so that worldview is always at the same time 
"life-view" (Lebensanscha uung). Moreover, all the more 
distinctive for "world-view" is that the manner of 
comprehension referred by this term has never been claimed 
to be a "scientific" one. It is not referred to a theoretical 
37. Ibid., S. 12 . 
38. See, for instance, GA24, S.5f. 
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knowledge of the whole of beings. Rather it is only the 
"conviction" (Oberzeugung, i. e., o6~a), which always carries 
practical implications that it would more or less determine 
the actions of those who have such worldviews. 39 
Actually, the opposi tion between philosophy as science and 
"worldviews-philosophy" implies precisely the archaic 
opposition between science and opinion, that is, ElTIOTTU1ll and 
o6~a. And in so far as "world-view" is only conviction, 
"worldview-philosophy" will be nothing but an thoroughly 
"incomprehensible concept" (Unbegriff) , as Heidegger called 
it. 40 It means nothing less than something like "scientific 
opinion". Philosophy, according to its etymology and its usage, 
as shown above, is "knowledge simply" ( Wissenschaft 
schlechthin) .41 And the idea of philosophy- itself precisely 
arose out of its contradistinction with the opinion, which 
prevailed in the rhetoric of the sophists. 
The widespread considerations in the nineteenth century 
of setting up a worldview as the task of philosophy for human 
life is menacing to the scientificality of philosophy as much 
as the rhetoric of the sophists is degenerating to the idea 
of E1TIOTTlI111 of the philosophers as supposed by Plato. If 
philosophy attempts to newly shape itself to be the formation 
of worldviews in a "scientific age", in which philosophy is 
plagued wi th the fact that all regions of reali ty are already 
occupied by the special sciences, this is surely the 
self-destruction of philosophy rather than its self-rescue. 
For, in so doing, it is undermining the soil precisely out 
of which the idea of philosophy first shaped itself. This idea 
is nothing other than the faith in ElTIOTTlI111, in science, and 
after all in human reason, especially in face of the whole 
39. For the meaning of Wel tanschauung, see Heidegger, GA24, S. 5ff; article 
"Weltanschauung", in Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, (Tubingen: 
Mohr, 1959); also Alois Halder, Max Muller, Philosophisches Worterbuch, 
3. Aufl., (Freiburg/Breisgau: Herder, 1993). 
40. See GA24, S.16. 
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of beings. 
' When Heidegger tried to reformulate the idea of philosophy 
as science through the coming to terms with "worldviews-
philosophy" from the outset, he was, I suppose, only 
travelling the same Ausgang from which philosophy gradually 
delimited itself out of its confrontation with the rhetoric 
of the sophists, as it shows in the dialogues of Plato, though 
Heidegger did claim that his is a "wholly new concept of 
philosophy". Noticeably, Heidegger did allude to Plato In 
introducing the conjunction of philosophy and science In 
opposition to the "arbitrariness and accidentality of the mere 
opinion. " 42 It is indeed a more or less necessary entrance for 
any reformulation of philosophy, In so far as it is a 
formulation that follows the direction of the ancient idea 
of ~lAooo~(a. It is only in the contradistinction with 86sa 
that ~lAooo~(a, as the searching of ETItOTTU1Tl, acquires and 
asserts its proper meaning. That is to say, in so far as 
philosophy seeks to get at the opposition of 86sa, it has to 
set out from 86Sa. 
§2.4 Philosophy and Particular Sciences 
When Heidegger formulated his idea of philosophy as 
"primal science", it is obvious that he still wanted to 
maintain philosophy as a kind of "science", or knowledge, in 
contradistinction to "worldviews", or convictions. 43 But so 
long philosophy is preserved of its scientificality, it 
immediately becomes the question that how is philosophy 
different from other sciences, especially in a time like our 
age that philosophy and science are regarded to have so much 
41. Ibid., S. 4 . 
42. GAS 6 / S 7, S. 1 9 . 
43. "Philosophie is - genauer: solI sein -, noch praziser: sie ist Problem 
- 59 -
dif.ference. By virtue of its manner of inspection, by virtue 
of its object-field, or by virtue of both of which? Out of 
these arise another "necessary" demarcation of philosophy 
apart from that with "worldviews" or opinions. 
After the coming to terms with "world-views", Heidegger 
precisely began his reformulation of the idea of philosophy 
as primal science by discussing the difference between 
philosophy and the "particular sciences" (Einzelwissen-
schaften) . This demarcation between particular sciences and 
philosophy is not totally coincident with the demarcation 
between philosophy (as metaphysics) and physical sciences, 
as formulated by Aristotle. For with particular sciences, 
Heidegger referred to physics, biology, mathematics, and also 
to theology, whereas theology is by no means a physical science. 
The particular sciences are distinctive in that they are 
limited to definite area of objects. They are knowledge of 
their corresponding field of objects. Philosophy as primal 
science, on the contrary, is never concerned with definite 
field of objects. It is rather concerned with what is common 
to all particular sciences. It is "the science not of a special 
Being, but of the universal Being (vom allgemeinen Sein) ."44 
Although this demarcation with particular sciences is 
different from the demarcation of philosophy with physical 
sciences, it is in no ways initiated by Heidegger. Actually 
this "universal claim" of philosophy can also be traced back 
to Aristotle as well as the "meta-physical claim" mentioned 
above. Precisely in the beginning of his inquiry of the science 
which theorizes "being qua being", Aristotle evokes the 
demarcation between it and the "special sciences". "Now this 
is not the same as any of the so-called special sciences; for 
none of these others deals generally wi th being as being. They 
cut off a part of being and investigate the attributes of this 
als Wissenschaft, und zwar als Urwissenschaft." See GA56/57, S.24. 
44. GA56/57, S.26. 
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part - this is what the mathematical sciences for instance 
do",45 Aristotle says in book Gamma of his Metaphysics. 
Heidegger further on remarked that the determination of 
the "universal Being" could never be something that is 
obtained "inductively" (induktiv) out of the result of the 
particular sciences, as what the so-called "inductive 
metaphysics" (induktive Metaphysik) attempted to work out. 
If it is so, philosophy could never proclaim to be "primal 
science". For "it would not be origin, but rather result, 
methodically founded by the particular sciences". 46 This 
remark against the "inductive metaphysics" arises out of 
another constituent of Heidegger's reformulation of 
philosophy. This is the "primal (Ur-) claim" of philosophy. 
According to Heidegger, the concept of philosophy as "primal 
science" means "something last, or better, at the beginning, 
the original, not temporally, but thingly (sachlich) , the 
first, with reference to grounding and constituting: 
principium, principle". 47 The particular sciences, on the 
contrary, is not principium, not the principle, but is only 
"principatum", that is, that which is derived from the origin 
(das Ent-sprungene) , but not itself the origin. 
Again, the primal claim of philosophy can as well as the 
universal claim be traced to Aristotle. · Closely following the 
demarcation with the special science in the Book Gamma of 
Metaphysics, Aristotle mentioned that what is sought for 
hereby is the "first principles" (6pX~). Aristotle says: 
"Now since we are seeking the first principles and the highest 
causes, clearly there must be some thing to which these belong 
In virtue of its own nature."48 
Therefore, according to Heidegger, philosophy as "primal 
science" is different from the particular sciences both wi th 
45. See Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1003a 22 f. 
46. GA56/57, S.27. 
47. Ibid., S. 24 . 
48. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1003 a27. 
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its "universal claim" and "primal claim". These actually 
are two basic elements of the scientificality of philosophy 
as contrasted with that of the particular sciences, including 
physical sciences. It is remarkable that in his reformulation 
of philosophy as primal science carrying these two basic 
claims, Heidegger obviously still attached to the tradi tional 
conception that philosophy is prior to the particular sciences 
(physical sciences included), and that it is so because 
philosophy is concerned wi th the knowledge of something 
ultimate, that is, of the ultimate ground (or cause). The 
knowledge of the special sciences as the knowledge of special 
field of obj ects is conceived to be posterior to philosophy, 
so long as that wi th which it is concerned is not the ul timate 
and must be determined (or caused) by the ultimate. And as 
long as the objects of special sciences as the principatum 
are determined (or caused) by the objects of philosophy as 
the principium, the truth of philosophy is applicable to the 
special sciences but not vice verse. The truth of philosophy 
is considered to be universally applicable to all other 
sciences as it is concerned with the ultimate principle. It 
is "universal (Ka86Aov)", "because it is primal (rrpWTf))". 49 
However, since the rise of the modern physical sciences, 
the special sciences, especially the physical sciences, have, 
as pointed out above, become "self-examination and autonomy" 
that the primary posi tion of philosophy wi th reference to the 
special sciences is no longer considered to be valid. Hence, 
how could Heidegger sustain the primal claim of philosophy 
on the one hand and its scientific status on the other hand 
at a time that has become fashionable to discard both of which? 
How could he revive the primal position of philosophy with 
regard to the special sciences? In what sense is philosophy 
still prior to the particular sciences? These are precisely 
the questions that we want to find out the answer in the present 
49. Ibid., 1026 a30. 
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essay. 
$2.5 The "Knowledge of Objects" as the Subject-matter 
of Philosophy 
Up to now, we have seen that Heidegger first of all tried 
to entrench the idea of philosophy from the worldview-
philosophy, which represents the threat to draw philosophy 
from the dignified status of absolute knowledge down to the 
relative and particular opinion. Heidegger then tried to 
distinguish philosophy from the special sciences, which 
represent the threat from another side to mold philosophy in 
accordance wi th the special sciences, and thus to turn it into 
"nothing other than more or less uncertain and hypothetic 
repetition and synthesis of what the special sciences have 
already fixed with the exactitude of their method".50 
Heidegger's reformulation of philosophy as "primal 
science" attempted no less than to deliver philosophy out of 
this predicament. In order to carry philosophy away from this 
impasse, Heidegger has on the one hand to find out the 
appropriate "object" for philosophy, which must be something 
different from the special fields of obj ects of the particular 
sciences and proves itself proper to philosophy in its own 
right. On the other hand, Heidegger has also to establish the 
proper "method" for philosophy, which shall be appropriate 
to philosophy_ and its proper "obj ect" as much as the "modern 
scientific method" is suitable for the modern physical 
sciences. However, one can not simply transplant the method 
of the modern physical sciences to philosophy, even if this 
method is proved to be fertile and effecti ve in its own fields. 
For, following the principle of phenomenology, H-eidegger was 
50. GAS 6/ S 7, S. 27 . 
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convinced that "all genuine scientific method, in accordance 
with its meaning, first arises only from the essence of the 
objects of the concerning science". 51 The proper "scientific 
method" for philosophy shall correlatively correspond to its 
proper "object". 
If philosophy, unlike the special sciences, is not 
concerned with the special regions, but rather concerned with 
the "universal Being", then where could it find out its proper 
"object"? "Manifestly, instead of engaging on the object of 
knowledge, I can engage myself on the knowledge of object", 52 
Heidegger says. Rather than engaged on knowing the objects, 
philosophy as the "primal science" is concerned with the 
knowledge as knowledge, which is considered to be the common 
location for all special sciences, in so far as they are 
knowledge. "With the knowledge, a phenomenon is obtained, 
which shall in true sense belong to every science, and make 
it to what it is.,,53 
Actually, this distinction between the subject matter of 
philosophy and that of the special sciences is a distinction 
that Heidegger took over from Husserl. Husserl, in a lecture 
series held at Gottingen in 1907, had already clearly pointed 
out that the particular sciences (or "science of the natural 
sort", natiirliche Wissenschaften) , determined by the 
"natural attitude" (Natiirliche Geisteshaltung) , are absorbed 
into the things that are always given to us as their objects 
of inquiry. 54 But, apart from the given things, the knowledge 
of these things could also become the problem, in so far as 
one is aware of the perplexity concerning the possibility of 
knowledge. The latter is precisely the case of philosophy as 
Erkenntnistheorie, or as metaphysics, which springs out of 
the "philosophical attitude" (philosophischen Geistes-
51. Ibid., S.16. See also GA20, S.24. 
52. GAS 6/ S 7, S. 28 . 
53. Ibid., S. 28 . 
54. Vide Idee, S .17ff. 
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haltung). In fact, this distinction between the subject-
matter of the special sciences and that of the "first 
philosophy" can well be traced to Descartes, who tried to 
"deduce" the knowledge of objects from the "I think", and gave 
rise to the separation between knowledge and its objects. 55 
§2.6 The Problematic of Axioms 
Philosophy concentrates itself upon the inquiry of the 
knowledge of objects. Knowledge is also a "fact of nature, 
it is the lived-experience of a knowing organic being, it is 
a psychological fact. "56 And in so far as knowing is a psychical 
process, it must follow the lawfulness of the psyche as much 
as the physical process has to follow the physical laws. This 
lawfulness of the psyche as a fact of nature is the object 
of the science of the psyche, that is, the psychology. However, 
psychology, according to Heidegger, is also a particular 
science. For it has as its subject-matter a special field of 
facts, that is, the psyche, or the "spirit" (Geist) .57 
Philosophy, contrary to psychology, is concerned with 
"another lawfulness i~ the psychical".58 The possibility of 
this "another lawfulness" is disclosed already on the 
equivocation in the concept of the psyche. Heidegger traced 
the awareness of this equivocation back to Kant. 59 But he did 
not mention Husserl's distinction between the "natural 
attitude" and "phenomenological attitude", which is crucial 
for the demarcation between psychology as a special science 
and phenomenology as a universal science of the psychical 
55 Ref. article "Erkenntnistheorie", in Historisches Worterbuch der 
Philosophie, Band 2: D-F, hrsg. von Joachim Ritter und Karlfried Grunder, 
(Stuttgart: Schwabe & Co, 1972). 
56. Husserl, Idee, S.19; see also Heidegger, GA56/57, S.29. 
57. See, GA56/57, S.29. 
58. Ibid., S. 32 . 
59. Ibid., S . 30. 
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ph~nomena. Rather, at this moment, he alluded to neo-Kantians 
at first. Only on the latter parts of the course after the 
explication of the method of the neo-Kantians and its 
deficiencies did he draw on the "phenomenological method" to 
deal with the problematic in question. 
Heidegger at the moment pointed out that apart from the 
"laws of the psychical course of representations 
(Vorstellungen) ", there is still a completely different kind 
of lawfulness in the psyche. Heidegger says: 
It is remarkable that the psychical still manifests a 
completely different kind of lawfulness: every science works 
with definite universal concepts and statements, with the 
help of which the immediate given is ordered. 60 
All science, or all knowledge, then will be regulated by such 
"universal concepts and statements", and therefore all lie 
on the ground of the "last concepts, principles, and axioms". 
Heidegger says: 
Sciences become sciences only through such axioms as 
norm-laws (Normgesetze) . They give the origin (Ur-sprung) to 
the knowledge, and the science, which has these origins as 
its obje'ct, is the primal science (Urwissenschaft) , 
philosophy. 61 
Philosophy is hereby conceived as the inquiry of the axioms, 
or the norm-laws, which underlies all sciences. These axioms 
in question are precisely what make up knowledge as knowledge. 
This conception seems able to satisfy the idea of philosophy 
as "primal science" with its twofold claims, as formulated 
above, the universal claim and the primal claim. On the one 
hand, those axioms under inquiry underlie all sciences in so 
60. Ibid., S.30. 
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far as they are knowledge. Therefore, they are universal to 
all special sciences, or further, to all science. On the other 
hand, those axioms are the "origin" of knowledge. They are 
considered to be the grounds upon which all science is made 
up. Therefore, those axioms are prior to the particular 
sciences, and are the "last concepts", or the principles, of 
the sciences. Actually, according to Heidegger, this inquiry 
of the axioms is nothing other than the inquiry about "the 
meaning of knowledge in general", "its unity, its unified 
meaning as knowledge" . 62 In short, it is the universal inquiry 
about the meaning of knowle~ge as such. 
Up to this point, this conception of philosophy as the 
inquiry of the axioms of knowledge elaborated by Heidegger 
is consistent with the neo-Kantianism and with Husserl's 
phenomenology alike. Actually, Heidegger here even mentioned 
Rickert and Windelband to confirm his formulation. It seems 
that the difference between phenomenology and Southwest 
German school of neo-Kantianism takes shape merely in the ways 
of the demonstration of these axioms. And it is precisely in 
this demonstration that the difficulty of the idea of 
philosophy as primal science consists. "Here the difficulty 
in which the idea of primal science is si tuated is shown out: 
How should the axioms be demonstrated?"63 
These axioms could in no ways be obtained deductively out 
of other statements, in so far as they themselves are the 
principles, the basic and the foremost statements (Grund-
satze) , only out of which other statements can be demonstrated. 
No more could they be deri ved indirectly from the facts. For, 
the comprehension of a fact as a fact - it implies the 
arrangement of it under the universal concepts - has already 
presupposed the regulation of the axioms. These axioms are 
the presupposi tions of all other statements and of the 
61. Ibid., S. 31 . 
62 Ibld., S.33. 
- 67 -
comprehension of all facts. The axioms, as what should be posed 
earlier than the latter, could never be demonstrated out of 
them. This difficulty of the demonstration of the axioms is 
called "the circularity of the grounding" (der 
Zirkelhaftigkeit der Begrundung). It means that the 
demonstration of the axioms can appeal to nothing except to 
themselves, as long as they are themselves the beginning, the 
principicum. According to Heidegger, the entanglement with 
this difficulty, which lies "in the task of the grounding of 
the origin, of the beginning", 64 is an indication that we are 
already moved within the sphere of "primal science". 
§2.7 The Teleological-critical Method of the 
Southwest Ger.man School of the Neo-Kantianism 
Through turning the question from the "objects of 
knowledge" to the "knowledge of objects", Heidegger had led 
from the inquiry of special sciences to the inquiry of 
philosophy as primal science. Now, it becomes a question that 
how can the axioms be demonstrated. "How, i. e., on which ways, 
with which methods?,,6.5 The ways, or the methods, of the 
demonstration of the axioms become the crucial problem of 
philosophy. Therefore, Heidegger said: "The axiomatical 
basic-problem is essentially a problem of the method.,,66 
First of all, Heidegger introduced the method of the 
Southwest German School of the neo-Kantianism. Heidegger 
called it the "teleological-critical method" (teleo-
logische- kri tische Methode). It sets out from the two kinds 
of lawfulness in the psychical. One the one hand, the psychical 
as facts of nature must follow the "natural law" (Naturgesetz) . 
63. Ibid., S. 31. 
64 Ibid., S. 31 . 
65 Ibid., S.33. 
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This is conceived as the law of the "must" (Miissen). On the 
other hand, next to this kind of lawfulness, there is another 
completely different kind of lawfulness in the psychical, that 
is, the "norm-laws" (Normgesetze) , the law of the "ought" 
(Sollen). "Against the ps·ychlcal necessit-y, there is a 
command". "The natural law is principle of the explanation 
(Erklarung) , the norm principle of the evaluation 
(Beurteil ung) . ,,67 
After separating and securing these two kinds of 
lawfulness in the psychical, it becomes the problem how to 
decide which laws in the psychical are the norm-laws, which 
are considered to be the problematic of philosophy as primal 
science. According to Windelband, "amongst all the 
representation- associations, there are only a few which have 
the value of the normality (Normalitat) . ,,68 He tried to discern 
out those norm-laws through the "teleological method". "The 
logical normali ty is required by the representation-acti vi ty, 
in so far as it is supposed to fulfill the end to be true," 
Windelband says. 69 The principle for Windelband to discern the 
norm-laws presupposes that truth (Wahrheit) is the end of 
thinking. The manner and the validity of the norm-laws are 
then determined out of the end of thinking to be true. 
Therefore, those laws in the psychical are considered to be 
the norm-laws, in so far as they are supposed to fulfill the 
end of thinking. Hence, in so far as this method tries to decide 
the norm-laws according to the end, the telos, of thinking, 
it is called the "teleological method". And it is also called 
the "critical method" by the neo-Kantians. The Southwest 
German school tried to establish philosophy, which they 
conceived as the "cri tical science of universally valid 
values", precisely by this "teleological-critical method". 
66. Ibid., S. 39. 
67. Ibid., S. 34 . 
68. Ibid., S. 34 . 
69. Ibid., S.34-5. 
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, Certainly, Heidegger was by no means satisfied with this 
teleological-critical method of the Southwest German school 
to claim to be the proper method for philosophy. Heidegger 
asserted that , this method is "full of presupposition" 
(voraussetzungsvoller) , 70 and is "superfluous" (ilberfl ilssig) 
at its first meaningful step.7l 
According to Heidegger' s analysis, Fichte is the first to 
recognize the teleological method as the method of philosophy. 
However, Fichte overlooked that the teleological method 
"requires a thingly (sachlichen), material guideline, in 
which the end of the reason ought to be realized". 72 The 
teleological-critical method of the neo-Kantianism 
transformed the method of Fichte to avoid its disregard of 
the "matter-sphere" (~achsphare). Heidegger says: 
Empirical-scientific establishment is in a definite sense 
necessary presuppositions of the teleological method. Only 
with reference to the empirically given, therefore, in 
relation to factually given psychical thinking-course 
(Denkverlaufe) , can I pose the question, which is necessary 
in regard of the end of thinking. 73 
The neo-Kantianism relied on the psychology and history 
to rectify the drawbacks of Fichte' s dialectical method. These 
special sciences provide the teleological-critical method 
with the "methodical function of the material-giving" 
(methodische Funktion der Ma terialgebung). However, the 
special sciences such as psychology and history are in this 
way hardly conceived to be the ground of the axioms, which 
the teleological-critical method aims to find out. But they 
only provide the material, out of which some laws are suggested 
70. See ibid., S. 4"7, 52. 
71. See ibid., S. 44, 52, 56. 
72. Ibid., S. 37 . 
73. Ibid., S. 41 . 
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out to be the axioms. 
The core of the teleological-critical method consists 
rather in the "ideal of thinking, or more precisely, its 
presentation (Vergegenwartigung) , the ideal-giving 
(Idealgebung) ",74 according to which the axioms are to be 
suggested out of the material provided. It presupposes that 
thinking ought to form itself according to its ideal (its 
entelecheia, to use Aristotle's words). It is by virtue of 
this ideal that the "material-giving" is judged to select out 
the appropriate norm-laws of thinking. Therefore, the 
execution of this method to select out the norm-laws depends 
on the ideal-giving itself. This method is only possible when 
the ideal of thinking is given. But as soon as the ideal of 
thinking is given at the outset, this method itself will become 
superfluous, for what it aims at arriving is already given 
from the beginning. Heidegger says: 
This method presupposes in itself, according to its most 
proper meaning, as condition of its proper possibility, what 
it is first of all supposed to achieve ... But provided that the 
ideal, the "ought-content" (Sollenverhalt), is "somehow" 
found, then the problem, for its solution this method is 
discovered, would be " itself already solved and the method 
would be illusory. If the method, according to its pretended 
meaning, is supposed to be possible, then it is also already 
superfluous. 75 
§2.8 A New Approach to the Psychical 
Heidegger tried to overcome the "teleological-critical 
method", and so the Southwest German school of neo-Kantianism, 
74. Ibid., S. 43. 
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concerning the problematic of the reformulation of philosophy, 
through a deeper inquiry into the psychical, to which 
knowledge in general as the subject-matter of philosophy is 
supposed to belong. Heidegger poses the following questions: 
What is then the psychical? How is precisely this being 
supposed to have the property to stand under a norm and to 
realize an ought (ein Sollen)? What is the psychical ?76 
Is there a manner of inspection (Betrachtung) of the 
psychical that primal-scientific problem could be released 
through it, viz., obj ecti ve (gegenstandliche) layers, which 
make up the primal-scientific Object-field (Objektgebiet) , 
could be showed up at the psychical itself? More precisely: 
Could the axiomatical problem, the questions of the ul timate 
norms of the knowing, willing -and feeling, be- demonstrated 
in the psychical itself? Do I stand in the psychical itself 
in the primal-sphere, where the genuine origin lies?77 
According to Heidegger, the approach of the neo-Kantianism 
to the sphere of the psychical is far from satisfying. For, 
it relies on the psychology to obtain the "material-giving". 
That is to say, it depends on the psychology to get the 
information about the psychical. Therefore, its approach to 
the psychical will be determined by the attitude of the 
psychology (to use Husserl' s words, determined by the "natural 
attitude") . This dependence on the psychology is by no means 
free of problems. First, psychology is an empirical science 
(Erfahrungswissenschaft) . The psychological knowledge 
acquired through it, therefore, must rest on the "experience" 
(Erfahrung) - experience in the sense of "observable facts". 
And its method to obtain such knowledge is "inductive" and 
"hypothetical". Accordingly, its result must be only 
75. Ibid., 8. 44 . 
76. Ibid., 8.60. 
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provisional, never conclusive (nie abschlieEbar) , and the 
laws acquired by it must be only conditional. 78 However, "the 
genuine meaning of the teleological method requires for 
possible execution the completeness of the material-giving 
characterization. "79 The psychology as an empirical science 
can never satisfy this requirement. Moreover, in so far as 
psychology is a theoretical science, the "material-giving" 
provided by it is limi ted to the theoretical sphere. 
Therefore, if the neo-Kantianism depends on the psychology 
for the "material-giving" of the psychical, then its inquiry 
on the "norm-laws" of the psychical will be confined only to 
the theoretical aspect. According to Heidegger, this approach 
actually falls prey to the traditional "preference of the 
theoretical" (Bevorzugung des Theoretischen). And it is 
precisely the aim of Heidegger to break up this preference, 
and to probe into the "pre-theoretical realm".80 
Therefore, in so far as the teleological-critical method 
is "full of presuppositions" and it itself lacks a proper 
access to the psychical, Heidegger sought to get another way 
to probe into the psychical. In order to enter the realm of 
the psychical appropriately, Heidegger demands that "all 
overlaying of the mat~er-sphere by unproved and free-chosen 
theorems and preconceptions" is to be avoided .81 Instead, "the 
matter-sphere as such is only to be deal t wi th by pure 
dedication to the matter (reine Hingabe an die Sache)". 82 Only 
the "description" (Beschreibung), which does not get out from 
the matter-sphere, but remains staying with it, could fit the 
matter-sphere. 
Al though Heidegger hereby had not yet mentioned the ti tIe 
"phenomenological method", these methodical considerations 
77. Ibid., S. 60-1. 
78. Vide ibid., S. 57 f. 
79. Ibid., S. 57 . 
80. Vide ibid., S.59. 
81. Ibid., S.61. 
82. Ibid., S. 61 . 
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are at any rate reminiscent of it, as developed out by Husserl, 
for instance, in the Logische Untersuchungen. The "avoiding 
of unproved preconceptions" seems at first sight to be the 
paraphrase of the "principle of presuppositionlessness" 
(Prinzip der Voraussetzungslosigkeit) 83. The "pure dedication 
to the matter" appears to be a paraphrase of the 
phenomenological maxim "to the things themselves". And the 
insistence on the description is the very methodical 
orientation for the phenomenology of consciousness in the 
Logische Untersuchungen. 
However, although Heidegger seems to appeal to the same 
methodical considerations with Husserl to layout the 
appropriate subject-matter of philosophy, what was 
eventually approached by them via this "way" turned out to 
be very different. Already in this "groundbreaking" course 
in 1919 can we see that Heidegger, though nominally appealing 
to the "phenomenological method", actually attempted to 
formulate an idea of philosophy which is radically different 
from that of Husserl. It is true that they both tried to base 
philosophy on what is conceived to be the radical (the root, 
or the origin) . But they differ precisely in what is supposed 
to be the radical. 
Heidegger did follow Husserl to reject the approach of 
neo-Kantianism to let philosophy as Erkenntnistheorie rely 
on the results of the special sciences, for instance, on 
psychology and history on the part of the Southwest German 
school. And he also followed Husserl to attempt to build up 
another idea of scientificality on a field not only 
heterogeneous to but also more original (or radical) than that 
of the physical sciences. They both found out their "new" 
field in the psychical, or more precisely in the "lived-
experience", to which all kind of knowledge as psychological 
phenomena are supposed to belong. But despite the fact that 
83. Vide Husserl, LU, 11/1, S .19f. 
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they both tried to approach their new field with the same, 
or at least similar, methodical considerations from the outset, 
the new fields they respectively claimed to discover for 
philosophy are eventually quite different from one another. 
In so far as they both found out their new fields in the 
psychical and both considered their fields to be different 
from the obj ect-field of psychology as a special science, it 
is important first of all for both of them to set up a 
demarcation between their idea of philosophy, which is to be 
established on the new field, and the psychology, which, 
though concerned with the psychical too, is a special and 
empirical science. Hence, just on the topic of the demarcation 
between philosophy and psychology is it possible to glimpse 
the difference between Husserl and Heidegger. 
For Husserl, the demarcation between philosophy (as 
phenomenology) and psychology consists first of all, as 
pointed out before, in their attitude, rather than in their 
fields of inquiry. Determined by the natural attitude, 
psychology inquires the psychical "psycho-physically" as 
facts on the actual world appended to the physical bodies. 
Husserl, on the contrary, tried to set up the phenomenological 
attitude which tries to look at the psychical "pure for itself, 
in pure immanence". 84 In the phenomenological attitude, the 
psychical is no longer regarded as actual facts, but as "pure 
consciousness", or through the transcendental ETTOXTl, as 
"transcendental consciousness", in which the subject-matter 
is "given as something absolute".85 
Contrary to the case of Husserl, the phenomenological 
maxim "to the things themselves" did not lead Heidegger to 
the "transcendental consciousness". As already pointed out 
above, Heidegger even did not mention Husserl's distinction 
84. Vide Husserl, Logos-essay, 8.33. 
85. For "pure consciousness, see Husserl, Ideen 1,8.59,69£ etc. For "given 
as something absolute", see, ibid., 8.80££; idem, Logos-essay, S.32£. 
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between the natural attitude and philosophical attitude in 
formulating his idea of philosophy. On the issue of the 
demarcation with psychology, Heidegger insisted rather on the 
empirical foundation and the preference of the theoretical 
on the side of psychology. Philosophy, as primal science 
formulated by Heidegger, could never found on the experience 
(in the sense of the observable facts), and should probe into 
the "pre-theoretical" realm rather than cling to the "primacy 
of the theoretical". Heidegger says: 
What is now the proper meaning of the fact that both 
solutions [realism and idealism] hold themselves on the fact 
of the natural science (Naturwissenschaft)? It is not only 
the naturalism (Naturalismus) , as someone has said (Husserl, 
Logos-essay) . It is the general domination of the theoretical 
that transfigures the genuine problematic. It is the primacy 
of the theoretical (Primat des Theoretischen). 86 
For Heidegger, what should really be reckoned with in the 
scientific domains is not the domination of the naturalism 
(or the natural attitude), but rather the general domination, 
or the primacy, of the theoretical. Accordingly, it is 
precisely the task of -Heidegger to get over the domination 
of the theoretical and establish an appropriate science for 
the pre-theoretical, rather than to follow Husserl to secure 
the discovery of the pure consciousness against the natural 
attitude. 
Concerning the above-mentioned difference between Husserl 
and Heidegger, who both to large extent set out from the same 
phenomenological principles, it lS, I suppose, something 
irrational, and external and maybe prior - to these 
principles, that really counts. I think it is the difference 
86. GAS 6 / 57, S. 87 . 
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of the pathos (disposition, or Stimmung, attunement) 87 of the 
two thinkers that really affect the outcome of the execution 
of the same principles. For Husserl, it is the pathos to seek 
out the absolute knowledge that incessantly urges him 
following the route of Descartes, to find out the fundamentum 
inconcussum for all human knowledge. The phenomenological 
methods served for Husserl to find out this much demanded 
fundamentum inconcussum, that is, the pure consciousness, the 
beings in which, Husserl supposes, enjoy the privilege of 
"absolute giveness", in so far they are "something immanent", 
that is to say, something that is referred to by itself (as 
the thought referred by the thinking) . 88 For Heidegger, there 
is another pathos that permeates his thinking. It is the pathos 
to stick to the finitude (Endlichkei t) of human knowledge. 89 
It is this pathos that makes Heidegger defy every attempt, 
including the phenomenology of Husserl, to base all human 
knowledge in a mathematical way on the fundamentum inconcussum. 
Rather than trying to demonstrate the "pure and absolute 
knowledge" out of the "absolute giveness", Heidegger sought 
to get at the understanding of the "meaning of the lived-
experience" (Sinn des Erlebnisses), which is conceived by him 
to be the very subject-matter of philosophy as primal 
science. 9o 
87. Ref. Heidegger, WiPh, S.23ff. 
88. Ref. Husserl, Ideen I, S.8Sf; Heidegger, GA20, S.137f. 
89. Eugen Fink asserted that the idea of the human fini tude is what makes 
the thinking of Heidegger different from that of Husserl. Fink says: 
"Heidegger rather because he came to Husserl with the fundamental idea 
already that all knowledge is to be interpreted from the basis fact of 
human finitude. Like Kierkegaard in the latter's attitude to Hegel, 
Heidegger probably finds in Husserl a certain hybris, a certain 
'superbi ty', forget ting the limi ts of humani ty, and fleeing from certain 
problems, such as those of death, etc." See Dorion Cairns: Conversa tions 
with Husserl and Fink, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), p.2S. For 
Heidegger's own discussion of human finitude, see KPM, S.2Sff. For the 
thematic discussion of the moment of human fini tude in Heidegger's 
thinking, see Tze-wan Kwan, Die hermeneutische Phanomenologie und das 
tautolog.ische Denken Heideggers, (Bonn: Bouvier, 1982), S.49ff. 
90. GAS 6 / S 7, S. 67 . . 
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§2.9 The Problematic of Lived-experience 
Heidegger, as mentioned above, attempted to reformulate 
the idea of philosophy as primal science by a deeper inquiry 
into the psychical. And as soon as psychology is also an 
inquiry of the psychical, Heidegger, in order to set up the 
proper subj ect-matter of philosophy, has first of all to come 
to terms wi th psychology on the issue of the characterization 
of the psychical. Heidegger contrasted his idea of philosophy 
with psychology through pointing out the latter's empirical 
foundation and preference of the theoretical. For example, 
Heidegger said, under the influence of psychology, there is 
nothing said about the "psychological common-connection in 
its completeness". All are said about the "psychological 
process", but nothing about the "psychical subject". 91 Hence, 
in order to get over the limitation of psychology, he tried 
to get into the subj ect-matter deeper, specially in a manner 
"to understand wi th looking, and to look wi th understanding, 
rather than to eternally know the matter".92 
Yet, it does not appear to be very clear that how Heidegger 
in the course of this l~cture turned from the question on the 
psychical into the question on the meaning of the lived-
experience, which was soon transformed into the problematic 
of "life in and for itself" (Leben an und fUr sich) and so 
became the proper subject-matter of Heidegger's 
reformulation of both philosophy and phenomenology. 93 Above 
all, it seems that in the ini tiation of phenomenology, there 
is little significant difference between the meaning of the 
physical and that of lived-experience. Husserl himself also 
set out from "the pure phenomenology of the lived-experience 
91. Ibid., S.64. 
92. "Statt ewig Sachen zu erkennen, zuschauend zu verstehen und verstehend 
zu schauen", ibid., S.65. 
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in general". 94 For Husserl, lived-experience precisely means 
the psychical as such, that is, the psychical "looked at" in 
itself but not "psycho-physically". "What psychical Being 
'is' can not be said to us by the experience in the same sense 
of that of physical. The psychical is indeed not experienced 
as that which appears (Erscheinendes); it is 'lived-
experience' and lived-experience looked in the reflexion, it 
appears as itself by itself, in a absolute flux, as now and 
already 'fading away', constantly sinking back into a 
having-been-ness (Gewesenheit) in a lookable (schaubarer) 
manner", Husserl says. 95 
However, in a closer inspection, it is discernible that 
there are significant nuances between the meaning of 
lived-experience of Heidegger and that of Husserl. Heidegger 
at this issue actually gets closer to Wilhelm Dilthey, who 
"has already sought to base his thinking on ' lived-experience' 
in the time when the word was not yet conceived as now", 96 than 
to Husserl. Admi ttedly, for all three of them, what is 
distinctive for lived-experience is that it means something 
"lived" before the construction, or abstraction, of the 
particular sciences, and it is precisely out of it that the 
particular sciences arises. In short, for them, the 
lived-experience serves as the primal "source" (Quelle) of 
all knowledge. But the demarcation with the "primacy of the 
theoret.ical" rather than with the "natural attitude" pressed 
Heidegger from the meaning of lived-experience into the 
"pre-theoretical" inquiry of the "essence of life in and for 
itself" rather than into the "transcendental" inquiry of the 
"consciousness" and the "pure I". Actually, it turned out soon 
that Heidegger would reformulate the phenomenology as the 
93. VideGA56/57, S.116, S.121; GA58, S.l. 
94. Husserl, LU, 11/1, S.2. 
95. Husserl, Logos-essay, S.29f. 
96. Heinrich Rickert: Die Philosophie des Lebens, quoted from Materialien 
zur Philosophie Wilhelm Dil they, hrsg. von Fri thj of Rodi und Hans-Ulrich 
Lessing, (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1984), S.95. 
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"original-science (Usprungswissenschaft) of the factical 
life in itself". 97 Obviously, the problematic of factical life 
is much lesser the matter of concern of Husserl than that of 
Dilthey, whose intellectual efforts were almost completely 
devoted to "grasp life itself in its multiplicity and depth" , 
and "to understand the life out of itself".98 For Husserl, 
surely, such transformation, or even disfiguration, of 
phenomenology into the inquiry of factical life by Heidegger 
shows that Heidegger has fallen prey to the "anthropologism", 
against which the "original phenomenology" shall fight no less 
than against the "psychologism". Yet, Husserl would be aware 
of this stray of Heidegger only ten years after the 
presentation of the semester course at issue. 99 
The concentration on the theme of "life" builds up a direct 
relationship between Heidegger and the trend of the 
"life-philosophy" (Lebensphilosophie) , which was so 
predominant at the time between 1880 and 1930 that "hardly 
a contemporary philosophical direction remained uninfluenced 
by it" .100 Amongst the various representatives of the life-
philosophy, the influence of Dilthey on the early Heidegger 
is the most express. It can easily be seen that in various 
manners the early Heidegger has followed the terminology and 
direction of the thinking of Dilthey, who was precisely 
regarded as the "genuine source of the modern life-
philosophy" .101 And apart from Dilthey, Georg Simmel and Henri 
Bergson also exerted considerably influence on Heidegger. 
This ini tial entanglement wi th the theme of life and wi th the 
Lebensphilosophie, has, above all, already revealed the 
"irrational" or "anti-rational" current in the thinking of 
97. GA58, S. 65 . 
98 Quoted from the article "Leben", in Historisches Worterbuch der 
Philosophiei Ref. also SZ, S.46f. 
99. Ref. Husserl, "Phanomenolgie und Anthropologie", in Husserliana Band 
XXVII: Aufsatze und Vortrage (1922-1937), hrsg. von Thomas Nenon and Hans 
Rainer Sepp, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), S.164f. 
100. Schnadelbach, op. ci t., S. 172. 
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Heidegger, which would only become more apparent in his latter 
thinking. For, life is regarded as "something irrational", 
or something beyond the reach of reason, and the 
Lebensphilosophie as the "metaphysics of the irrational". 102 
It is noteworthy that Heidegger in this course of 1919, 
as in SZ, tried to rise up the field of inquiry by an analysis 
of the question (Frage) at issue. Heidegger was here concerned 
with the question that "is there anything?" (Gibt es etwas?) 
in the lived-experience, whereas in SZ, he would deal with 
the tripartite formulation of the Being-question. According 
to Heidegger, if one can hold tight to the lived-experience 
of question (Frageerlebnis) , it would be revealed that "in 
this lived-experience something is questioned with reference 
to something in general" .103 This structure of "living unto 
something" (Leben auf etwas zu) is apparently revealed out 
of the respect of the intentionality (Intentionalitat) , which, 
as the structure of "directing-i tself-to" (Sich-richten-auf) , 
was considered by Heidegger to be one of the decisive 
discoveries of the phenomenology founded by Husserl.104 
Although Heidegger had not mentioned the title 
"intentionality" hereby, he in a few years later would say 
that "intentionality is a structure of the lived-experience 
as such". 105 
Out of this "intentional analysis" of the lived-experience, 
Heidegger discussed the problem of the "role of the inquirer" 
(Rolle des Fragenden) and the meaningful "environing-world" 
(Umwelt). However, it is hereby not intended to follow his 
discussions on these themes in details. It suffices to point 
out that these discussions had already anticipated the 
problems of the "who" and of the "world" in SZ as the basic 
101. Rickert, op. cit., S.95. 
102. Ref. Schnadelbach, op. ci t., S. 174 . 
103. Ibid., S. 67 . 
104. Vide GA20, S. 34ff. 
105. Ibid., S. 36. 
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moments of the structure of "Being-in-the-world" (In-der-
Wel t -sein) . 106 
For Heidegger's analysis of the lived-experience in this 
semester, it is worthy noticing that Heidegger here stated 
that the" li v~d-experience properly for me" (eigens fur mich, 
this surely anticipates the character of Jemeinigkeit of 
Dasein in SZ) 107 is a "properizing-event" (Ereignis) rather 
than a "process" (Vorgang) . And by Ereignis, he means no Being, 
neither physical nor psychical Being. Heidegger says: 
The lived-experience does not pass through before me like 
a thing, which I pose forth, as Object (Objekt) , rather I 
properize it for me and it is properized according to its 
essence. And therefore I understand it gazingly, since I 
understand it by no ways as a pro-cess (Vor-gang) , as thing 
(Sache), Object, but rather as something utterly new, as a 
properizing-event (Ereignis) . I see so less a material thing 
(Sachartiges) as an Obj ecti ve matter-sphere, a Being (Sein) , 
neither physical nor psychical Being. Understanding simply 
the lived-experience, I see nothing psychical. Er-eignis also 
does not mean that I would ap-propriate (an-eignen) myself 
the lived-experience from outside or from somewhere. 
"Outside" and "inside" here have so less meaning as "physical" 
and "psychical". 108 
Heidegger hereby stated that lived-experience is not like a 
thing. It is not "Object" (Objekt) , it is "something utterly 
new", to the extent that Heidegger asserted that it is "neither 
physical nor psychical Being". Obviously, from the lecture 
courses of the following years, it can be seen that Heidegger 
would soon amend this assertion. He would soon regard life 
as Being and would thematize such term as "Being of factical 
106. Vide SZ, S.53£. 
107. Vide ibid., S. 42£. 
108. GA56/57, S. 75. 
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life" (Sein des faktischen Leben) .109 Nevertheless, from this 
initial exclusion and latter amendment, it can be seen that, 
on the one hand, Heidegger was seeking for a "utterly new" 
characterization of lived-experience, and on the other hand, 
as will be shown later, Heidegger in this semester has not 
yet understood "Being" as he later would. Moreover, from this 
characterization of the lived-experience, it can also be seen 
that Ereignis, as a cardinal concept of Heidegger's latter 
thinking, has already been posed out in his first course after 
the Great War. And it seems that the meaning of Ereignis 
therein, as something original, something before 
"Objectification" (Objektivierung) and knowledge, is to a 
certain extent related to its meaning in Heidegger's late 
thinking, apart from the fact that it is hereby considered 
in contradistinction with "Being", rather than considered as 
characterization of Being. 
§2.10 The Method for the Science of Lived-experience 
in general 
After turning from the psychical as inquired by the 
psychology to the pre-theoretical lived-experience and 
generally indicating the structure of it, Heidegger is 
encountered with the question: "How is a science of the 
lived-experience as such possible?"llo It is a question 
concerned with the how (Wie), the way, or the method, of the 
inspection of the "environing-world-lived-experience" 
(Umwelterlebnisse). It is precisely the core and the zenith 
of the course, as Heidegger says: "This whole lecture is 
109. GAS 9 , S. 172 . 
110. "Wie ist eine Wissenschaft von Erlebnissen als solchen moglich?", ibid., 
S. 98. 
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actually moved around the method-problem. ,,111 And it is only 
at here, nearly the end of the course, that Heidegger first 
overtly alluded to the "phenomenological method" as the 
guideline for the appropriate access into the original domain, 
that is, the pre-theoretical lived-experience. 
First of all, following the elaboration of Husserl in Ideen 
I, Heidegger presented the "method of reflective description 
or descriptive reflexion" of phenomenology. In the natural 
attitude, our "gaze" (Blick) is directed to the thing (Ding) . 
But in the inquiry of the lived-experience, there should be 
a "gaze-turning" (Blickwendung) , though which our gaze is 
turned away from the thing back to the lived-experience. This 
"gaze-turning" is called "reflexion" (Reflexion) , in so far 
as the gaze is turned back to that "which is the same being 
with the reflexion itself". According to Husserl, what appears 
in the reflexion is describable. "The field of li ved-
experience, the stream of lived-experience, which is obtained 
in the reflexion, becomes describable, ,,112 Heidegger says. And 
therefore "the science of the lived-experience is a 
descriptive science." In this descriptive reflexion, the 
lived-experience is supposed to be exposed as what lies in 
the lived-experience as such. 
But there was the objection that this descriptive 
reflection could never layout what is in the lived-experience 
as such to the extent as it is supposed to be. For, "in the 
reflexion, we are set in theoretically", and all "theoretical 
bearing" (theoretische Verhalten) , as Heidegger had showed 
out, is necessarily "de-living" (entlebendes) bearing. 113 When 
we try to seize the lived-experience, it turns out that the 
stream of lived-experience would be made "still", and it would 
no longer be the dynamic stream of li ved-experience as such. 
This is the objection from Paul Natrop, which was regarded 
111. Ibid., S.110. 
112. Ibid., S.100. 
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by 'Heidegger as "the only objection scientifically worth 
noticing". 114 It asserts that every description proceeds 
already in "concepts" (Begriffen). It is a "transcribing" 
(Umschreiben) of something into universality (Allgemein-
hei ten). Therefore, every description is already "mediated" 
through "abstraction" and would not be "immediate" as 
phenomenological description claims to be. 115 '~It is therefore 
hopeless to escape from the theorization, if one wants to make 
the lived-experience the object of a science. There is after 
all no immediate seizing (unmittelbares Erfassen) of the 
lived-experience.,,116 
According to Heidegger, this obj ection of Natrop grows out 
of the basic position of the Marburg school, and therefore 
comes from the "standpoint of the theoretical itself". It 
demands phenomenology to give what it is not supposed to 
provide. "What is demanded, as the aim of knowledge, is the 
'absolute' presentation of the lived-experience, analogously 
as the presentation of the Object (Objekt) . ,,117 This "absolute 
presentation", in accordance with the Kantian standpoint, can 
only be obtained through the mediation of "the consciousness, 
that is, the subjective",. In such demand, Natrop had already 
given the problem at iS,sue "a definite turning" .118 Heidegger 
stated that this objection as well as other criticism of the 
phenomenology has set out from a stubborn standpoint, in this 
case, from the standpoint of the "transcendental philosophy" 
(Transcendentalphilosophie), that they all overlooked" the 
fundamental demand of phenomenology".119 
Heidegger pointed out that the question on the "manner of 
the scientific disclosing of the lived-experience" should 
113 Ibid. , 8.100. 
114 Ibid. , 8.101. 
115 Ibid. , 8.101. 
116 Ibid. , 8.101. 
117 Ibid. , 8.102. 
118 Ibid. , 8.102. 
119 Ibid. , 8.109. 
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stand under the "principle of all principles" of the 
phenomenology. This principle, as mentioned above, asserts 
that "whatever presents itself to us originally in the 
'intuition' , is to be simply accepted as what it gives itself". 
It insists on the "intuition" - in the "broad" sense of 
phenomenology - as the source, the origin of knowledge. This 
principle, in so · far as it serves as "the principle of all 
principles", is, according to Heidegger, not a "theoretical 
statement" (theoretischen Satz) .120 Rather, "it is the 
primal-intention of the true life in general, the primal-
bearing (Urhaltung) of the lived-experience and life as such, 
the absolute life-sympathy (Lebenssympathie) identical with 
the lived-experience itself. ,,121 It is the "basic-bearing" 
(Grundhal tung) in which we li ve. And it is through rigorously 
keeping to this "basic-bearing" that the scientificality of 
phenomenology is considered to be more "rigor" than that of 
the particular sciences. Heidegger says: 
The "rigor" (Strenge) of the scientificality, which is 
evoked in the phenomenology, acquires its original meaning 
out of this basic.:..bearing, and it is not comparable wi th the 
'rigor' of the derivative, not original science. 122 
Heidegger proceeded to point out that the objection from 
Natrop is grounded on the preconception that all description 
as "grasping in words" (In-Worte-Fassen) is carried out in 
language, and that all language is already "Objectifying" 
(objektivierend). Therefore, all description is mediated 
through the "Obj ectifying" and never immediate. Besides, 
there is still another prejudices in the theoretical 
standpoint that they simply identified the "phenomenological 
seeing" (phanomenologische Sehen) wi th the description. They 
120. Ibid., S. 109. 
121. Ibid., S. 110. 
122. Ibid., S.110. 
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are · not clear that "the seeing, out of which eventually a 
description first grows, that is, the intuition, has a 
completely different character". 123 Even if the description 
is necessarily an de-living theorization of Objectification, 
it does not exclude the possibility that the intuition backing 
the description is not theoretical in character. 
Accordingly, Heidegger elaborated the concept of the 
"formal theorization" (formale Theoretiserung) , which is 
regarded as the alternative to the de-living theorization of 
Objectification and as the proper method for the science of 
lived-experience as such. First of all, Heidegger admitted 
that, if phenomenological investigation is a "bearing to 
something" (Verhalten zu etwas) at all, then there lies in 
it the "inescapable objectification" (Vergegenstandlichung) . 
But this is not necessarily the "Objectification" 
(Objektivierung) , which is a serious of steps of de-living 
(Entlebungsstufen) that finally only "something in general" 
(Etwas iiberhaupt) is left as its peak. According to Heidegger, 
the Objectification is motivated by the "sphere of the 
thinghood" (Die Sphare der Dinghaftigkei t) ",124 and each step 
of de-living inside it is therefore bound to arrive into the 
sphere of thinghood as the final step. In contrast with the 
Objectification, the formal theorization is "free" (frei). 
It means that it does not belong to the steps of de-living 
and therefore is not bound to the sphere of thinghood as the 
final step. Heidegger says: 
We said: the formal obj ectification (Vergegenstand-
lichung) is free, that is supposed to mean: it has no 
steps-binding (Stufengebundenhei t) . Every step has in itself 
the possibili ty to be seen formally. The formal 
characterization demands no special motivation in a definite 
123. GA56/57, S .111. 
124. Ibid., S.90. 
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step inside the process of theorization. 125 
In so far as the formal theorization is not bound to a 
defini te step, it is supposed to cover a wider range than the 
Objectification, which aims at the thinghood. It actually 
covers everything that is able to become lived-experience. 
Hence, all "livable-experience" (Erlebbares) is accessible 
to this method of formal theorization. Therefore, there turns 
out to be two kinds of theorization and of theoretical, which 
are basically different from each other. 
What is worked out in the formal theorization is no 
theoretical de-living and fixation of the livable-experience. 
It is rather "the index for the highest potentiality of the 
life. Its meaning rests on full life itself. ,,126 Heidegger here 
also called it "the pre-worldly" (das Vor-weltliche) , as it 
is not yet something that is broken from the life and arranged 
into the world (certainly here the meaning of "world" is quite 
different from that of it in SZ). And it is only from this 
pre-worldly that "something of knowability" (Etwas der 
Erkennbarkeit) is first motivated. 
This so-called "formal theorization", as contrary to the 
Objectification, actually is Heidegger's perhaps earliest 
explication of the phenomenology laid out by Husserl. It is 
something that springs from Heidegger' s interpretation of the 
"principle of all principles", which is regarded by Heidegger 
as the "primal-bearing" and "absolute life-sympathy" rather 
than a "theoretical statement", as mentioned above. The formal 
theorization, as the "living of living" (Erleben des Erlebens) , 
is regarded as the intuition, which Heidegger specified as 
"the understanding, the hermeneutical intuition" (die 
verstehende, die hermeneutische Intuition) .127 Obviously, 
this is an amendment of the phenomenological intuition worked 
125. Ibid., S.114-5. 
126. Ibid., S.115. 
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out ' by Husserl. And it is clear that this amendment arises 
out of the influence of Dilthey. Actually, precisely through 
this grounding-breaking course is it able to see that, as 
already pointed out above, the influence of Dilthey on 
Heidegger could hardly be overestimated, alike in regard of 
the subject-matter and of the method. Despite that Heidegger 
is concerned with the problematic of life as the proper 
subject-matter of philosophy so well as Dilthey, Heidegger 
also took up Dilthey's basic conceptual pair, that is, the 
pair of understanding (Verstehen) and explaining (Erklaren) , 
and obviously followed Dilthey's demarcation to reserve ' the 
admission to the life for the understanding, and to depreciate 
the explaining in the realm of the Geistes for its reifying 
(Verdinglichung) of the lived-experience. 128 Therefore, 
Heidegger hereby specified the intuition for the formal 
theorization, the meaning of which rests on the life, as the 
"understanding intuition". What is already implied in the 
coinage of this very term is in fact nothing other than the 
conflation of the Lebensphilosophie of Oil they and the 
phenomenology of Husserl, a conflation that would reach its 
zenith in Sein und Zei t, as will be shown later. It means that 
Heidegger's "hermeneut.ical transformation of phenomenology" 
had already begun in 1919, just when he became the assistant 
of Husserl. It is precisely through the lifting up of the 
capacity of understanding over knowing (or, explaining) that 
Heidegger would seek an alternative of phenomenology to the 
"transcendental approach" of Husserl. And it is out of the 
understanding of life that Heidegger would develop out the 
concept of "Being-understanding" (Seinsverstandnis) , the 
possibility of which would be considered by Heidegger to be 
the basic problem of philosophy. 
Yet, although Heidegger claimed that "this whole lecture 
127. Ibid., S.117. 
128. Vide for example, ibid., S. 66f. 
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is actually moved around the method-problem", the elaboration 
of the method that is supposed to be the method of the science 
of lived-experience as such, that is, that of the formal 
theorization, is by no means satisfying. To weigh it according 
to its occupation of the space in this course, the elaboration 
of this method can hardly be equal to the importance of it 
over the whole problematic. It scarcely occupies six pages 
out of one hundred and seventeen. And it is so sketchy that 
it seems that it can hardly be understood just when it is read 
in itself. Actually, what is implied In this sketchy 
discussion can only be brought out with reference to the later 
development of Heidegger's thinking. Moreover, this course 
as a whole is an internally inconsistent, or incomplete, one. 
It sets out from the "knowledge of obj ects" and the problematic 
of axioms, but finally turns out to have nothing decided about 
this matter, after a long and never returned deviation into 
a deeper inquiry of the psychical. 
How does the problematic of the knowledge as knowledge, 
or the meaning of knowledge, turn into the problematic of the 
lived-experience as such, or the life in and for itself? Is 
this turning, as the transformation of the problematic of 
philosophy as primal science, legitimate? On which grounds 
could it assert that life in and for itself is the proper 
subject-matter of philosophy? Is it said that philosophy is 
concerned with "universal Being"? If it is so, then how can 
life, which is only a particular region of Being, be the 
subject-matter of philosophy? 
If description and intuition are separable, then is the 
"formal theori zation" as the "understanding intui tion" 
involved language? Is language, as Natrop says, necessary 
"Objectifying"? If it is so, then does the "formal 
theorization" have to remain intuition and get rid of language, 
in order to be something non-Objectifying? If so, then would 
the inquiry of lived-experience as such, which is considered 
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. to be "pre-theoretical" and to be carried through the method 
of formal theorization, still be a "science"? Is science 
necessary "theoretical" and "Objectifying"? Is there any 
"pre-theoretical science"? If there is, in which ways is its 
scientificality different from that of the theoretical 
sciences? 
All these questions remain situated in obscurity. However, 
after all, despite its incompleteness, inconclusiveness and 
obscurity, this Kriegsnotsemester does present some budding 
aspects of Heidegger's thinking in a decisive moment of 
transition, that is, a transition out of the orientation of 
the neo-Kantianism, out of the problematic of knowledge, into 





FROM LIFE TO BEING: 
THE ELEVATION OF THE BEING-QUESTION TO THE 
SUBJECT-MATTER OF PHILOSOPHY 
In a time that 5ein und Zeit has already appeared for 
seventy years, and the first published volume of Heidegger' s 
Gesamtausgabe, Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie (GA24), 
which was regarded by Heidegger himself as the "new 
elaboration of the third division of the first part of 5ein 
und Zeit",l has appeared for more than twenty years, it has 
already been well-known that Heidegger in the 5Z-period was 
concerned wi th the formulation of philosophy as "ontology", 
or as "the science of Being".2 It is the aim of the present 
essay to work out the reformulation of philosophy in 
Heidegger's early thinking, covering both the pre-5Z-period 
and 5Z-period. In the above chapter, the Kriegsnotsemester 
of 1919, which is concerned with the reformulation of the idea 
of philosophy as primal science, is put under analysis. In 
such analysis, the basic traits of Heidegger' s reformulation 
of philosophy in the pre-5Z-period have already been 
recognized. Furthermore, it can be seen from it that the two 
basic motives of Heidegger' s early thinking as a whole, i.e., 
"science and life", are already put forth in this course. And 
. GA24, S.l. 
2 Vide SZ, S.38; also GA2'4, S.15: "Philosophy is not science of being, 
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it was also shown that many basic ideas in SZ, for instance, 
the environing world, could well be found in this first course 
of Heidegger after the First World War. It is really a 
groundbreaking course, yet in the sense of a probative 
struggling for a new ground, more than a systematic laying-out 
of a marked-off and more or less secured ground. 
However, what is most remarkable of this groundbreaking 
course compared with the SZ-period is that not only the 
Being-question was not yet figured out as the central and sole 
topic of philosophy, but Being was also excluded from the very 
subject-matter of philosophy proposed in this course, that 
is, from the lived-experience as such. "I see so less a 
material thing as an Objective matter-sphere, a Being, neither 
physical nor psychical Being.,,3 In the Kriegsnotsemester of 
1919, under the Scholastic concept of existentia, Being was 
still 60nceived mainly in the meaning of "mere existence", 
or of "reality" (Wirklichkeit) , that is, in the meaning of 
Vorhandensein (literally, Being-before-hand) as used in SZ.4 
Hence, it was still conceived through "the Being-manner of 
the natural things in the widest sense."s And in so far as 
the lived-experience as such was grasped by Heidegger as 
"something utterly new", something essentially different 
from the natural things, as Ereignis rather than as process, 
Being was here excluded from the characterization of the 
lived-experience as such, and therefore from the subject-
matter of philosophy as primal science. 
How then was Be£ng as such to become the proper 
subject-matter ,of philosophy for Heidegger? How did Heidegger 
move from the problematic of lived-experience as such to the 
Being-question? What is the position of the problematic of 
but rather of Being, or, as the Greek expression says, ontology." 
3. See §2.8 of this treatise. 
4. For the meaning of Vorhandensein used by Heidegger in the 52-period, 
see GA24, S.36. 
5. GA2 4, S. 3 6 . 
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life in Heidegger's thinking in SZ-period? Would it simply 
be displaced on behalf of the Being-question, in so far as 
it is, according to the tradi tional viewpoint, somehow 
incompatible to the Being-question? Now, in this chapter, 
I am going to deal with these questions, and to investigate 
how the Being-question, which appears as the sole question 
of concern in the SZ-period, was shaped out from the inquiry 
of life. 
§3.1 Heidegger's First Confrontation with the 
Being-question 
According to the self-presentation of Heidegger, viz., to 
the autobiographical statements that only appeared after the 
fifties, his confrontation with the Being-question could well 
be traced as early as to the summer of the year 1907. In this 
very summer, Heidegger was exposed to Franz Brentano's 
dissertation, Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden 
nach Aristoteles (On the manifold meaning of being according 
to Aristotle), which was as a gift sent to Heidegger by his 
fatherly friend, Dr. C~nrad Grbber. The title page of this 
book carries the motto of Aristotle: TO QV AEYETalTIOAAaxWS 
("the being is said in manifold ways"). Heidegger says: 
His dissertation Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des 
Seienden nach Aristoteles (1862) had since 1907 been my rod 
and staff of my first awkward attempts to penetrate into the 
philosophy. Indefini tely enough, the following considerations 
moved around me: If the being is said in manifold meaning, which 
is then the leading basic meaning? What does Being mean?6 
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Hence, according to this self-presentation, some 
Heidegger scholars hold that the Being-question had already 
stood there at the very beginning of Heidegger's thinking.7 
And they regard the inquiry into the tactical life, as it 
appears in the Kriegsnotsemester and in the lecture courses 
of the following semesters, as "a completely new beginning" 
of Heidegger, though it actually "does not leave the 
Being-question behind". 8 But there are also scholars, who hold 
that the "old Heidegger's autobiographical statements" are 
not so reliable that they "must themsel ves be carefully 
weighed, counterbalanced, and so corrected against all 
archival evidence that can possibly be mustered."9 
At any rate, even if the "old Heidegger's" self-portrait 
is reliable that he was actually sent with a copy of Brentano' s 
dissertation, and he was stunned by it, and then became 
engrossed with the Being-question, the whole event can hardly 
be taken as if Heidegger had already grasped the Being-
question, as well as the thinking of Aristotle, in the same 
manner as he seized it in the 5Z-period, or even the later 
period, of his thinking. The ambigui ty of these self-
presentations may easily suggest this kind of 
misunderstanding. Yet, the publication of Heidegger' s "early 
lecture courses at Freiburg" (Frilhe Freiburger Vorlesungen) 
togethe.r with his other earlier writings, has confirmed that 
this view could be nothing other than misunderstanding. 
According to the Lebenslauf written by Heidegger himself 
in 1915, that is, the autobiographical statements of "the 
young Heidegger", when he studied in the Bertholdgymnasium 
in Freiburg from 1906-1909, his interest was centered on 
mathematics, which soon also extended to physics. 10 And it was 
6. SZO, S.81; see also UzS, S.92; BaR, p.x . 
. For instance, see P6ggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, S.46. 
8. See ibid., S. 27, 46. 
9. See Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, p.6. 
10. For this Lebenslauf, see Ott, Martin Heidegger, S.85ff. 
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in the final year at school that Heidegger was introduced "more 
consciously, but not yet with theoretical rigor into the 
philosophical problems", "primarily through the lectures on 
Plato given by Professor Widder".11 Here it is the lectures 
on Plato but not a book on Aristotle that was said to introduce 
Heidegger into philosophy. And indeed, Grober is also 
mentioned in this Lebenslauf as offering "decisive spiritual 
influence",12 but there is no Brentano. When Heidegger was 
studying in the University of Freiburg, it was the study of 
the Scholastic philosophy, of which Thomas Aquinas and 
Bonaventura was mentioned in the Lebenslauf, that had 
determined his thinking. Therefore, Heidegger said: "My basic 
philosophical convictions remained those of Aristotelian-
scholastic philosophy. "13 In so far as Heidegger's thinking 
was determined by the Aristotelian-scholastic philosophy, it 
is very plausible to think that Heidegger's comprehension of 
Aristotle as well as the Being-question proposed by him was 
first of all directed by the scholasticism, that lS, a 
comprehension of Aristotle that Heidegger would try 
continuously to deconstruct in and after the SZ-period. 14 And 
although Husserl was also mentioned next to the scholastic 
philosophy for being decisive to Heidegger's academic 
development, Heidegger actually was, according to both the 
testimonies of Husserl and Heidegger, 15 hardly familiar wi th 
11. Ibid., S. 86. 
12. Ibid., S. 85. 
13. Ibid., S. 86. 
14. John Caputo has argued that the influence of the medieval scholasticism 
on Heidegger's comprehension of Aristotle and of the Being-question is 
"overlooked". See Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas, p.17. Besides, Caputo 
also argues that Heidegger was indebted to Carl Braig, a Catholic thinker, 
who and whose book, Vom Sein, AbriB der Ontologie, are also mentioned 
together wi th Brentano and Brentano' s book in Heidegger' s treatise "Mein 
Weg in die Phanomenologie" (See ZSD, S.81-2), much more than to Brentano. 
For, Caputo has found it "easier to discern elements of Heidegger' s mature 
wri tings" in Braig' s book Vom Sein, one section of which is entitled "Ober 
die mannigfal tige Bedeutung des Seinsbegriffes", than in Brentano' s book 
on Aristotle, alike in regard of its content and articulation. See ibid. , 
p.45-55. 
15. See, Heidegger, ZSD, S.82-84; also Husserl's letters to Natrop, in 
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Husserl's phenomenology until he himself became the assistant 
and the "most valuable philosophical co-worker" of Husserl. 16 
When Heidegger changed from the study of theology to the 
Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, he began to 
attend Heinrich Rickert's seminars and thus "learned first 
of all to recognize philosophical problems as problems and 
gained an insight into the essence of logic." 17 Above all, 
logic was reported to be the very discipline that had 
interested Heidegger at most until the time when this 
Lebenslauf was written. Therefore, even if Heidegger was 
already concerned wi th the Being-question, it must have been 
conceived under the framework of logic or of the theory of 
judgment, that is, precisely the framework to the Being-
question that Heidegger would try incessantly to overcome in 
and after the SZ-period. 18 Actually, in the Kriegsnotsemester, 
though a new ground is already on the way of breaking out, 
the relics of the logical framework are still clearly visible 
that it set out to reformulate philosophy precisely from the 
problematic of the axioms of knowledge as knowledge. 
It seems that for Heidegger the preference of the 
problematic of logic, which held sway throughout the whole 
studying years of Heidegger, had only been left behind when 
the problematic of life was pressed out instead of it to be 
the proper subject-matter of the philosophy for Heidegger. 
And actually, it is precisely through the unfolding of the 
problematic of "life in and for itself" that the meaning of 
Being underwent a radical change in Heidegger thinking. It 
is first through this change that Being is no longer conceived 
only as "mere existence" (Vorhandensein) and thus excluded 
Thomas Sheehan, "Heidegger's Early Years", and "Heidegger' s 'Introduction 
to the Phenomenology of Religion', 1920-21". 
16. Husserl' s own words, quoted from Sheehan, "Heidegger's 'Introduction 
to the Phenomenology of Religion', 1920-21", p.44. 
17. Ot t , op . c it., S. 8 6 . 
18. For Heidegger' s consideration of the Being-question under the framework 
of logic in his dissertation and Habilitationsschrift, ref. van Buren, 
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from the characterization of life, but is considered in a wider 
perspective that can cover both the life and the "mere 
existence". Hence, it is, I suppose, only after the unfolding 
of the problematic of life that, as will be shown later, the 
Being-question would get its exclusive significance in 
Heidegger's thinking, as the one it possesses in the 5Z-period. 
It therefore means that the Being-question would acquire its 
importance in the same manner as it maintains in 5Z, only after 
the course of the Kriegsnotsemester, but not from 1907 onwards, 
that is, the year in which Heidegger was reported having 
received the book of Brentano, in so far as the problematic 
of life was gradually unfolded only in the following semesters 
after this groundbreaking course. 
§3.2 Life and Philosophy 
Conspicuously, as shown by his early lecture at Freiburg, 
Heidegger's thinking was centered on the problematic of life 
from 1919 to 1924. And in the 5Z-period, that is, from 
1924-1929, though the problematic of life seems nominally 
derived of its first rank of importance, it actually still 
dominated the thinking of Heidegger, to the extent that it, 
under the name of "factical Dasein" or "Existence" (Existenz), 
even overshadows the Being-question as such. The Kehre of 
Heidegger, I suppose, can to certain extent be regarded as 
the overcoming of this domination of the problematic of life 
over the Being-question as such. 
It is Plato who first introduced the problematic of life 
(su.:nl) into philosophical discussion. 19 And for Plato, the 
problematic of life is already closely connected with that 
op. ci t ., p. 56. 
19. Ref. article "Leben", in Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie, Band 
5: L-Mn, hrsg. von Joachim Ritter, (Basel: Schwabe & Co, 19-80). 
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of the soul (,+,vxTl, the psyche) . Living is regarded as moving. 
Soul is regarded to be "immortal" (i.e., always living) in 
so far as it is "always in motion" . 20 Actually, there is somehow 
in Plato already a tension between the concept of life and 
that of Being. For, Being is comprehended by Plato, who follows 
Parmenides in this point, as something static and unchangeable. 
Life as incessant moving, and thus ever changing, is precisely 
at the opposition of Being. But the contemplation of the 
unchangeable Being is at the same time regarded as the highest 
performance of life. 21 That is to say, life is to achieve its 
highest performance only when it is occupied with something 
static and unchangeable, viz. only when it becomes "de-living". 
Obviously, when Plato thought that the highest performance 
of life is contemplating the static and unchangeable Being, 
Being outweighs life for him. 
The neo-Platonism follows the demarcation of Plato to put 
life on the side of movement, difference and limitlessness, 
in contradistinction with Being, identity and limitedness. 
And life also becomes the middle element of the triad, 
Being-life-thinking. Life is conceived as the alienation and 
differentiation of the Being as the original unity, whereas 
thinking as the re-unification from this state of 
differentiation. Hereby life as movement has gotten the sense 
of the actualization of original unity. 22 
However, in ancient Greek and Hellenistic philosophy, life 
was discussed only in connection wi th other problematic, for 
instance, that of soul, but never became a thematic topic in 
itself. It as well as the concept of Weltanschauunghas become 
a thematic topic of philosophy only after the German 
Romanticism, in which life is lifted up as something opposite 
2 0. Vide Plato, Phaedrus, 246 c 7f. 
21. Ref. Heinz Heimsoeth, The Six Great Themes of Western Metaphysics and 
the End of the Middle Ages, trans. Ramon J. Betanzos, (Detroit: Wayne 
State University Press, 1994), p.155f. 
22. Ref. article "Leben", in Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie. 
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to the concept of reason delivered from the enlightenment. 
It is put on the side of the dynamic, organic, concrete and 
the intuition as opposite to the static, mechanic, abstract 
and the pure reason. 23 
In the nineteenth century, after the fall of Hegelianism, 
the topic of life was included as a philosophical theme mainly 
under the rubric of Lebensphilosophie, which is generally 
regarded as the offspring of the German Romanticism. It is 
such a predominant philosophical trend around the turn of 
centuries that, as mentioned above, "hardly a contemporary 
philosophical direction remained uninfluenced by it". At this 
point, Heidegger is not distanced from his contemporaries. 
It is obvious from his early lectures at Freiburg that life 
or lived-experience, as the "indication of a definite 
spiritual situation",24 is a predominant theme of his early 
thinking. Actually, life has become so much predominant a 
theme in the thinking of early Heidegger that, contrary to 
the Hellenistic philosophy, . it was not only accorded an 
independent position, but other topics could acquire their 
proper sense only with reference to life. The priority is now 
reversed that life is no longer regarded as the 
differentiation and alienation of the primal, but it is itself 
regarded as the primal, of which the general concepts are only 
the "de-living" abstraction. Therefore, it demands an 
"original-science of the factical life in itself". 
It is indeed a crucial step for Heidegger' s thinking that 
he has introduced the topic of life as the proper 
subject-matter of philosophy. But this step is hazardous as 
it is crucial. Crucial is it that it signifies Heidegger's 
philosophical detachment from Husserl's transcendental 
phenomenology, so long as Heidegger understands the meaning 
of" 1 i ve d - e xp er i e n c e " in terms 0 f the "f act i c a I 1 i f e" rat her 
23. Ref. Schnadelbach, op. cit., S.176f. 
24. wAnrnerkungen zu Karl Jaspers >Psychologie der Wel tanschauungen< 
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than of the "pure consciousness". And it implies that 
Heidegger has from the outset of his thinking left behind the 
ambition to articulate a system of "absolute knowledge" upon 
the "transcendental ego" . This detachment in a decisive manner 
directs the subsequent thinking of Heidegger, including the 
SZ-period and the late period. But hazardous also it is that 
it not only signifies the conscious detachment from Husserl' s 
transcendental phenomenology or even the whole tradition of 
transcendental philosophy, but also, perhaps unconsciously 
at least at the beginning, from the ancient ideal of philosophy. 
For, life as the moving or changing, is essentially a 
counter-concept to the idea of ElTlOTTU11l, as expounded by Plato 
and Aristotle. "We all suppose that what we know is not capable 
of being othe.rwise ... Therefore the obj ect of knowledge is of 
necessity. Therefore it is eternal; for things that are of 
necessity in the unqualified sense are all eternal; and things 
that are eternal are ungenerated and imperishable", Aristotle 
says.25 The object of knowledge should be eternal, and thus 
ungenerated and imperishable, viz., it should always be so. 
It can not be something ever moving or ever changing. Only 
what is unchangeable or unmovable can be known. 26 What is ever 
movlng, such as life, can never be the object of knowledge. 
Life as moving defies every attempt of kno~ing. Therefore, 
in accordance with the ancient idea of ElTlOTn~ll, the 
subject-matter of philosophy should be something static and 
eternal, such as Being, instead of something ever changing, 
such as life. 
If life is a topic so heterogeneous to the idea of E1TlOTll~ll 
and therefore of <plAooo<pla, then when Heidegger led the 
subject-matter of life into the core of philosophy and 
(1919/21)", in Wm, S.14; also see GA59, S.13. 
25. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1139 b 17f. For the interpretation of 
this passage of Aristotle, ref. Heidegger, GA19, S. 31f: "Die ETIIOTlll111 geht 
also auf solches Seiende, das immer ist." 
26. Ref. Gadamer, Lob der Theorie, 3. Aufl., (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 
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reformulated the idea of philosophy as "the science of 
lived-experience as such", would it be something like the 
"worldview-philosophy" that it turns out to the self-
destruction of philosophy rather than its rescue? In fact, 
a comparison of philosophy of life and worldview-philosophy 
can well be justified that worldview, as mentioned above, is 
always accompanied wi th life-view. And the science of 
lived-experience as such formulated by Heidegger, as the 
theory of world-views, is supposed to be not theoretical. Then, 
if the inquiry into lived-experience as such is so much 
inconsistent with the idea of philosophy, why did Heidegger 
still try to put this inquiry under the rubric of philosophy? 
Is it actually an inquiry that is wholly different from 
philosophy that if it is designated as philosophy, then the 
concept "philosophy" would even.tually become an 
"incomprehensive concept" (Unbegriff)? 
Perhaps , it is precisely the "question of all questions" 
concerning the thinking of Heidegger that what he, no matter 
in his early or late period, tried to assign to philosophy 
as its proper subject-matter are somehow irrevocably ruptured 
with the traditional idea of philosophy. And from the above 
analysis, it is obvious that this trend to sunder with the 
traditional idea of philosophy has already been at work in 
the very beginning of his thinking. This ini tial rupture wi th 
the ancient idea of philosophy has already given some hints 
to the fact that Heidegger in his late thinking, after having 
discovered that philosophy is nothing other than metaphysics, 
eventually gave up the name of "philosophy" and simply 
designated his vocation as "thinking" (Denken). 27 
1991), S.67. 
27. See, for instance, "Brief uber den >Hurnanisrnus<, in Wrn, S.313-364. 
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§3.3 The Incompatibility of Life and Science 
Actually, Heidegger himself was well aware of the 
"difficulty" concerning the idea of an "original-science of 
the life in itself". He knew it quite well that the idea of 
such a science would likely turn out to be "contrariety" 
(Widersinn) , "factually unexecutable" (faktisch unaus-
filhrbar) , and "superfluous" (iJberfliJssig). 28 Hence, why did 
Heidegger still intend to work out such a science even that 
it would likely be in vain? Presumably, there must be a strong 
motivation for Heidegger to venture into such a hazardous 
inquiry. Then what would such ·a motivation be? And how was 
Heidegger supposed to evade such difficulty? 
On the one hand, in the early Heidegger, there must be a 
strong disposition to thematize the problematic the life. This 
disposition, which seems to arise in Heidegger after the First 
World War, I suppose, as any other disposition of human beings, 
can hardly be fully explained. And an explanation for our case 
is even more baffled that about Heidegger's spiritual 
itinerary between the "dark war years" of 1917 to 1919, "almost 
nothing is presently known". 2 9 Perhaps, it could only be said 
that it is the "indicatiqn of a definite spiritual situation". 
On the other hand, in the young Heidegger there must be still 
a quite strong conviction in the idea of ETIlOTn~n, i.e., of 
s .cience or Wissenschaft. Standing under the Western tradi tion 
of philosophy, Heidegger was still convinced that in so far 
as he attempts to know life, he should establish a science 
(and thus, a proper scientific method) for it. The early 
Heidegger still maintained the fai th in science, which would 
finally be expressed in his notorious Rektoratsrede at 
Freiburg in 1933. 30 Hence, the dernarcation between philosophy 
2 8. See GAS 8, S. 81. 
29. Kisiel, op. cit., p.6i also ref. van Buren, op. cit., p.144. 
30. See Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universitat, Das Rektorat 
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as science and worldview-philosophy, as shown above, remains 
an important theme for him. With this conviction in science, 
and under his disposition to the problematic of life, 
Heidegger was therefore aspired to establish a science for 
the life in itself, though it is clear to him that such a science 
stands in the danger of turning out to be a contradictory idea. 
The tension, as pointed out by Dil they, between "universally 
valid knowledge" and a wisdom concerning "the enigma of life", 
a tension that is perhaps another indication of "spiritual 
situation", found its vivid expression in the early 
Heidegger. 31 
However, although Heidegger was still convinced with the 
idea of science, he was by no means satisfied with the 
particular sciences (as dominated by the modern physical 
sciences, which have already become the model or ideal of 
science in the second half of nineteenth century) . Heidegger 
was convinced that life, provided that it could be studied 
by science, should be inquired under a kind of science that 
is utterly different from the particular sciences in vogue. 
This dissatisfaction, as shown above, lies, for Heidegger, 
ln the theoretical character of these sciences, as contrary 
to Husserl, who was rather dissatisfied with the "natural 
attitude" of these sciences. 
What is the reason for Heidegger's dissatisfaction with 
the theoretical sciences, especially when they are used to 
investigate the life? What are the drawbacks of the 
theoretical sciences that, though they prove to be effecti ve 
in the physical realm, Heidegger considered that they are 
inappropriate in the realm of life? According to Heidegger, 
as mentioned above, the drawback of the theoretical sciences 
consists in the fact that they are essentially based on the 
"process of de-living" (ProzeB der Ent-lebung). The process 
1933/34, hrsg. von Hermann Heidegger, 2. Aulf. (Frankfurt/Main: 
Kloster-mann, 1990), S.9-19. 
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of de-living was regarded by Heidegger as "the essence of the 
theoretical form of obj ecti vi ty" (Gegens tandli chkei t) . 32 And 
in so far as they are based on the process of "de-living", 
it is qui te absurd to apply them to the inquiry on the " living" . 
However, are there any sciences that are not theoretical 
in character? That is to say, are there any sciences that are 
not based on the process of de-living? Would it be the case 
that science is essentially theoretical that the term 
"theoretical science" is actually a pleonasm? Does not the 
classical idea of ETTIOTrH..lll, as expounded and founded by Plato 
and Aristotle, imply that it should be theoretical? It was 
said above that, according to the ancient idea of ETTIOT~~ll, 
"only what is unchangeable or unmovable can be known". If it 
is so, then would it mean that to make something the object 
of knowledge is to make it unchanged, unmoved, that is, to 
"de-live" (to un-move) it? Is not science in general, but not 
only theoretical science, essentially "de-living"? 
Aristotle, as pointed out above, classified science into 
three branches, the theoretical, practical and productive 
science. Theoretical science is distinguished from the other 
two that it is regarded as the knowledge for the sake of 
knowledge itself, where~s the practical science as that for 
the sake of the well-being of the actor, and the productive 
science as that for the sake of the product. 33 And therefore, 
based on this distinctiveness, theoretical science is 
considered to be independent of who is theorizing, whereas 
the practical science to be dependent on the actor, and the 
producti ve science on the producer. Precisely from this point 
is it able to see that only theoretical science is consistent 
with the common idea of knowledge, according to which the 
31. Ref. Bambach, op. cit., p.187. 
32. GAS 6/57, S. 90 f . 
33. Ref. article "Theorie", in Alois Halder and Max Muller, Philosophisches 
Wdrterbuchi also Gadamer, "Theorie, Technik, Praxis", in Gesammel te Werke 
Bd 4, Neuere Philosophie 11, (Tubingen: Mohr, 1987), S.243-30S. 
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genuine knowledge is universally valid for various people. 
And though, in Aristotle's classification, the practical and 
the productive are juxtaposed with the theoretical science 
that all three of them are considered as "science", actually 
only the theoretical science meets Aristotle's own 
delimitation of ETIlaTn~n. It has been pointed out that, for 
Aristotle, "what we know is not capable of being otherwise". 
And Aristotle also asserted that "among things that can be 
otherwise are included both things made and things done.,,34 
It means therefore that "things made" and "thing done" can 
by no means be the object of knowledge. Hence, Aristotle also 
frequently uses the term ETnaTn~n exclusively for "theoretical 
science" ( ETIlaTn~n in contradistinction to 
"practical wisdom" (<ppovnaIS) and "art" (TExVn) .35 It may be said 
that, for Aristotle, science (ETIlaTn~n ) already means 
theoretical science. 
Actually, it may well be said that all science in the 
Western tradition, including the modern physical sciences, 
is developed under the influence of the idea of ETIlaTn~n worked 
out by Plato and Aristotle. They all seek for wha't is eternal 
unchangeable, imperishable, and what is equally valid for 
different people, as the,object of knowledge. Therefore, all 
science developed out by the Western tradition is essentially 
theoretical in character. They are all motivated, as pointed 
out by Heidegger, by the "thinghood" (Dinghaftigkei t), which 
is something abstracted from all special variety and is only 
"something in general". The mathematical model of the modern 
physics, of which no exact instances can ever be found in the 
factical world, may well exemplify this "something in general". 
Only through this abstraction is something able to be released 
from the particular viewpoint of particular viewer and 
34. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1140 a 1. 
35. Vide Aristotle, op. cit., 1140 a 1f£; also ref. F.E. Peters, Greek 
Philosophical Terms, p.60. 
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therefore to become equally valid for various viewers. 
According to such an idea of ElT10TT)l.lll, which is essentially 
ElT10TTU.lll 6EUJpET1Kn, science can never become the inquiry on life. 
For, according to the traditional idea of life, upon which 
Heidegger was also dependent, life is that which is self-
referential and self-sufficient .. 36 Life is always life in and 
for itself. It is always related to a self. This self-
relatedness is what precisely baffles any attempt of science. 
For, science, according to its ancient idea, is what is equally 
valid for various viewers, but can never be valid only for 
a viewer. Science can never be something related to and 
sufficient for a self only. Its process consists precisely 
in the de-living that it has to remove or abstract from its 
object whatever that is related to a particular viewer only, 
viz., whatever that is related to a sel·f. The obj ect of science 
is the object for the "pure I" rather f6r the "living self". 
Therefore, if life is put under a science, what is 
characteristic of it would have to be removed that it could 
no longer be what it is through the process of science. Hence, 
although there may be science of life, such as biology, there 
could be no "science of life in and for itself" at all. Natorp, 
I suppose, is to a certain extent right on this issue. His 
criticism might be based on the misunderstanding of the idea 
of phenomenology, but it is certainly based on the penetrating 
understanding of the idea of science. 
If what Heidegger understands under the concept of science 
is in accordance wi th the idea of ElTlOTTH.lll as founded by Plato 
and Aristotle, that is, with the traditional Western idea of 
science, then Heidegger's proposal of a science of "life In 
and for itself", I suppose, is really a contrariety, as 
suggested by he himself. The idea of a "pre-theoretical 
36. For the traditional idea of life, ref. article "Leben", in Historisches 
Worterbuch der Philosophie; also Heinz Heirnsoeth, op. cit., p.162ff. 
Heidegg~~ in GA58 also characterized life as "self-sufficiency" (Selbst-
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science" of life is, according to the above analysis, actually 
an "incomprehensive concept". For, science actually means 
theoretical science. The inconsistency of the idea of science 
and that of life can well explain why life is usually regarded 
as something "irrational". For, life as ever moving is 
precisely at the opposition of science, which is considered 
to be based on reason. 
§3.4 The Venture of "Destruction" 
How did Heidegger suppose to evade such a difficulty 
concerning the idea of a science of life in and for itself 
that it would turn out to be either a contradictory idea, or 
superfluous that what it attempts to achieve has already been 
carried out by the particular sciences such as biology? In 
so far as the demarcation between pre-theoretical and 
theoretical science seems to be a problematic idea, Heidegger 
soon shifted the considerations on the difference in 
"tendency" (Tendenz) of the "original-science" of life and 
of the "particular science". Heidegger says: 
The factical life itself and the infinite wealth of the 
worlds lived in it is not to be inquired, but rather the life 
as springing-Qut (entspringend) , as going-forth (hervQr-
gehend) out of a origin. Therefore it is the tendency of the 
understanding of life out of its origin that is leading, and 
this tendency is determining for the manner of preparing of 
the experience-soil (ErfahrungsbQdens) and the forming out of 
the evident Object-realm and thing-realm (Objekt- und 
Sachgebiets). Hence, in so far as the aim of the original-
science is not merely to grasp the factical life and its worlds 
and world-content according to its what-determinations and 
genugsamkeit). See GA58, S.30f; also GA60, S.12. 
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contexts ... the original-science is not in conflict with the 
particular sciences ... In so far as the original science lives 
in a different tendency against the life and its life-worlds 
from the particular sciences, it is not superfluous ... 37 
The science of life is regarded as different from the 
particular sciences that it holds a different "tendency" wi th 
the particular sciences. It is not supposed to inquire the 
"life itself" and its "worlds" according to their "what-
determinations", but rather to understand the life as 
"going-forth out of a origin". Therefore, the science of life 
is called a "original-science" (Ursprungswissenschaft). 
"Life is original-scientifically to be understood as 
springing-out of the origin. ,,38 
However, it is by no means clear that how is the tendency 
of understanding the life as springing-out of the origin 
different from the tendency of the inquiry of particular 
sciences. Is not life itself regarded as the origin? Then what 
does it mean by "life as spring-out of the origin"? Is there 
still another origin that is even more "original" than life? 
Once again, the formulation of a science of life falls into 
obscurity, despite that the formulation has already been 
modified. Actually this is only one of the modifications that 
Heidegger attempted after his "groundbreaking" course of 1919 
concerning the possibility of a science of life. These 
varieties of formulations precisely indicate the fact that 
Heidegger was still probing his way out and had not yet made 
the "decisions" over the formulation of philosophy. After all, 
at the moment, Heidegger himself was still travelling on a 
way, of which he "did not know where it would lead".39 
However, the obscurity of the concrete elaboration and 
demarcation notwithstanding, there are something still quite 
37. GAS 8 , S. 81 . 
38. Ibid., S. 82. 
39. UzS, S.91. 
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clear on Heidegger' s attempts to formulate a science of life. 
There are two points of importance that are once again worth 
mentioning. First, the problematic of life is regarded as 
related to that of the origin, no matter it is itself 
considered to be the origin or as "spring-out of the origin". 
And obviously it is through this conception of life that the 
inquiry of it is regarded to be related to philosophy, which 
is concerned wi th the primal, the apxTl. Secondly, the inquiry 
of life is specified as "understanding of life". Obviously, 
it is Dilthey's demarcation between the understanding and 
explaining that is here at work. Actually, the tendency to 
understanding as contrary to the explaining is precisely one 
of the elements that distinguishes the "original-science" 
from the particular sciences. Both of these points, as will 
be shown later, would still be effectual and decisive in the 
5Z-period. 
While Heidegger himself did not even know where his inquiry 
would lead to, he resorted to the historical investigations 
for a clarification of the problematic at issue. This 
historical investigations are mainly concerned with two 
closely related matters, these are, the problematic of 
factical life and the concept of philosophy. For the former 
matter, Heidegger attempted an investigation of early 
Christianity. For the latter, he ventured into the 
investigation of Aristotle. And as long as Greek philosophy 
was enlisted to systematize Christiani ty, as pointed out above, 
Aristotle, being one of the most important Greek thinkers, 
is also involved with the former matter. 
On the latter part of the Lebenslauf, Heidegger reported 
a quite important change of his interest after his 
dissertation, namely, his aversion against history 
engendered by his preference of mathematics was basically 
overcome. He began to recognize that philosophy "must not 
allow itself to be oriented one-sidedly either on the 
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mathematics and the natural sciences or on the history". 40 It 
was precisely out of this conviction that his 
Habilitationsschrift on Duns Scotus was carried out. 
Therefore, from then on, the conflation of the "systematic" 
and the "historical" inquiry becomes one of the main themes 
of Heidegger's thinking, as he expresses in the summer 
semester of 1928: "The historical characterization is dead, 
if it is not systematic, and the systematic characterization 
is empty, if it is not historical. "41 
The investigation of the early Christianity in the winter 
semester of 1920/21 is perhaps Heidegger's first thematic 
historical venture after his Habilitationsschrift on Duns 
Scotus. This investigation was surely worked under the idea 
of "destruction" (Destruktion) as developed in the former 
semester. 42 The idea of destruction was first mentioned in the 
winter semester of 1919/20,43 and was later developed by 
Heidegger as one of the three basic elements of the 
phenomenological method. 44 
The method of destruction is directed to the "hardened 
tradition" (verharteten Tradition), in so far as it "blocks 
the access to the original 'source' (Quelle) , out of which 
the categories and concepts delivered to us were in genuine 
manner drawn. ,,45 Actual-ly, the method of destruction is 
demanded by the idea of phenomenology itself, in so far as 
this idea consists in nothing other than the conviction that 
"it is only by return to the original sources of intuition 
and to essential-insights which are drawn out of them that 
the great tradition of philosophy is to be evaluated according 
to their concepts and problems. ,,46 According to the idea of 
4 0 . Ott, Ope cit., 5.86-87 
41. GA26, 5.10. Ref. also, GA56/57, 5.125. 
42. Vide GA59, 5.29ff, GA60, 5.78, 135f. 
43. Vide GA58, 5.240f; ref. also Kisiel, Ope cit., p.123. 
44. Vide GA24, 5.31f. 
45. 5Z, S.21-22. 
46. "Vorwort zum Jahrbuch fUr Philosophie und phanomenologische Forschung, 
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phenomenology, all concepts should be evaluated by return to 
the "original sources". But in so far as our understanding, 
as pointed out by Heidegger, tends to fall into the tradi tional 
delivered concepts and these concepts would likely become 
"hardened" and detached from the "original source" that they 
would turn out to block the original sources rather than reveal 
them,47 it is then necessary to destruct these concepts, in 
order to revive the original sources. Therefore, the 
"phenomenological destruction" is 'considered to be a 
"basic-element of the phenomenological attitude".48 It is 
concerned with the "appropriation of the radical basic-
experience-possibilities (Grunderfahrungsm6g1ichkeiten) " 
as the "original sources". 49 And this "basic-experience", for 
the young Heidegger, is actually nothing other than the 
"factical life-experience" (faktische Lebenserfahrung) , 50 
which as the modifications of term "lived-experience" is 
exclusively the young Heidegger's matter of concern. 
In the winter semester of 1920/21, Heidegger tried to 
appropriate the early Christian thinking as the "model of 
factical life-experience".51 But Heidegger soon found that, 
already in the early Christian theologians, such as in 
Augustine, the Christian thought, as pointed out above, was 
permeated wi th the Greek philosophical elements. In the case 
of Augustine, for instance, the Christian thought is 
intermingled with the neo-Platonism. And this is especially 
the case for the Scholasticism, which is thoroughly mixed up 
with Greek philosophical conceptuality. Therefore, in order 
to remove the Greek elements in the Christian thought and to 
reveal the "primal-Christian life-experience" (urchrist-
1, 1913", in Husserliana Band XXV: Aufsatze und Vortrage (1911-1921), 
hrsg. von Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp, (Den Haag: Martinus Nij hoff, 
1987), S.63 . 
• p. Vide S2, S.21f. 
46. GAS 9 , S. 36 . 
49. PA, S. 249. 
50 . Vide GAS9, S.36f; GA60, S.8ff. 
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lichen Lebenserfahrung) ,52 a destruction is supposed to carry 
out. 53 
In this lecture course on the early Christianity and 
especially in the following lecture course on Augustine, the 
phenomenological destruction was carried out against the 
Greek elements in the Christian thought. The "Platonic-
Aristotelian philosophy" is hereby regarded as blocking the 
access to the original rather than as the original. For 
instance, concerning the problematic of temporality 
(Zeitlichkeit), Heidegger says: 
The sense of this temporality is also ground-laying for 
the factical life-experience as well as for the problem like 
that of the eternality of God. These problems were already 
no longer originally grasped in the Middle Ages, owing to the 
influence of the Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy on the 
Christiani ty ... 54 
It seems that at this point, concerning the problematic 
of the factical life-experience, Heidegger had ascribed far 
more importance to the early Christianity than to the Greek 
philosophy. This could well serve to be an indirect proof for 
the assertion expounde~ above that the Greek philosophy, 
especially Aristotle, does not play such an outstanding role 
in Heidegger's thinking from the very beginning as it plays 
in the SZ-period and the following period. 55 As John van Buren 
says, "here Heidegger modeled his thinking especially on the 
young Luther's theology of the cross (theologia crucis) and 
its scathing attack against the theology of glory (theologia 
gloriae) in Aristotelian Scholasticism and against the 
philosophia gloriae of the so-called 'blind heathen master 
51. Ref. Pbggeler, op. ci t., S. 38. 
52. GA 60 , S. 11 6 . 
53. Ref. Pbggeler, op. cit . , S.38f; also van Buren, op. cit., p.157ff. 
54. GA 60, S. 104 . 
55. Ref. Kisiel, op. cit., p.227f. 
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Aristotle' himself ... "s6 
Actually, not only that ancient Greek philosophy does not 
play a crucial role for Heidegger's early thinking, but it 
is precisely because the early Christianity can provide an 
alternative view of life to the "ancient science" that 
Heidegger had picked it up as the "model of factical 
life-experience". 57 And to consider with regard to Heidegger' s 
thinking in the 5Z-period, it is clear that these 
investigations of the early Christianity had provided 
enormous aspirations and impetus to Heidegger, especially to 
his effort to transform the traditional doctrine of Being, 
which is based on the concept of "mere existence" or 
"thinghood" rather than on the factical life. Many important 
conceptions, which had become well established in 5Z-period, 
as will be shown later, (such as the conception of napovota 
or ouota as "Anwesenhei t") were actually developed out of these 
investigations of the early Christianity.58 
§3.S "The Being of the Factical Life" as the 
Problematic of Philosophy 
It is precisely out of the destruction against the 
Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy" for the benefi t of the 
"primal-Christian life-experience" that Aristotle gradually 
becomes the exclusive theme of Heidegger's historical 
investigations. Heidegger himself expressed clearly this 
return to Aristotle from the "Middles Ages" or from "the 
5 6 
. Van Buren, "Martin Heidegger, Martin Luther", in Reading Heidegger 
from the Start, ed. Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren, (New York: State 
University of New York Press, 1994), p.161. For Luther's influence on 
Heidegger, see also van Buren, The Young Heidegger, p.158ff; and Poggeler, 
op. C it., S. 40 f f . 
57 . Re f. GAS 8, S. 61 f . 
58. Cf. GA60, S.102 and SZ, S.25. 
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phenomenology of religion" in his letter to Karl Lbwith: 
... 1 have for now decided to forgo a seminar in the 
phenomenology of religion. For, in all honesty, all that would 
come of it is the kind of drivel over the phen6meriol6gY of 
religion that 1 want to eliminate from philosophy, this talk 
about the religious that one picks up from the secondary 
literature. Perhaps we could risk it next summer. 1 then thought 
of Plotinus, but once again the same problems in part. ~ 
decided on Aristotelian metaphysics. 59 
The problems of facticity exist for me no less than in my 
Freiburg beginnings, only much more radically, and now in the 
perspectives which even in Freiburg were guiding me. That 1 
was constantly concerned with Duns Scotus and the Middles Ages 
and then back to Aristotle, is by no means a matter of chance. 60 
The first letter was written in 1920. It can reveal the 
Young Heidegger's considerations that it is for the sake of 
the clarifications of "the religious" in philosophy that he 
decided to carry out an investigation on Aristotle. The Second 
letter was written in 1927, after the publication of 5Z. It 
is a retrospection on his own philosophical reflections over . 
the problematic of "facticity" or the "factical life-
experience" from his early Freiburg lecture to the publication 
of 5Z. Heidegger clearly stated that he was at first concerned 
with the Middles Ages and "then back to Aristotle". Although 
the two cited letters was written in different periods, they 
both express conspicuously that Aristotle is by no means 
Heidegger's starting point. 
However, the question of Being is indeed raised in a new 
manner through this historical investigation on Aristotle, 
which is in fact occasioned by the problematic of the inquiry 
59. Heidegger's letter to Karl Lbwith on September 13, 1920, quoted from 
Kisiel, Ope cit., p.150, 227. 
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of the "facticallife-experience". And it is precisely through 
this investigation of Aristotle that the problem of life, as 
the matter of concern of the young Heidegger, and the question 
of Being, as the sole question for the late Heidegger, are 
conflated to form the new problematic for Heidegger's 
reformulation of philosophy. This problematic is the "meaning 
of Being of the factical life".61 
In the winter semester of 1921-22, Heidegger halted his 
series of lecture courses on the "phenomenology of religion" 
and held his first lecture course on Aristotle, which was 
entitled "Phanomenologische Interpretationen (Aristotles) 
(Phenomenological Interpretations (Aristotle)) .62 However, 
Heidegger in his lecture course actually had little to do with 
the interpretations of the works of Aristotle. He rather 
presented an analysis of the concept of philosophy and an 
analysis of the factical life, which is supposed to be closely 
related to the concept of philosophy.63 
However, although it is actually not an interpretation of 
the works of Aristotle, the influence of Aristotle or of the 
"Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy" here is much more 
apparent than in any other lecture courses presented before. 64 
The Platonic idea of philosophy or "philosophizing" became 
at first time the thematic topic of analysis. And it is 
precisely out of this analysis that a "new" formulation of 
philosophy was worked out. This formulation is actually very 
ancient with regard to the Western philosophical tradition 
60. Heidegger's letter to Karl Lbwith on August 20, 1927, ibid., p.19. 
61. GA61, S. 172 . 
62. See GA61, "Nachwort der Herausgeber", S. 201. 
63. See GA61. 
64. Actually, as shown by the publications of the early lectures at Freiburg, 
the influence of Aristotle on Heidegger can well be traced to the lecture 
course held two semesters earlier, that is, to the winter semester of 
1920/21. In this course, Heidegger said: " ... sofern es zur Philosophie 
gehbrt, die Gesamthei t des Seienden einzuteilen und nach den verschiedenen 
Regionen verschiedenen Wissenschaften zuzuteilen. Schon Aristoteles sagt 
in seiner Metaphysik: TO DV TIo~~axws ~EYETal (das Seiende wird vielfach 
gesagt.). See GA60, S.56. But the main topic of this lecture course is 
still the Christian "factical life-experience". 
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as it is new for Heidegger. It is ancient so long as it once 
again asserts "being qua being" to be the proper object for 
philosophy. This conception of philosophy (or first 
philosophy) was, as mentioned above, already explicitly 
worked out by Aristotle, and its idea could even be traced 
to Parmenides. It is new for Heidegger, because it is not only 
different from, but also to certain extent contradictory to 
his former formulation of philosophy. For, as pointed out 
above, Heidegger's earlier formulation of philosophy is 
concerned wi th the problematic of life in and for itself, and 
Being was excluded as heterogeneous to it. 
Philosophy was formulated in this lecture course on 
Aristotle as "knowing bearing to being as Being" (erkennendes 
Verhalten zu Seiendem als Sein). 65 Here, the "object" 
(Gegenstand) of philosophy was no longer regarded as "the 
lived-experience as such", but as "being as Being". Obviously 
it is a transcription of the Aristotelian formulation, which 
reads: "a science which theorizes the being qua being", though 
the name "Aristotle" was not explicitly mentioned in these 
passages. 
Heidegger's formulation can be analyzed into three 
consti t uti ve elements: knowing, bearing to, and being as Being. 
The first and the third of these can well be traced to the 
j.\ristotelian formulation. The first element "knowing" 
delimits that philosophy (or, for Arist.otle, first philosophy) 
is a kind of ETIlOTn~n, that is, knowledge or science. This is 
actually the very core of philosophy. For, in accordance wi th 
Aristotle, while first philosophy is the theoretical 
knowledge of being qua being, philosophy simply means ETIlOTn~n 
in general. However, this is also the element that Heidegger 
somehow intentionally overlooked in his former formulation 
of philosophy as "primal science". Heidegger rather insisted 
65. See GA61, S.58-60. 
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that. it is based on the "understanding" or "hermeneutical 
intuition". "To understand with looking, and to look with 
understanding, rather than to eternally know the matter" . This 
was the motto of Heidegger. And actually, as pointed out above, 
whether the inquiry of the life in and for itself, as based 
on the understanding intuition, could be established as a kind 
of science is very problematical. 
The third element "being as Being" is surely a translation 
of "TO QV 15 QV" in the Aristotelian formulation. This is one 
of formulations of the object of (first) philosophy given by 
Aristotle in Metaphysics. There are also other formulations 
given by Aristotle. It is also said to be the science that 
inquires "the first principles and the causes" and the science 
that deals with the "imrnovable substance". 66 Whether these 
formulations are compatible and consistent with each other 
has· long been one of the crucial problematic concerning the 
Aristotelian metaphysics. 67 Certainly, here, as a treatise on 
Heidegger rather than on Aristotle, is not the place to get 
into this problematic in details. What is significant for us 
is that Heidegger, hereby obviously under the influence of 
the Aristotelian formulations, only stressed one formulation 
of the first philosophy. He only picked out the formulation 
of "being qua being" as the object of philosophy. What does 
it matter for Heidegger's stress on only one of the 
formulations? 
In fact, this formulation is by no means a predominant one 
in regard to the tradition of metaphysics. While the unity 
of the various formulations of first philosophy in Aristotle 
had become problematical, one formulation amongst them gained 
66. Ref. §1.1 of the present treatise. 
67. Ref., for instance, Giovanni Reale: The Concept of First Philosophy 
and the Unity of the Metaphysics of Aristotle, trans. John R. Catan, 
(Albany: State University of New York, 1980); Heidegger also raised the 
problem concerning the unity of the various formulations of the object 
of first philosophy in Aristotle, see, for instance, GA19, S.222; KPM, 
S. 7f. 
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the predominant role after the Aristotelian metaphysics was 
recruited by the Christian theologians to explicate the 
Christian fai th. This predominant formulation is that of the 
supra-physical (or immovable) substance. For, as pointed out 
above, the concept of supra-physical substance could well be 
compared to that of Christian God. Actually, the accidental 
title "meta-physics" could also facilitate the conception 
that it is concerned with something "supra-physical". And the 
formulation of the "first principle and cause" is also 
stressed, in so far as God is considered to be the first 
principle. 
On the contrary, the formulation of "being as being" became 
only secondary and preparatory, so long as all the efforts 
of knowing are centered on the knowledge of God. For, God, 
even though he is the sole creator, is hardly the sole being. 
Apart from God, which is regarded as the "highest being", man, 
beasts, plants, and stones, are being too, even though they 
are only beings created by God, that is, only creature. In 
so far as the passions of knowing were condensed to the 
knowledge of God, the question of Being was raised only with 
reference to God. Therefore, the question of being qua being, 
or being in general, became subordinated to the question of 
only one specific region of being, that is, to God, and 
therefore became only secondary and preparatory in regard of 
it. Nevertheless, as soon as Aristotle explicitly pointed out 
that the inquiry of being qua being belongs to the science, 
which he designated as first philosophy, this inquiry could 
then hardly be overlooked by any metaphysicians. It therefore 
remained classified into one division of metaphysics, though 
only a preparatory division. 
Through the classification of the late scholasticism, 
especially under the influence of the Spanish Scholastics, 
Francis Suarez, metaphysics was in the seventeenth century 
divided into metaphysica generalis and metaphysica specialise 
- 119 -
Metaphysica generalis was considered to deal with being qua 
being, or being in general. It, as the "study of being", later 
also got the name "ontologia". Although it is considered to 
deal with Being in general, ontology is by no means regarded 
as the primary or ultimate concern of metaphysics. Rather, 
God as the first and principal being is regarded as the primary 
object of metaphysics, and therefore theologia rationalis, 
as one part of metaphysica specialis, was accorded with the 
first position. 68 This classification was still effective in 
Kant that he asserted metaphysica specialis to be "metaphysics 
in its final end" (Metaphysik im Endzweck) .69 
Heidegger's stress on the inquiry of being qua being as 
the object of philosophy is apparently different from the 
traditional orientation of metaphysics, which, on the 
contrary, insists on metaphysica specialis rather than 
Metaphysica generalis. This turn of stress on the inquiry of 
being qua being rather than on the supra-physical substance 
as the proper object of (first) philosophy is by no means 
something singular to Heidegger. This stress on the inquiry 
of being qua being is actually related to a general trend of 
the German philosophical milieu after the turn of century. 
This trend, which was at that time involved with the title 
of "rebirth" or "resurrection" of metaphysics, attempted to 
reformulate philosophy as ontology.70 Obviously, this trend 
is resulted from the collapse of the Hegelian idealism, which 
could well be regarded as the summit of the traditional 
metaphysics. The collapse of the Hegelian idealism, which was 
engendered by the rapid development of the modern physical 
sciences, somehow implies the end of the traditional 
metaphysics, which, as pointed out above, concentrated itself 
on the inquiry of supra-physical substance. As expressed by 
68. Ref. Heidegger I GA24 I 8.112 f; article "Ontologie", in Halder /Mtiller, 
Philosophisches Worterbuch. 
69. Ref. Heidegger, KMP, 8.9. 
70. Ref. Schnadelbach, Ope cit., 8.232f. 
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the doctrines of positivism, the possibility of any knowledge 
or any science of supra-metaphysical being is thoroughly 
denied. In so far as nobody, who considers himself to be 
engaged in science, still believes the possibility of any 
knowledge about metaphysical substance, philosophy, if it 
wants to keep itself as a science, is obliged to reformulate 
its subject-matter. But, at a time that various divisions of 
sciences had almost covered all regions of reality, where 
could philosophy find its proper subject-matter? The object 
of philosophy is being qua being: This was the eminent answer 
at the beginning of the twentieth century, when philosophy 
faced the formidable siege of various kinds of particular 
sciences. 
Although the stress on the inquiry of being qua being as 
the subject-matter of philosophy is by no means singular to 
Heidegger, it is peculiar to his thinking that he tried to 
connect this inquiry of being qua being wi th the problematic 
of life, that is, the matter of concern of the young Heidegger. 
This connection could well be discerned out in the second 
element of Heidegger' s formulation of the obj ect of philosophy. 
This second element is: "bearing to". Heidegger formulated 
philosophy as "knowing bearing to being as Being" rather than 
simply "knowledge of being as Being". It is precisely this 
second element that distinguished Heidegger's formulation 
from Aristotle's. Actually, . "bearing to" or "directing-
itself-to" (Sich-richten-auf) was considered by Heidegger as 
the structure of lived-experience as such. Philosophy, 
therefore, as "knowing bearing to being as Being" was regarded 
by Heidegger as a kind of lived-experience. That immediately 
means that it, as a kind of lived-experience, is subordinated 
to the question of lived-experience as such, or of the factical 
life-experience in general. Hence, the traditional 
conception of philosophy as the inquiry of being qua being 
is in this manner connected wi th the problematic of factical 
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life-experience. 
Moreover, Heidegger did not seem satisfied wi th this loose 
connection between the problematic of factical life-
experience and the inquiry of being qua being. He tried to 
- - . . - -. - - -
conflate the two inquiries together by formulating the 
problematic of factical life-experience as "the Being of 
factical life". Heidegger then regarded "the Being of factical 
life" to be the proper subject-matter of philosophy. He 
expressed clearly this conception in the essay entitled 
"Ph~nomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles" 
(Phenomenological Interpretations to Aristotle) in 1922 
(once supposed to be lost, and "discovered" only recently, 
edited by Hans-Ulrich Lessing and published in 1989), which 
was a program of his recent and future work that served for 
the appli.cation of the Extraordinariat of Marburg and 
Gottingen. Heidegger says therein: 
The object of philosophical research is human existence 
(Dasein) as it is interrogated on its character of Being. 71 
The problematic of philosophy treats the Being of the 
factical life (das Sein des faktischen Lebens).72 
In this first "official" written work since his 
Habilitationsshrift in 1916, a work that is regarded by 
Heidegger scholars as "the zero-point of the specific project" 
of 5Z,73 Heidegger explicitly connected the Being-question 
with the problematic of factical life, and formulated the 
problematic of philosophy or of "philosophical research" as 
"Being of the factical life" or -to "human existence" wi th 
71. PA, S.238. 
72. PA, S. 246. 
73. See Theodore Kisiel, op. cit., p.250; Also, Gunter Figal, op. cit., 
S.23. 
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regard to its "character of Being" (5einscharakter) .74 The 
conflation "Being of factical life" also appeared at the 
Aristotle-course in 1921-22. 75 This conflation actually 
signifies an important breakthrough of Heidegger' s thinking. 
On the one hand, the Being-question was by no means 
Heidegger's matter of concern in the Kriegsnotsemester of 
1919. It therefore was not the subject-matter of Heidegger' s 
reformulation of philosophy as primal science in this course. 
Actually, Heidegger in the lecture course of 1919/20 
explicitly stated that philosophy as "origin-science" 
requires "no ontology". 76 But soon, in the Aristotle-essay of 
1922, apparently under the impetus of his historical 
investigations on Aristotle, philosophy, for Heidegger, 
became "principal ontology" (prinzipielle Ontologie) ,77 which 
lS obviously a term that anticipated the term 
"fundamental-ontology" (Fundamentalontologie) in 5Z. 78 The 
Being-question from then on acquires its central place in 
Heidegger's thinking. 
Moreover, Heidegger in the Kriegsnotsemester had also 
explicitly excluded Being from his characterization of the 
factical life. But now, in this Aristotle-essay as well as 
in the Aristotle-course, not only Being was brought out as 
the main question of philosophy, but the Being-question was 
conflated with the life-question and turned out to become one 
question, that is, the question of "Being of factical life". 
Obviously, the meaning of Being hereby for Heidegger is much 
different from that he grasped in the Kreigsnotsemester. It 
is no longer conceived only in the sense of "the Being-manner 
74 h 
. T e German term "Dasein" in this text had not yet carried the special 
meaning as in Sein und Zeit, so here it was translated into English as 
"existence", which is the usual meaning of "Dasein". The formal 
terminological word for Heidegger in this text is rather "the factical 
life" (Das faktische Leben) . 
7
5
• See GA 61, S. 1 7 2 . 
76. GA58, S.239. 
77. PA, S. 246. 
78 SZ, S.13. 
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of the natural things in the widest sense." On the contrary, 
the meaning of Being now covers both the Being-manner of the 
natural things and that of the factical life. Concerning this 
difference, it will be treated in more details in next chapter. 
On the other hand, the formulation of philosophy as the 
inquiry of ~Being of factical life" signifies an important 
breakthrough of Heidegger's thinking because it actually in 
a large extent determines the direction of thinking of 
Heidegger in SZ-period. As pointed out above, Heidegger in 
the Aristotle-course of 1921-22 formulated philosophy as the 
~knowing bearing to being as Being". But then in the 
Aristotle-essay in 1922 he formulated philosophy as the 
inquiry of ~the Being of factual life". Certainly, the former 
formulation is closer to the tradi tional metaphysics, but at 
the same time seems comparably irrelevant to Heidegger's 
matter of concern in the early twenties. The second 
formulation, presumably Heidegger's construction, then 
serves to include his proper concern, that is, the problematic 
of factical life, into the subj ect-matter of philosophy, and 
also subordinate it under the ~adltional problematic of 
metaphysics, that is, the Being-~tion. This formulation 
was then generated into the basic question of SZ. It became 
the question of the Existence, namely, the Being of human 
Dasein. The published part of SZ is in fact nothing other than 
the ~existential analytic of Dasein". Therefore, it can be 
said that the published SZ is merely the working out of the 
problematic of the ~Being of factical life", which was first 
posed in the Aristotle-course of 1921-20. 
Obviously, However, in SZ, contrary to the Aristotle essay 
of 1922, the question of Existence is by no means regarded 
as the proper problematic of philosophy. Philosophy is 
supposed to deal with the question of Being as such. Whether 
it is better to stick to the traditional formulation of being 
qua being, or better to stick to the problematic of life? Which 
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question is the most genuine question of philosophy? 
Obviously, Heidegger had not yet made his decision over these 
questions in the early twenties. But to see it from 5Z, 
Heidegger has resolutely clung to the traditional metaphysics 
and posed the question of Being as such as the proper 
subject-matter of philosophy. The question of Existence was 
arranged by Heidegger as only the preparatory analysis of the 
question of Being as such. Yet, the "existential analytic of 
Dasein is also that "out of which all other ontologies can 
first arise". 79 It is somewhat striking that the traditional 
priority of metaphysics in regard of its subject-matter was 
reversed in· Heidegger. The inquiry of the Being of human being, 
as metaphysica specialis, is regarded as preparatory, whereas 
the inquiry of Being in general, as metaphysica generalis, 
is regarded as the "final end". And this arrangement had indeed 
already been anticipated, though not· yet systematically 
worked out, in the Aristotle-essay of 1922. Heidegger says 
therein: "The problematic of philosophy treats the Being of 
factical life. Philosophy is in this regard · principal 
ontology, so that the determinate, particular, world-laden 
regional ontologies receive the problem-ground and 
problem-sense from the ontology of factici ty. ,,80 
All the efforts on the above analysis of the young 
Heidegger are hitherto pressed into the clarifications of 
Heidegger's reformulation of philosophy in the 5Z-period, 
which is actually nothing other than the incorporation of the 
Being-question into the reformulation of philosophy as a 
science of life in the pre-5Z-period. Through the historical 
investigations over Aristotle, the Being-question gradually 
becomes the crucial problematic for Heidegger. It was then 
dragged by Heidegger into the enigmatic fabric of the 





problematic of life. This results in the formulation of 
philosophy as the inquiry of the "Being of factical life". 
Through this conflation, the meaning of Being as well as that 
of the factical life is completely changed for Heidegger. And, 
as pointed out above, this conception of philosophy, though 
it would be posed with different terms, still determines 
Heidegger's way of thinking in the SZ-period. Actually, the 
access to the way of SZ-period has already been seen. However, 
it still requires one step further to really get along into 
this way. This step is: to build up the connection between 
Being and time. 
§3 . 6 The Problema tic of Time 
It has been traced that under the impetus of the historical 
investigation on Aristotle, the Being-question, which on the 
one hand is the central question of the traditional 
metaphysics (or first philosophy) since Parmenides and on the 
other hand somehow stands at the opposi te of the life-question, 
was elevated to the center of Heidegger's reformulation of 
philosophy. And no sooner than the Being-question was raised 
to the central place, was it conflated with the life-question 
by Heidegger. This conflation resul ts in the question of the 
"Being of the factical life". This, to see 
conceptuali ty of traditional metaphysics, is 
it from the 
actually a 
strikingly awkward expression. For, as pointed out above, 
Being, since Plato, was considered to be something static and 
unchangeable, whereas life to be ever moving and changing. 
How could these two so utterly different, and even 
contradictory, concepts be merged into one? Actually, it is 
precisely this "contradictories in one" that has determined 
the thinking of Heidegger. It is therefore by no means 
surprising that Heidegger would become more and more engrossed 
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into the enigmatic thinking of Heraclitus, a thinker who 
incessantly seeks for the truth of the harmony of the 
opposites. 
'. While Heidegger posed the question of the Being of factical 
life and touched on the relation between the "principal 
ontology" as the inquiry of the Being of factical life and 
other "ontologies", through the relation between Being of 
factical life. and Being as such has not yet worked out 
explicitly, the framework of the way of thinking of the 
SZ-period had already been set up. But there is still one 
element, which is constitutive for the program of Sein und 
Zei t that is missing. This element is time (Zei t) . According 
to the progra~ of SZ, Heidegger tried to interpret the meaning 
of Being of Dasein as well as that of Being as such in terms 
of time. Then, how could Heidegger build up the relation 
between "Being and Time"? I am now going to give a brief 
treatment to this question, in order to complete the 
preparation to the analysis of Heidegger's reformulation of 
philosophy in the SZ-period. 
The problematic of time was already thematically raised 
in Heidegger's trial lecture of his Habilitation, "Der 
Zei tbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft" (The time-concept 
in the historical science) . 81 In this lecture, Heidegger, 
still under the influence of the South West German School of 
neo-Kantianism, was concerned with the distinction of the 
natural science and the historical science. He tried to 
demarcate these two kinds of science by virtue of the 
difference of their respective time-concept. According to 
Heidegger, the time-concept understood by the physical 
sciences is a series of homogeneous ordering of points of time. 
There are no quali tati ve differences between different points 
of time. But, on the contrary, the time-concept understood 
by the historical sciences is various with it that for 
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historical sciences each points of time are qualitatively 
different from each other with regard to the events happening 
in them. 82 
Actually, the relation between being and time was already 
implicitly touched in this trial lecture. For, the natural 
science and the historical science are supposed to deal with 
two different regions of being, that lS, with nature and 
history respectively. But, after all, as pointed out above, 
the Being-question was not yet the central question for 
Heidegger at that time. Only after almost ten years, in the 
winter semester of 1925, did Heidegger renew this problematic 
in the trial lecture and pose it explicitly in regard of the 
relation between time and division of various regions of 
being. 83 
The concept of "temporali ty" (Zei tlichkei t), which would 
then serve as one of the constitutive concepts in the program 
of SZ, was already mentioned in the Kriegsnotsemester of 1919. 
It is worthy noticing that in this groundbreaking course, the 
concept of temporali ty was as well as in SZ used by Heidegger 
to characterize the "Being" of human being, though the meaning 
of the terms used in the two contexts are certainly as much 
different as they seem to be the same. Heidegger says in the 
Kriegsnotsemester: 
The psychical in sense of psychology is a Being, not in 
rest, but rather in constant changing, a process-connection, 
running in the time, precisel v cha~acteri zed by temporali ty. 84 
Certainly, this is a characterization of the psychical (or, 
of lived-experience) that Heidegger hereby did not agree with. 
8 1. FS, S. 357-375. 
82 Ref. Pbggeler, '" Geschichtlichkei t' im Spatwerk 
Pbggeler, Heidegger und die hermeneutische Philosophie, 
P.lber, 1983), S.142f. 
83. Vide GA20, S.lff. 




It is the characterization of the psychical "in sense of 
psychology", a characterization posed by a theoretical 
science. But astonishing enough is that this characterization 
did literally agree with his later characterization of the 
factual life, or Dasein, that is, "a Being" "precisely 
characterized by temporality". 
The problematic of time was posed explicitly with regard 
to the problematic of the factical life-experience only 
through Heidegger's historical investigation of the early 
Christiani ty. In the investigation of the early Christiani ty, 
Heidegger found out a kind of temporality different from the 
"obj ecti ve concept of time". 85 The distinction of them could 
well be represented by the difference of the two time-concepts 
in Greek, i.e., of Xpovo~ (time) and Kalpos (instant moment). 
"'Time and instant moment' (Zei t und Augenbli ck) . offer a 
special problem for explication", Heidegger says. 86 The XPOVOS 
as the objective time is considered as a series of firmly 
ordering of points of time. The Kalpos, on the contrary, is 
"without proper ordering and fixed position". 87 It lS 
something that lS without order, abruptly appearing, 
unaccountable and unpredictable. It may well be illustrated 
by the Christian conception of the return of Christ 
(Wiederkunft Christi) . 88 There is no certainty that at which 
moment of time Christ will return. He may come at every moment. 
According to Heidegger, this time-concept is the "time of 
factical life". 89 "For the Christian life, there is no 
certainty. The constant uncertainty is also characteristic 
of the basic-meaning of the factical life~,,90 
Indeed, this distinction of the "time of factical life" 
and the "objective concept of time" is very significant for 
85. GA 60 , 3. 104 . 
86 Ibid., 3.102. 
87. Ibid., 3.104. 
88. Ref. Poggeler, 
e 9 GA 60 , 3. 102 . 
Ope '+-C~ L.. , 3.144. 
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Heidegger's "existential analytic of Dasein" in the 5Z-period. 
The "time of factical life" was generated into the "authentic 
temporality", on which the Being-structure of Dasein is based. 
However, there is still another conception of Heidegger that 
appears to be more pertinent than it with regard to the 
problematic of the connection of Being and time. That is the 
conception of ouota or lTapovota as presence (Anwesenhei t) . This 
conception was recounted by Heidegger himself as one of the 
"three insights" that is decisive for the posing of the 
Being-question in 5Z. 91 Heidegger thus says: 
wi th the insight into the aAi)8Ela as unconcealment 
(Unverborgenheit) , the basic trait of Quoia, of the Being of 
beings was recognized: the presence (Anwesenheit). But the 
li teral translation, i. e. ' . the translation that is thought out 
of the matter speaks first, when the matter-content 
(Sachgehalt) of the matter, hereby the presence as such, is 
brought before the thinking. The disquieting, ever watchful 
question on Being as presence . (present) (Gegenwart) is 
developed to the question on the Being with regard to its 
time-character ... Time became questionable in the same manner 
as Being. 92 
According to the recount of Heidegger, he got the insight 
into aAnSEla as unconcealment through a "renewed study of the 
Aristotelian treatises" . 93 And through the insight into aAfJSEla 
as unconcealment, the basic trai t of ouofa as "presence" was 
recognized. Hence, it can be said that these two insights were 
both occasioned by the historical investigation on Aristotle, 
which, to reckon from the lecture courses held by Heidegger, 
had began at least in the winter semester of 1921/22. And the 
90. Ibid., S. 105 . 
91. Vide, BaR, p.x. 
92 Ibid., p. xii. 
93. Ibid., p.x. 
- 130 -
conception of 000ta as presence, and therefore, with regard 
to the "time-character" is so important to Heidegger's way 
of thinking that it is precisely from this conception that 
he established the connection between Being and time. For, 
Quota, since Aristotle, is a crucial determination of the 
meaning of being, 94 and presence is one dimension of time. 
And in accordance with the account of Poggeler, which is 
based on his conversations with Heidegger between 1959 to 1963, 
"in the years 1922/23, Heidegger had a 'flash of genius' 
(Geistesbli tz) which he came to regard as the real beginning 
of his life's work: 000(a for the Greeks means constant, and 
so is oriented toward only one dimension of time, the 
present ... ". 95 The importance of the conception of 000{a as 
presence could well be estimated that even Heidegger himself 
regarded it as the "real beginning" of his thinking. The 
insight in fact completely determines the direction of 
thinking in the SZ-period, so long as the program of SZ is 
nothing other than to work out the meaning of Being in terms 
of time. The Being-question, which was itself just sorted out 
and renewed, was soon developed into the "question on Being 
with regard to its Being-character". Time became the guideline 
for the Being-question. But it also at the same time became 
as "questionable" as Being. 
Up to now, almost all the constitutive elements of the 
program of SZ have already been sorted out and gi ven a certain 
extent of clarifications. First, Heidegger, through the 
historical investigations on Aristotle, became clung to the 
traditional formulations of (first) philosophy and brought 
94. Aristotle: "And indeed the question which, both now and of old, has 
always been raised, and always been the subject of doubt, viz. what is 
being? (Tt TO QV), is just the question, what is substance? (Tts Ti ouola) ." 
See Ariitotle, Metaphysics, 1028 b 2. 
95. Ref. Kisiel, op. cit., p.230. And actually, Heidegger had already 
concentrated on the meaning of TTapovo(a, a \-'lord of the same stem with O\"Ola, 
as "Anwesenheit" in the winter semester of 1920/21. See GA60, S.102ff. 
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out "being qua being" to be the proper subject matter of 
philosophy. Then, Heidegger built up the connection between 
the tradition and his own efforts of philosophizing by 
constructing the conception of "Being of factical life". 
Heidegger then formulated the inquiry of "Being of factical 
life" as "principal ontology" and declared its grounding 
character with regard to other ontologies. Therefore, the 
conception of a "fundamental ontology" (i.e., a existential 
analytic of Dasein) that shall precedes all other ontologies 
was established. And, finally, through a "flash of genius", 
Heidegger discovered that the meaning of Being, as exemplified 
by the conception of ouoia as presence, could be explicated 
in terms of time. The connection of Being and time was 
established and time became as questionable as Being for 
Heidegger. Now, it lS time to see that how Heidegger tried 
to systematize all these elements and through it attempted 
a reformulation of philosophy, which would turn out to be the 
most influential one since the death of Hegel. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
BEING-UNDERSTANDING AND TEMPORALITY: 
THE FORMULATION OF PHILOSOPHY IN SEIN UND ZEIT 
It has in the present treatise already been said many times 
that the aim of this treatise is to give a treatment of 
Heidegger's reformulation of philosophy in his early thinking 
and the so-called "early thinking" can further be divided into 
the pre-SZ-period and the SZ-period. Up to now, many passages 
have been devoted to the analysis of Heidegger' s reformulation 
of philosophy in the pre-SZ-period and its transi tion to the 
SZ-period. Now, it is time to give a thematic treatment to 
Heidegger's reformulation of philosophy in the SZ-period. It 
will be shown that even Heidegger in the SZ-period had decided 
that the subject-matter of philosophy is Being in general, 
his way of thinking the Being-question in this period was still 
completely directed by the two motive~, science and life, 
which are claimed in the present essay to be two basic 
motivations of Heidegger's formulation of philosophy in the 
early period as a whole. It will be shown that the development 
of Heidegger' s thinking is by la,rge determined by the tension 
between these two motives. 
§4.1 Philosophy as Ontology 
In the above preparations, as summarized at the end of last 
chapter, some clues of Heidegger's reformulation in the 
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5Z-period have already been sorted out, but they have not yet 
been put together to form a uni tary and coherent formulation 
until the year 1924. And, in fact, some important decisions 
have not yet been made concerning the connection of these 
fragmental clues. The year 1924, as expounded above, is set 
to be the "approximate starting point" because these important 
decisions have only been explicitly made in this very year. 
I have above briefly described the main character of 
Heidegger's thinking in the 5Z-period in such way: "Its basic 
question is the question of the meaning of Being as such, and 
it tried to work out and answer this question in a 
fundamental-ontological way, that is, by way of an existential 
analysis of a special kind of beings, Dasein, to which always 
belongs a kind of Being-understanding." Two main elements of 
this description are: first, the main quest·ion of this period 
is "the question of the meaning of Being as such"; Secondly, 
Heidegger attempted to ask this question through a special 
way, that is, "fundamental-ontological way". One of the 
important decisions Heidegger has not yet made in 1922/23 is 
whether the question of the meaning of Being as such or the 
question of the meaning of the "Being of factical life" should 
be the proper question of ph~losophy as science or of 
"scientific philosophy". 
In the Aristotle-course of 1921/22, he delimited 
philosophy as "knowing bearing to being as Being". But soon, 
in the Aristotle-essay of 1922, he asserted that "the 
problematic of philosophy treats the Being of the factical 
life." Obviously, Heidegger has not yet decided over the 
"destination" of philosophy, and therefore, the destination 
of his own thinking. He still fluctuated and hesitated over 
the two al ternati ves of the Being-question. Certainly, to see 
it from the viewpoint of the 5Z or latter period, the question 
of Being as such finally became the sole subject-matter of 
Heidegger's reformulation of philosophy. However, this 
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decision over the subject-matter was by no means firmly 
established before 1924, despite the old Heidegger's 
autobiographical statements on his youthful invol vement wi th 
the Being-question. 
The question of the Being as such was first posed overtly 
in the lecture course on Plato's Sophists in the winter 
semester of 1924-25. 1 In this lecture course, as well as in 
the SZ, the question of Being as such was posed in the form 
of the question of the "Being of beings". The Being-question 
in such form was then posed in an even more systematic and" 
programmatic manner in the lecture course of just the next 
semester, that is, in the summer semester of 1925. Especially, 
in this lecture course, which was entitled "Geschichte des 
Zeitbegriffs" (History of the time-concept), the question of 
Being as such was elaborately posed wi th regard to the "Being 
of Dasein" (das Sein des Daseins) .2 Not only the question of 
Being as such, but also the "fundamental-ontological way" to 
answer this question, a way that was already anticipated by 
the idea of "principal ontology" in Aristotle-essay of 1922, 
was firmly established, and the structure of SZ could also 
well be recognized in this lecture course. Hence, no wonder 
the Heidegger scholars have regarded this very lecture course 
as a "draft" of 5Z. 3 
In contrast with his negative and critical attitude 
towards the Being-question and ontology in the pre-SZ-period, 
as pointed out above, Heidegger, according to his own words 
said soon after the pUblications of SZ, in the SZ-period was 
concerned wi th "newly posing the problem of ontology". 4 The 
term "ontology", though it can be analyzed into two Greek stems, 
QV and Aoyo), is only a coinage in the beginning of the 
1. Vide GA19. Ref. Kisiel, op. ci t., p. 318. According to Kiesel, Heidegger 
analyzed the question of Being on February 10, 1925. See, ibid., 5.478. 
2. Vide GA20. 
Vide, for instance, Kisiel, op. cit., p.313ff. 
GA32, 5.18. 
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seventeenth century. It, as mentioned above, served as another 
name for one of the scholastic divisions of metaphysics, that 
is, for metaphysica generalis. It generally means the inquiry 
of being qua being, QV D ov. The meaning of the term "ontology" , 
generally as the inquiry of being qua being, was used by 
Heidegger in the 5Z-period as the "ontology in a formally broad 
sense", or "in the greatest possible width", contrary to any 
definite ontology worked out in the history of metaphysics. 
Heidegger says in 5Z: 
The task of ontology is to set in relief the Being of beings 
and to explicate Being itsel f ... Since the term "ontology" is 
used in a formally broad sense for this investigation, the way 
to clarify its method by tracing the history of that method 
is precluded from itself. Moreover, the word is meant of no 
definite philosophical discipline, which stands in connection 
with the others, when the term "ontology" is used. It is not 
supposed to be its task to satisfy any present discipline. But, 
on the contrary, a discipline can be built up only out of the 
matterful necessi ties of defini te questions and of the manner 
of treatment that is demanded by the "things themselves".5 
Heidegger says also in Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie 
(GA24) : 
We assert now: Being is the genuine and sole theme of 
philosophy. This is no invention of us. This posing of theme 
rather became vi vid at the beginning of philosophy in antiqui ty 
and is worked out in its most grandiose form in the Hegelian 
logic. Now we simply assert that Being is the genuine and sole 
theme of philosophy . Negatively, this means: philosophy is not 
science of beings but of Being, or, as the Greek expression 
sounds, ontology. We grasp this expression in the greatest 
possible width and not in the narrower meaning that it has, 
s. SZ, S.27. 
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' precisely in the Scholasticism or in modern philosophy in 
Descartes and Leibniz. 6 
It lS clear that for Heidegger in the 5Z-period, philosophy 
is ontology. And when Heidegger said that philosophy is 
ontology, he used the term "ontology" in "a formally broad 
sense". He just tried to assert that the subject-matter for 
philosophy is Being, and philosophy is the "science of Being". 
He did not mean of any "definite philosophical discipline". 
The term "ontology" just generally brings forth the 
subject-matter or the "object" of philosophy. Heidegger says: 
Ontology and phenomenology are not two different 
disciplines which among other belong to philosophy. The two 
ti tIes characterize philosophy itself according to object and 
treatment-manner (Gegenstand und Behandlungsart) . Philosophy 
is universal phenomenological ontology ... 7 
But when Heidegger siid that he was not uSlng the term 
"ontology" "in the narrower meaning that it has, precisely 
in the Scholasticism or in modern philosophy in Descartes", 
he had made a mistake. For, as pointed out above, the term 
"ontology" is only a coinage in the seventeenth century. There 
was "metaphysics", or "first philosophy", for the 
Scholasticism and Descartes, but no "ontology". And, for the 
Scholasticism and Descartes, the proper question of ontology, 
that is, the question on being qua being, is by no means the 
question of the first rank of importance. For them, it did 
not seem to be so important to the extent that it requires 
making it an independent discipline. And precisely in this 
absence of an independent inquiry on being qua being is the 
conception of metaphysics for Scholasticism and Descartes, 
and their difference wi th the "resurrection of metaphysics" 
6 GA24, S.15. 
- 137 -
In the time of Heidegger partially revealed. 
Nevertheless, despite this confusion, which could more or 
less show the immaturity of Heidegger concerning the 
Being-question in the 5Z-period, what Heidegger intended when 
he stressed that the term "ontology" is used "in a formally 
broad sense" is qui te clear. He just wanted to use it 
generally to represent, to use Heidegger's own words said 
later, "the effort to bring Being into words" and to avoid 
the connection wi th any "defini te philosophical discipline", 
Scholasticism and Descartes alike. 8 More precisely, it just 
means the effort to bring Being into "science", wi thout 
affiliation with any pre-given philosophical discipline. 
Wi th such general reformulation of philosophy as ontology, 
it is obvious that Heidegger in the 5Z-period had made up his 
mind about the subj ect-matter of philosophy. He had gone out 
from the hesitation between the inquiry of being as such and 
of the Being of factical life. Yet, does it mean that through 
such decision, Heidegger had left behind the problematic of 
life, which, as the above analysis shows, was once his sole 
matter of concern? By no means! It has been pointed out above 
that the young Heidegger was motivated by two ideas, l.e., 
life and science. The thinking of the young Heidegger was 
actually generated by the tension between the "universally 
valid. knowledge" and "the enigma of life". But now, while the 
idea of philosophy as science is still preserved in the 
formulation of philosophy as ontology, does the other basic 
idea, that is, the problematic of life, vanish in Heidegger' s 
thinking? By no means! 
Indeed, at first sight, in the reformulation of philosophy 
as ontology, the problematic of life seems to lose its 
significance, especially for those who are aware of the 
apparent contradiction between the traditional concept of 
. SZ,S.38 . 
. EiM, S.31. 
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life and that of Being. But actually, the problematic of life 
was still preserved in Heidegger in the 5Z-period. It is indeed 
not revealing in this simple formulation of philosophy itself 
as ontology. But it lies in the very way of solving the question 
posed by this formulation. And the problematic of life not 
only lies in the way of solving the question of the meaning 
of Being in general as the "fundamental question of 
philosophy" posed in 5Z, it actually directs this way, to the 
extent that the "failure" of this way, I suppose, is by large 
due to the obsession with it. 
This way of solving the question of meaning of Being, which, 
I suppose, is directed by the problematic of life, is the 
so-called "fundamental-ontological way". This, as mentioned 
above, is the second main element of Heidegger's thinking in 
the 5Z-period. It tried to solve the question of the meaning 
of Being through an "existential analytic of Dasein" . Actually, 
the term "Dasein" means for Heidegger in the 5Z-period nothing 
less than the "Being of factical life" for Heidegger in the 
pre-5Z-period. Hence, when Heidegger attempted to solve the 
question of the meaning of Being as such through an existential 
analytic of Dasein, he just tried no less than to solve the 
question of Being through an analysis of the "Being of factical 
life". In short, the problematic of life still held away in 
this "fundamental-ontological way". 
§4.2 The Priority of Human Dasein 1n the Being-
question 
Why Heidegger supposed that the question of the meaning 
of Being as such should be solved through an existential 
analytic of Dasein? How could the question of being as such 
be solved through the analysis of a particular region of beings? 
Is not the question of Being precisely the "most universal" 
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question that it is supposed to cover all kind of being in 
so far as it is being? If so, why is it supposed to be solved 
through a "narrower" question, that is, the question on the 
Being of human Dasein? 
These questions could be ,clarified in two steps: first, 
to explicate why the question of Being as such would be pushed 
into an analysis of one particular kind of beings; then, to 
explicate why precisely human Dasein is chosen to be the very 
kind of being through an analysis of which the question of 
Being as such could be solved. 
In order to explicate the first question, we have to point 
out first of all one basic conception of the early Heidegger. 
This conception is: "Being means the Being of beings" (Sein 
besagt Sein van Seiendem) .9 Again, this conception could well 
be traced to the lecture course on Plato in 1924/25. 10 Being 
was regarded by the early Heidegger as that which "determines 
being as being". Thus, Being was regarded to be in connection 
with the corresponding being. "What determines the being as 
being, is its Being," Heidegger says.11 And, in so far as 
Heidegger conceived that "Being is always the Being of a 
being", 12 it seemed apparent for him that the interrogation 
concerning the Being-question should be started wi th beings. 
"In order to ask for the Being of being, the being itself must 
be interrogated in regard to its Being. ,,1 3 "In so far as Being 
makes up what is asked about, and as Being means Being of beings, 
the being itself turns out to be what is interrogated in the 
Being-question. " 14 It therefore means that if Being, that is, 
Being of being, is to be asked for, the being should be 
interrogated, and should be interrogated in regard of its 
SZ, S.6. 
10 . Vide GA19, for instance,S.13 . 
11 GA20, S.195. 
12 
1 3 
SZ, S.9: "Sein ist jeweils das Sein eines Seienden." 
GA2 ° , S. 1 95 . 
14. SZ, S.6. 
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Being. Heidegger expressed this conception more explicitly 
in GA24: 
The Being shall be grasped and made our theme. Being is 
always Being of beings and accordingly it becomes accessible 
at first only in the access (Ausgang) from a being. Here the 
phenomenological vision which grasps must indeed be directed 
at beings, but only to do so that the Being of this beings will 
come into relief and possible thematization. 15 
Approximately in the year 1924, Heidegger had decided that 
Being should be the proper subj ect-matter of philosophy. Being 
is what is asked about. And Heidegger at that time thought 
that Being is always "Being of beings". Accordingly, he 
thought that in so far as Being is Being of beings, beings 
should be the "access" of the question of Being. It then leads 
to the second step of our clarifications. If the Being-
question gains its access in the interrogation of beings, then 
could it be started in the interrogation of any kind of beings, 
or of only certain kind of beings? Heidegger in SZ tried to 
prove that only one kind of beings could be the right access 
to the question of Being. He tried to prove the precedence 
of one kind of beings amongst other kinds in face of the 
Being-question. Heidegger says in SZ: 
15 
If the question on Being is to be explicitly posed and 
carried through in complete transparency to itself, then a 
working out of this question, according to the elucidation so 
far, requires the explication of the manners of looking at Being, 
of understanding and conceptually grasping of meaning, ~ 
preparation of the possibility of the right choice of the 
exemplary being, and the working out of the genuine 
access-manner to this being. Looking at, understanding and 
concei ving of, choosing, access to, all these are consti tuti ve 
GA24, S. 28 . 
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bearing of the questioning, and therefore themselves .aLe. 
Being-modes (Seinsmodi) of a definite being, of the being, 
which we, the Questioner, ourselves in each case are. 
Accordingly, to work out the Being-question (Seinsfrage) means 
to make a being, the questioner, transparent in its Being. The 
questioning of this question, as Being-mode of a being, is 
itself essentially determined by what is questioned in it -
by Being. We grasp this being, which we oursel ves in each case 
are, and which have amongst others the Being-possibility of 
questioning, terminologically as Dasein. The explicit and 
transparent posing of the question on the meaning of Being 
requires a preceding suitable explication o'f a being (Oasein) 
with regard to its Being. 16 
Which is the "exemplary being"that can serve as' the 
Ausgang (access) for the working out of the B~ing-question? 
It is, Heidegger answers, precisely the questioner of the 
question. But, who is the questioner? Apparently, it can be 
nothing other than the human Dasein, that is, precisely what 
we "ourselves in each case are". Not only the solving of the 
Being-question, but also its "explici t and transparent 
posing" requires "a preceding sui table explication of a being 
(Dasein) with regard to its Being". The human Dasein is the 
"exemplary being" concerning the Being-question. It 
maintains a priority amongst other kinds of beings. 
In accordance with the presentation of SZ, the priority 
of human being in face of the Being-question seems to be first 
of all built up on the fact that human being is precisely the 
"questioner" of the Being-question. But actually, Heidegger 
laid the priori ty of human Dasein concerning the Being-
question on something other than merely the phenomenon that 
Dasein asks about Being. Heidegger laid it on a special abili ty 
of human Dasein, an abili ty precisely out of which the 
Being-question rises, viz., only by virtue of which human 
16 SZ, S.7. 
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Dasein could be the questioner. 
Dasein asks about Being because it is touched, aroused, 
and moved by the Being. And it could be touched and moved by 
it only because it can receive its arousal. Hence, the 
Being-question rests on Dasein's ability to receive Being's 
arousal. Heidegger called this ability "Being-understanding" 
(Seinsverstandnis). This is an ability that belongs 
exclusively to the Being-constitution of human Dasein. 
Heidegger says: 
The questioning, as seeking, needs a preceding guidance 
from what is sought. The meaning of Being must be in certain 
ways at our disposal. What is indicated is that: we are always 
moved already in a Being-understanding (Seinsverstandnis). 
Out of it arises the explici t question of the meaning of Being 
and the tendency towards its concept. We do not know what 
"Being" means? But already, if we question: "what is 'Being' ?", 
we keep ourselves in an understanding of the "is", without 
being able to conceptually fix what that "is" means . We do 
not even know the horizon, out of which we are supposed to 
grasp and fix the meaning. This average and vague Being-
understanding is a fact.17 
It is precisely out of the Being-understanding that human 
Dasein is able to be the questioner of the Being-question. 
"Out of it arises the explici t question of the meaning of Being 
and the tendency towards its concept." If one does not in 
advance understand something like Being, he can by no means 
raise the question on Being, and, needless to mention, solve 
this question. Obviously, when Being is what is asked about, 
it means that little is known about Being. But the fact that 
we know li ttle about Being does not preclude that we are "moved 
already in a Being-understanding". Actually, if we are to ask 
about Being and to pose the Being-question, it is necessary 
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that we are "moved already In a Being-understanding". 
Otherwise, we can not even raise the Being~question. While 
it is a fact that we have little knowledge or concepts on Being, 
it is also a fact that we have already have a Being-
understanding, even though it is only an "average and vague" 
understanding. 
We do not know the meaning of Being, do not have the concept 
of it, and we even do not know the "horizon" out of which this 
meaning can be grasped. But we do understand Being if we can 
question about it. It means that there is a difference between 
understanding of Being and knowledge of Being. Although we 
have not yet known it, we can have already understood it. And 
we can know about it, only in so far as it has already been 
understood by us. The knowledge of Being comes out of the 
understanding of Being. The Being-understanding is what lS 
necessarily "already there" (schon da), if we are going to 
question it or to know it. Hence, the understanding of Being 
shall come earlier than the knowledge of Being. 
Hence, an understanding of Being shall be "already there" 
before the establishment of any ontology, that is, any 
explicit knowledge or science of Being, in which Being is 
explicitly conceived and "objectified" (vergegenstand-
licht) .18 Therefore Heidegger called this Being-
understanding, which shall come earlier than ontology, 
"pre-ontological" (vor-ontologische) Being-understanding. 
Heidegger says: 
The Being-understanding, which has not yet been brought 
to concept, we call pre-ontological or ontological in the 
broader sense . Being-conceiving (Seinsbegreifen) presupposes 
that the Being-understanding itself is developed out and the 
Being, which is understood, proj ected and somehow revealed in 
it, is properly made to theme and problem. There are many stages 
p. sz, s.s. 
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, between the pre-ontological Being-understanding and 
expressive problematic of the Being-conceiving. 19 
According to Heidegger, this pre-ontological Being-
understanding of human Dasein does not only necessarily come 
before ontology as the science of Being, but it is also the 
condition for the achievement of it. Heidegger says: 
No explici t ontology belongs to the experience of beings, 
but on the other hand, the understanding of Being in general 
in the pre-conceptual sense is the condition that Being can 
be objectified, that is, thematized at all. It is in the 
obj ect.ification as such that the basic act, in which ontology 
is constituted as science, is achieved. 20 
The pre-ontological Being-understanding is the condi tion 
of the achievement of the knowledge of Being, i. e. , of ontology, 
because the knowledge of Being is actually nothing other than 
the "objectification" (Vergegenstandlichung) of the "pre-
given Being" (vorgegebenen 5ein) which is already somehow 
"disclosed" (enthDllt) in Being-understanding. 21 
It has already been shown that for Heidegger in the 
5Z-period, philosophy is ontology or "universal ontology". 
Ontology is science on Being. Being is always Being of beings. 
Therefore, the inquil-y is supposed to begin in beings. Which 
kind of beings should be the "access"? Now, there is a kind 
of Beings that appears to be the questioner of Being. It is 
not only the questioner of Being, it is also who questions, 
conceives, objectifies, and, above all, understands. It is 
the sole kind of beings to which belongs a Being-understanding. 
This Being-understanding is the condition of any knowledge 
of Being. This kind of beings is Dasein. Therefore, Heidegger 
18 Vide GA24, 3.398£. 
19. Wrn, 3. 1 32. 3 e e a 1 SO, 3 Z , 3. 12 ; GA 2 4, 3. 3 9 8 . 
20 GA24, 3. 398 . 
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as,serted that concerning the Being-question, Dasein has . 
precedence over other beings. Heidegger says: 
Dasein accordingly has precedence over other beings in 
several senses. The first precedence is an ontical one: this 
being is in its Being determined by Existence (Existenz). The 
second precedence is an ontological one: Dasein lS 
"ontological" in itself on the ground of its Existenz-
determinedness (Existenzbestimmthei t) . Now however to Dasein 
belongs co-originally - as constituents of the Existenz-
understanding - an understanding of Being of all being unlike 
Dasein. ' Dasein therefore has the third precedence ~ 
ontic-ontological condition of possibility of all ontologies. 
Dasein has thus proved itself to be what is ontologically 
primarily to be inquired before all other beings. 22 
In so far as Being-understanding is the condition of any 
ontology, Dasein, as the sole kind of beings that has a 
Being~understanding, is regarded by Heidegger as "ontic-
ontological condition of possibility of all ontologies". 
Actually, according to Heidegger, Being-understanding is not 
only one ability of Dasein amongst others, but Dasein is a 
kind of beings that lS precisely delimited by Being-




That we understand Being, is not only actual, but it is 
rather necessary. Wi thout such revealing of Being we even can 
not be "man". That we are, is certainly not necessarily 
unconditioned. There is in itself the possibility that man is 
not at all. There was a time, where man was not .... But if man 
stands in existence (Dasein) , then a condition is necessary 
that he can there-be (da-sein) , that he understands Being. 23 




Hence, Dasein is considered by Heidegger as the kind of beings 
that should be interrogated first, in order to pose and solve 
the Being-question. It proves itself "to be what lS 
ontologically primarily to be inquired before all other 
beings" concerning the Being-question. Therefore, in order 
to pose the Being-question, it requires an inquiry of Dasein 
"in regard of its Being". In the SZ, Heidegger designated such 
inquiry as the "existential analytic of Dasein". This 
analytic of Dasein is also called "fundamental ontology", so 
long as it serves as the "fundament for ontology", 24 for the 
"laying-ground of ontology in general". 25 As a matter of fact, 
the whole of the present published parts of SZ, which is only 
a torso of the complete program,26 is nothing other than an 
existential analytic of Dasein, which is actually only 
"preparing" (vorberei tend) for the posing of the Being-
question. 
§4.3 The Transformation of the Being-qUestion 
The approach of the early Heidegger to the Being-question 
lS called "fundamental-ontological way" because it tried to 
solve the Being-question by way of an existential analytic 
of Dasein, which is also called "fundamental ontology" by 
Heidegger himself . Although the existential analytic of 
Dasein was claimed by Heidegger to be only "preparing" for 
the posing of the Being-question, it actually took up a 
position that is more important than only preparing. For, the 
early Heidegger had actually transformed the Being-question 
into the question of Being-understanding, which belongs 
solely to the Being-consti tution of Dasein. Thus, concerning 
24 "das Fundament fur Ontologie", see "Einleit1.1ng zu: >Was ist 
Metaphysik?<, in Wm, S.380. 
25. GA2 6, S. 196 . 
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the Being-question Dasein has taken up a position that is more 
important than just as an access for it. Heidegger says: 
Something like Being is given to us in the Being-
understanding, in the understanding of Being which lies at the 
root of every bearing (Verhal ten) to beings. 27 
There is (or, literally, it gives, es gibt) Being, only 
if Being-understanding, i. e., Dasein exists. This being 
accordingly claims a distinctive priority in the problematic 
of ontology. It shows itself in all discussions of ontological 
basic problem, and above all in the fundamental question toward 
the sense of Being in general. Its working-out and answer 
requires a general analytic of Dasein. This implies at the same 
time tha~ ontology can not be grounded in a purely ontological 
manner. Its proper possibility is referred back to a being, 
that is, to something ontical: the Dasein.28 
Being is "given", or "disclosed" to us In the Being-
understanding. Only in this giving or disclosing in the 
Being-understanding is Being accessible to us. Furthermore, 
Being is accessible to us, that is, to Dasein. There is Being, 
only if Dasein exists. Therefore, in so far as there is Being 
only if there is Dasein, and in so far as Being is given to 
Dasein only in Being-understanding, Being-understanding is 
supposed to take a central place in regard of the Being-
question. In fact, for the early Heidegger, the Being-
understanding is so central that it even displaced the 
question on Being as such. The Being-question was thus posed 
in the form of the question on the "inner possibility of the 
Being-understanding". Heidegger expressed this most 
explicitly in his Kantbuch. He says: 
26. For the complete pronounced program of 52, see SZ, S.39-40. 
27 GA24, S. 21 . 
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The Being-question as the question of the possibility of 
the concept of Being springs out on its part from the 
pre-conceptual Being-understanding. Hence, the question of 
the possibility of the Being-concept is once again one step 
dri ven back to the question of the essence of the understanding 
of Being in general (Frage nach dem Wesen des Verstehen vom 
Sein uberhaupt). The more originally conceived task of the 
laying-ground of the metaphysics is transformed accordingly 
into the illumination of the inner possibility of the 
Being-understanding. 29 
Heidegger even claimed that if the Being-question is not 
posed as the question of the lnner possibili ty of the 
Being-understanding, the interpretation of Being and the 
horizon of this interpretation could by no means come into 
light. He says: 
The passage from Plato's Sophist which opens the 
investigation serves not as decoration, but rather as 
indication to that in ancient metaphysics the gigantomachy 
over Being of beings had been aroused. In this battle, the way 
in which Being as such become understood must already be 
visible - no matter the question of Being here may not be 
generally and manifoldly posed. However, insofar as in this 
gigantomachy the question of Being is first won, but is still 
not worked out in the characterized manner as the problem of 
the inner possibili ty of the Being-understanding, nei ther the 
interpretation of Being as such, nor even the necessary horizon 
of the interpretation as such can expressively come into 
light.30 
Therefore, it can be known that it is by no means accidental 
that the Being-question was formulated as "the question of 
28 GA2 4, S. 2 6 . 
29 . KPM, S.226. 
30 KPM. S. 239. 
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th.e meaning of Being" by Heidegger in his early thinking, in 
so far as the Being-question is put in the form of the question 
on the inner possibility of the Being-understanding. For, 
understanding and meaning are two concepts which are 
intrinsically connected. "Meaning is that wherein the 
understandability of something is maintained. What can be 
articulated in understandingly disclosing, we call meaning," 
Heidegger says. 31 Hence, if the Being-question is worked out 
in the form of the question of "the inner possibility of 
Being-understanding", it would thus also be formulated in the 
form of "the meaning of Being". These two formulations, which 
could be found frequently in the early but seldom in the late 
Heidegger, are indeed co-related. Heidegger says in SZ: 
All efforts of the existential analytic serve the one aim 
of finding a possibili ty of the question of the meaning of Being 
in general. The working out of this ' question demands a 
delimitation of the phenomenon in which something like Being 
. becomes accessible of the phenomenon of Being-
unde r standing. 32 
This manner of formulating the Being-question is crucial 
for Heidegger's early thinking. As pointed out above, the 
attempt to reformulate philosophy as ontology is actually a 
predominant trend in the nineteenth century. It is by no means 
the singulari ty of Heidegger' s thinking. What is distinctive 
in Heidegger's early thinking compared to other attempts to 
reformulate philosophy as ontology lies rather on its 
approach to elaborate the Being-question. Different from 
other approaches to reform ontology, Heidegger tried to 
reformulate the Being-question as the "inner possibility of 
the Being-understanding". And in so far as Being-
understanding solely belongs to the Being-constitution of 
31. SZ, S.151. 
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hU,man Dasein, the Being-question therefore becomes 
essentially "Dasein-related". This "Dasein-related" 
approach or "fundamental-ontological way" to the Being-
question makes the early Heidegger different from those 
others who also attempted to reformulate philosophy as 
ontology. 
Although to overcome the subjectivistic tendency of the 
modern philosophy is one of the main motives of Heidegger's 
late thinking, Husserl is still to certain extent right to 
include Heidegger into the "subjectivistic tendency" of the 
modern times. 33 For, according to the thinking of early 
Heidegger, philosophical inquiry is always "I-related" 
( Ichbezug) or "subject-related" (subj ektsbezogen) , 34 no 
matter its object is life-experience as such or Being as such. 
Dasein can surely In certain sense be regarded as "I" or 
"subject", though it is also necessary to remind of their 
nuances. Hence, the "Dasein-related" approach to the 
Being-question in the early Heidegger can also be called 
"I-related" or "subject-related". But it is by no means 
supposed to be the "transcendental I" or the "transcendental 
subject" in the Husserlian phenomenology or in the German 
idealism. Thus, Husserl is also right to distinguish 
Heidegger from his "transcendental orientation". 35 
However, it is also very problematical to regard the early 
Heidegger's approach as "anthropological", as expressed by 
Husserl. 36 For, Heidegger had in SZ explicitly distinguished 
his "existential analytic of Dasein" from "anthropology, 
32. S Z , S. 372 . 
33 Vide Hus ser 1, "Phanomenolgie und Anthropologie", in Husser 1 iana Band 
XXVII: Aufsatze und Vortrage (1922-1937), hrsg. von Thomas Nenon and Hans 
Rainer Sepp, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), S.164f. 
34. Vide, GA56/57, S. 69; GA26, S .179. 
35. Husserl, Ope cit., S.164f. 
36. Husserl, Op. ci t., S. 164 f; also idem, "Marginal remarks on Being and 
Time", in Husserl, Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and 
the Confrontation with Heidegger, ed. and trans. Thomas Sheehan and 
Richard E. Palmer, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Acadmeic, 1997), p.284. 
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ps y c h 0 log y, and b i 0 log y" . 3 7 Admi t t e d I y, He i de 9 9 er' sat tit u d e 
towards the contemporary trend of "philosophical 
anthropology" is very ambiguous, but he certainly had little 
to do with the "anthropologism" as expressed by Husserl, which 
is characterized by the "natural attitude". Heidegger, as 
Husserl's assistant and the "most valuable philosophical 
co-worker", is presumably by no means unaware of Husserl's 
distinction between "natural attitude" and "phenomenological 
atti tude", which is for Husserl a central demarcation between 
phenomenology as philosophy and particular SClences. 
Heidegger rather, I suppose, intentionally neglected this 
distinction. For him, both of these orientations, as 
dominated by the traditional "preference of the theoretical", 
had lost sight of the most important subject matter. This 
subj ect-matter, as pointed out above, is the pre-theoretical 
factical life-experience. This subj ect-matter actually still 
held away in the 5Z-period of Heidegger's thinking, though 
under a different name. It exerted its force in the somewhat 
awkward name of "the Being of factual life", which then became 
"the Being of Oasein", out of which the Being-question is 
supposed to get its solution. 
Indeed, the early Heidegger's approach still lies on the 
"subjectivistic tendency". But he resorted neither to the 
transcendental I, nor to the psychological or anthropological 
subj ect. He rather posed the "question on the meaning of the 
'I am'" (Frage nach dem 5inn des >ich bin<) . 38 It is a question 
growing out of the question on the "meaning of the Being of 
the factical life", and therefore out of his early 
considerations of the problematic of pre-theoretical 
lived-experience as such. Indeed, this question on the 
meaning of the "I am" is still concerned with the question 
of the "I" (Ich). But it is b y no means concerned with the 
3 7 . Vide SZ, S. 45£. 
3 8 GA61, S. 172 . 
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"transcendental I" as the "ultimate foundation" of all human 
knowledge. Its considerations lies rather on the self-
referential, and authentic (eigentlich, literally, "for its 
own") character of the pre-theoretical I as lived-experience, 
than on the universalized, generalized, and de-living 
character of the theoretical I as "pure 1ft. It is concerned 
with the proper Being of I or of life, which is regarded by 
the young Heidegger as utterly different from the Being of 
things or "mere existence". In accordance with the analysis 
of Heidegger, the question on the meaning of the Being of I 
and its distinction with that of the things are precisely 
neglected by the intentional analysis of the consciousness 
of Husserl. Heidegger says: 
In the working-out of the intentionali ty as of the thematic 
field of phenomenology, the question on the Being of the 
intentional remains undiscussed. It is not posed in the field 
acquired, in the pure consciousness; it is indeed flatly 
rejected as nonsensical. It was through the way of acquiring 
of this field, through the reduction, expressly deferred. And 
where the Being-determinations are brought into play, as in 
the starting position of the reduction, it is likewise not 
originally posed. Rather the Being of the acts is in advance 
theoretical-dogmatically determined as Being in the sense of 
the reality of nature. The Being-question i tsel f remains 
undiscussed. 39 
Throughout the intentional analysis of the pure 
consciousness, and the process of acquiring of this field of 
analysis, the question on the Being of the intentional (i. e. , 
the psychical, or the lived-experience) is "rejected", 
"deferred" and "theoreticql-dogmatically determined". It lS 
never explicitly posed as a question. Indeed, according to 
Heidegger, to put it on the context of the .Western philosophy, 
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Husserl is by no means the only figure who had utterly 
neglected this very question. Nearly all relevant tradi tional 
determinations of the human being had neglected the question 
on its Being. Heidegger says: 
The relevant origins for the tradi tional anthropology, the 
Greek definition and the theological guideline, indicate that 
over the essential determination of the being "man" the question 
on its Being remains forgotten, and its Being is rather 
conceived as something "self-evident" in the sense of the 
Being-mere-existence 
things. 40 
( Vorhandenseins) of other created 
Descartes, to whom one attributes the discovery of the 
cogito sum as departure-point of the modern philosophical 
questioning, investigates the cogitare of the ego - in certain 
limits. But he leaves the sum completely undiscussed, even 
though it is approached just as original as the cogitio. Our 
analytic posed the ontological question on the Being of the sum. 
If this is determined, then the Being-kind (Seinsart) of the 
cogitationes first becomes graspable. 41 
The phenomenological interpretation of personality, which 
is in principle more radical and transparent, also does not come 
into the dimension of the question on the Being of Dasein. 
Despite all their differences in questioning, development·, and 
orientation of their world-views, the interpretations of 
pers6nali ty in Husserl and Scheler agree in the negati ve side. 
They no more pose the question on the "Being-person" 
(Personssein) itsel f. 42 
In so far as almost all "essential determinations of the 
being 'man'" had neglected the question on its Being, 
39 GA20, S.157. 
40 SZ, S. 49. 
41 SZ, S.45-6. 
42 SZ, S.47. 
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Heidegger supposed that he has raised a question which, in 
spite of its importance, has never been posed in the history 
of philosophy. And, in order to put its distinctiveness into 
relief, Heidegger reserved a special term for it. Heidegger 
designated the being at issue, 1. e., the being "man" as 
"Dasein" rather than as "I", "subject" or "person". Therefore, 
he reformulated his question as the question on the "Being 
of Dasein" and his analysis as "analytic of Dasein". 
Admittedly, the term "Dasein" has many relations with "I" or 
"subject". But their difference is actually as much as their 
identity. All these can well be recognized in the analytic 
of Dasein as presented in 5Z. 
§4.4 The Being-constitution of Dasein 
I have asserted above that Heidegger' s formulation of the 
Being-question in the 5Z-period is still directed by his early 
analysis of the factical life. It 1S because 1n this 
formulation, Heidegger attempted to enter the Being-question 
through a "fundamental-ontological" way, i.e., through an 
existential analytic of Dasein, and this analytic of Dasein, 
as presented by 5Z, is actually nothing other than a 
continuation of his earlier analysis of the factual life. The 
hinge of Heidegger' s formulation of the Being-question in the 
5Z-period, as pointed out above, consists in his turning of 
the Being-question into the question of the inner possibility 
of Being-understanding. In so far as Being-understanding is 
something that solely belongs to the "Being-constitution" 
(5einsverfassung) of the being "man" or of Dasein, the 
Being-question is then turned to the unfolding of the 
Being-consti tution of Dasein, in order to find out the inner 
possibility of Being-understanding belonging to it. This is 
actually the very task of the Dasein-analytic. According to 
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Heidegger, the Being-understanding, and therefore the 
Being-question, can only be conceived, if the Dasein is 
interpreted originally enough. Heidegger says: 
But this [phenomenon of Being-understanding] belongs to 
the Being-constitution of Dasein. Only if this beings is 
interpreted beforehand in a sufficiently original way, can the 
Being-understanding itself, which is included in its 
Being-constitution, be conceived, and thus on this basis the 
question of Being which is understood in it and the question 
of the "presupposition" of this understanding can be posed. 43 
But to conceive the Being-understanding means to 
understand at first that beings to whose Being-constitution 
Being-understanding belongs, the Dasein. 44 
The Being-understanding is brought to light out of the 
Being-kind Dasein, which is primarily Existence. This 
Being-constitution of Dasein is of the kind that therein the 
inner possibili ty of the Being-understanding essentially 
belonging to Dasein can be showed out. 45 
The analytic of Dasein was thus carried out utterly in 
regard of . the Being-question. The published SZ is actually 
composed of an existential analytic of Dasein. Al though, the 
Being-question is, as pointed out above, in certain sense a 
"new question" for the thinking of early Heidegger, the 
content of the existential analytic of Dasein is in no sense 
new. If one is familiar with the thinking of Heidegger from 
1 91 9 to 1 924 , he will ea s i 1 Y fin d out t ha t, a 1 t hough the terms 
used in SZ are somehow different from those of his earlier 
period, the analytic of Dasein was surely carried out on the 
base of his earlier analysis of the "factical life". In fact, 
43 SZ, S.372. 
44. GA2 4, S. 322 . 
45. GA2 6 , S. 1 7 1 . 
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the analytic of Dasein as presented in the 5Z-period actually 
has much more to do with Heidegger' s earlier analysis of the 
"factical life-experience" than wi th the orientation of 
transcendental I as carried out by Husserl. The close relation 
between the terms "Dasein" and "factical life" can clearly 
be seen in Heidegger' s early explication of the term "Dasein". 
Heidegger says: 
Factici ty is the characterization for the Being-character 
of "our" "proper" Dasein. More precisely, this expression 
means: this Dasein in particular while (jeweilig dieses 
Dasein) , in so far as it is "there" Beingly (seinsmai3ig) in 
its Being-character ... 
And accordingly factical means something that is 
articulated upon Being-character thus being from itself and 
in such manner "is" . When man takes "life" as a manner of "Being", 
then "factical life" means: our proper Dasein as "there" in 
some kinds of Beingly expression of its Being-character. 46 
Admittedly, it is a passage of formidable obscurity. But, 
certain unmistakable connections between the expressions 
"Dasein" and "factical life" can still clearly be recognized 
out of it. First, Heidegger stated clearly that "facticity 
is the characterization for the Being-character of 'our' 
'proper' Dasein". And if "life" is taken as "a manner of Being", 
then "factical life" certainly means "a manner of Being" too. 
This manner of Being I according to Heidegger, is "our proper 
Dasein". "Factical" or "Facticity" is precisely the 
characterization of the special feature of this very "manner 
of Being". This characterization lies its emphasis on the 
46 GA63, S. 7. \~Faktizitat ist die Bezeichung fur den Seinscharakter 
>unseres< >eigenen< Daseins. Genauer bedeutet der Ausdruck: jeweilig 
doeses Dasein, sofern es seinsmai3ig in seinem Seinscharakter >da< ist ... 
Und faktisch heiBt sonach etwas, was auf so seienden Seinscharakter von 
ihm selbst her artikuliert ist und dergestalt >ist<. Nimmt man >Leben< 
als eine Weise von >Sein<, dann besagt >faktisches Leben<: unser eigenes 
Dasein als >da< in irgendwelcher seinsmaBigen Ausdrucklichkeit seines 
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delimitation "proper" (eigen). "Factical life means our 
proper Dasein." Its means that this manner of Being "is" in 
such a manner that it "is" (being) "from itself". This is 
precisely the meaning of the expression "in particular while" 
(jeweilig) , which is an expression of the early Heidegger that 
would soon be replaced by the term "always-mineness" 
(Jemeinigkei t) in SZ. 47 All these expressions attempt to point 
out the distinctiveness of this manner of Being, i.e., of 
Dasein, that it lS self-referential. Self-reference, as 
pointed out above, is the very feature of "life". And now 
Heidegger attributes it to Dasein too. Heidegger expressed 
the self-referential character of Dasein explicitly in sz. 
He says therein: 
. Dasein is a being which does not just occur among other 
beings. It is rather ontically distinctive that this being is 
in its Being concerned with this Being. But to this Being-
consti tution of Dasein belongs the case that it has a 
Being-bearing in its Being to this Being. 48 
Dasein is In its Being concerned with this Being. This 
means that Dasein is self-referential in regard of its Being. 
Hence, the connections between the term "factical life" and 
"Dasein" are apparent. Actually, they could be regarded as 
different expressions for the same matter, that is, the manner 
of Being of human beings. 
There are many reasons that Heidegger in the SZ-period 
preferred the expression "Dasein" to "factical life". 49 
However, I am not going to go through these reasons in the 
present essay. Apart from the consideration that the 
expression "factical life" would easily remind one of the 
predominant trend "life-philosophy", in which the Being of 
Seinscharakters." 
47 Vide SZ, S.42; ref. Kisiel, Ope cit., p.500f. 
48. SZ, S.12. 
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life has also in no ways been posed, Heidegger was likely to 
replace the term "factical life" with "Dasein", because 
"Da-sein" has obvious "literal" connections with Being (5ein) , 
which had become Heidegger' s subj ect-matter of reformulation 
of philosophy. Dasein can literally mean "being-there". 
Except the term "Dasein", Heidegger also found another 
expression to refer to the special "manner of Being" of the 
being "man". Another very important expression for this in 
the 5Z-period is "Existence" (Existenz) . It is a term intended, 
Heidegger says in his review of Jaspers' Psychologie der 
Wel tanschauungen, to indicate "the phenomenon of the 'I am' , 
and the Being-sense, which lies in 'I am' as the approach to 
a context of fundamental phenomena and the problems involved 
there".50 Heidegger says in 5Z: 
The Being itself, to which Dasein can in one way or another 
bear itself and always somehow bear itself, we call Existence. 
And because the essential determination of this being can not 
be achieved by ascribing to it a material what (sachhaltigen 
Was), its essence lies rather in the fact that it always has 
its Being to be as its own Being, the title Dasein has been 
chosen as pure Being-expression t·o characterize this being. 51 
Actually, as could be seen from the above quotation, both 
the terms "Existence" and "Dasein" are deliberately chosen 
to characterize a special manner of Being, which is concerned 
with its own Being in its Being, that is, self-referential. 
And while Dasein is used in 5Z both as the manner of Being 
of human being and also as the being "man", Existence is 
particularly used to refer to the Being-character of human 
beings. "Existence is the ti tIe for the Being- kind of the being 
which we are always ourselves, the human Dasein", Heidegger 
49. Ref., for instance, GA26, S.171ff. 
50. Wm, S.lO. 
51. SZ, S.12. 
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says. 52 It is a title used to designate the manner of Being 
of Dasein as contrary to the manner of Being of beings unlike 
Dasein, or of things, i. e., of "mere existence" (Vorhanden). 
Heidegger called the character of the special Being of Dasein 
"Existentials" (Existenzialien), as distinguished with the 
character of the Being of beings unlike Dasein, which is 
traditionally designated as "categories". Heidegger says: 
Because it [the Existence-structure of Dasein] is 
determined out of the Existentiality, we call the Being-
characters of Dasein "Existentials. They are to be sharply 
separated from the Being-determination of the beings unlike 
Dasein, which we call categories. 53 
Heidegger called the Being-characters of Dasein 
"Existentials", and the Being-determination of the beings 
unlike Dasein, or of Vorhanden, "categories". In fact, 
category remains a cardinal concept in the inquiry of Being 
in the history of philosophy since the ancient Greece. But 
Heideggei here had attempted to carry out a rather 
revolutionary project in regard of the traditional inquiry 
of Being, "when he contrasted the concept of category wi th that 
of Existential, and regarded both of them as the 
characterizations of mere regions of Being, or Being-kinds 
(Seinsarten). While the traditional inquiry of Being 
considered the doctrine of categories as the general character 
of Being as such, Heidegger thought that it is only based on 
the interpretation of Being as "mere e x istence" (Vorhanden). 
Heidegger says: 
52 
This interpretation of Being becomes philosophically 
inadequate as soon as it spreads out uni versally and attempts 
GA2 6 , S. 15 9 . 
53. S2, S . 44 . 
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to understand also the Existence at the guideline of this 
Being-concept, while the way must be a reverse one. 54 
The tradi tional inquiry of Being interprets Being on the 
base of the Being of "mere existence" and attempts to 
understand the Being of human Dasein also from it. Heidegger 
thought that it precisely reverses the proper way. He thought 
that the interpretation of Being should be first of all based 
on the Being of human Dasein and the Being of "mere existence" 
is actually only a subdivision or derivation of it. A Chinese 
Heidegger scholar Tze-wan Kwan explicates this revolutionary 
thinking of Heidegger concerning the inquiry of Being 
concisely as following: 
The doctrine of categories, which categorizes only the 
mere existence (Vorhandene) in widest sense, is ordered into 
the analytic of Dasein. The character of Being of categories, 
i. e., of Vorhandensein, or to speak "temporally", of the 
presence, of the steadfastness, is understood properly as the 
way of Being of Dasein which is "proximally and for the most 
part" attuned in the form of inauthentici ty. To speak 
differently: The doctrine of categories is subordinated to the 
analytic of Dasein or the doctrine of Existentials, as its 
moment of forgottenness, i.e., of inauthenticity.55 
In contrast to the traditional inquiry of Being, the 
characterization of the Being of human Dasein, i. e., the 
Existentials, was put forth by Heidegger in place of the 
characterization of the Being of "mere existence", that is, 
the categories. This consideration in the ' sz is actually 
nothing new in the thinking of early Heidegger. ' It was already 
revealed in the groundbreaking course of 1919. In this course, 
Heidegger, as pointed out above, tried to establish a science 
54. GA24, S. 41 7 f . 
55 Tze-wan Kwan: Die hermeneutische Phanomenologie und das tautologische 
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of lived-experience as such. He thought that this new science 
could never be based on the tradi tional doctrine of categories, 
in so far as "the classification of the categories is dominated 
by the motivation-lawfulness 'thinghood' (Dinghaftkeit)." 56 
He thought that life is something "utterly new" and 
irrevocably different from the thinghood, and therefore it 
can never be based on the traditional doctrine of categories, 
which is moti va ted by the sphere of thinghood. In the 
Aristotle-course of 1922, in which the problematic of Being 
began to hold sway, Heidegger, following the terms of Dil they, 
put the inquiry of characterizations of the "factical life" 
under the title "the basic-categories of life". 57 Obviously 
in this course, Heidegger, though he was long aware of the 
difference between the Being of thinghood and the Being of 
human Being, did not . yet resolutely demarcate these two 
Being-kinds in regard of terminology. 
In 5Z, the difference of the Being of thinghood and the 
Being of human Dasein is even fixed in the terminology. This 
difference was in 5Z called "ontological distinction" 
(ontologische Unterschied). 58 Certainly, this so-called 
"ontological distinction" is utterly different from the 
"ontological difference" (ontologische Differenz) that 
appears in the Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie of 1927. 
However, I suppose, the concept ".ontologicaldistinction" has 
no less importance in Heidegger's thinking in and before 5Z 
than the concept "ontological difference" has in Heidegger' s 
thinking after 5Z. For, actually, as mentioned above, 
Heidegger's effort of thinking, until the publication of 5Z, 
lies on nothing other than working out the "Being of factical 
life", which remains for him something "utterly different" 
from the Being of "mere existence". And the distinctiveness 
Denken Heideggers, (Bonn : Bouv ier, 198 2) , S. 6 0 . 
56 GA56/56, S.90. 
57 • GA 61, S. 84 . 
5 8. Vide SZ, S.56. 
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of the "Being of factical life" is put into relief precisely 
by virtue of its distinction with the Being of mere existence, 
on which the traditional doctrine of categories is based. 
Hence, the analytic of Dasein, in which the Being of Dasein 
is supposed to worked out, remains one of the intrinsic and 
necessary part of the program of 5Z, even though the task of 
it is supposed to be "the meaning of Being in general" rather 
than the meaning of Being of Dasein. And actually, only an 
analytic of Dasein was worked out by Heidegger in the published 
part of 5Z. On the contrary, no systemic and explici t 
interpretation of the meaning of Being in general was given 
out. Beside, the analytic of Dasein actually has a much more 
importance role than merely "preparing". For, the 
interpretation of the meaning of Being in general is supposed 
to be worked out of the meaning of the Being of Dasein. 
Heidegger tried to "reverse" the traditional way of inquiry. 
He tried to develop a doctrine of Being that is based on the 
Being of human Dasein, and understand the Being of "mere 
existence" "at the guideline of this Being-concept". 
The meaning of the Being of Dasein lS temporali ty 
(Zeitlichkeit). Through the interpretation of the Ex istence 
of Dasein as "Being-in-the-world" (In-der-Wel t-sein) , 59 it 
ends up in the conclusion that "the existential-ontological 
constitution of the Dasein-whole grounds on the 
temporality". 60 Heidegger repeated this result In Die 
Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie. He says therein: 
What the existential analytic encompasses, I have 
according to the essential result laid out in my treatise on 
>Sein und Zeit< . The result of the e x istential analytic, the 
exposition of the Being-constitution of Dasein in its ground 
59. See S Z, S. 41 . 
60 S Z , S. 4 37 . 
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is this: the Being-constitution of Dasein grounds on the 
temporality (Zeitlichkeit) .61 
However, though the analytic of Dasein, i. e., the 
exposition of the Being-constitution of Dasein, does 
something more than preparing, it is not the proper 
destination of 5Z. It is only "a way". It is, as pointed out 
above, carried out only in order to work out the inner 
possibility of Being-understanding of Dasein and to work out 
the meaning of Being in general at the guideline of it. Since 
the Being-understanding belongs to the Being-consti tution of 
Dasein, and,the Being-constitution of Dasein grounds on the 
temporali"ty, the Being-understanding is considered to ground 
on the temporality also. Zeitlichkeit then turns out to be 
what constitutes the inner possibility of the Being-
understanding. Heidegger says: 
But then, if the Being-understanding belongs to the 
Existence of Dasein, this must also ground on the t"emporali ty. 
The ontological condition of the possibility of the Being-
understanding is the temporality itself. 6= 
Now Zeitlichkeit lS proved to be the possibility of the 
Being-constitution of Dasein and thus the Being-
understanding, but it is not yet the answer to the question 
of the meaning of Being in general, only such answer will be 
the proper destination of 5Z. Zeitlichkeit serves only as the 
"basis (Boden) for acquiring this answer". 63 In order to work 
out the question of the meaning of Being in general, it has 
to go a step further. It requires "a original explication of 








temporali ty as Being of the Dasein that understands Being" . 64 
Heidegger called this "the problematic of Temporality" 
(Temporalitat) .65 The relation of Being and time, which was 
occasioned through a "flash of genius" in the young Heidegger, 
was supposed to be radically built up in such problematic. 
And only through such problematic is the analytic of Dasein, 
which is actually nothing more than a analysis of the "Being 
of facticallife" presented in the earlier semesters, supposed 
to be turned into a science of Being, that is, ontology. 
Therefore, while the analytic of Dasein, which is supposed 
to be end up at exposing the Being-constitution of Dasein as 
temporality, is still directed by the problematic of life, 
the problematic of Temporali ty, which is supposed to be worked 
out from the analytic of Dasein, is directed by another motive 
of the early Heidegger beside life, that lS, the motive of 
science. 
§4.S The Problematic of Temporality 
What is the meaning of Temporality? How did Heidegger 
formulate this problematic? How is Temporali tat (Temporality) 
different from Zei tlichkei t (temporality), so that Heidegger 
found it necessary to use two terms to distinguish them? In 
SZ, · Heidegger had not yet pointed out expressively what lS 
involved with the problematic of Temporality. But according 
to the outline In § 8, It can be grossly ascertained that it 
is involved with "the explication of time as the 
transcendental horizon of the question of Being". In 
Grundprobleme (GA24), the problematic of Temporality lS 
further elaborated. Heidegger says therein: 
64. S Z , S. 1 7 . 
65. See GA24, S. 324 . 
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The horizon, out of which something as Being in general 
becomes understandable, is time. We interpret the Being out 
of time (tempus) . The interpretation is a temporal 
interpretation. The basic problematic of ontology as the 
determination of the meaning of Being out of time is the 
problematic of Temporali ty. 66 
According to this formulation, we know that the 
problematic of Temporality is the basic problematic of 
ontology. And ontology, as we have mentioned before, is the 
science of Being. Hence, it becomes clear that the problematic 
of Temporality is concerned with the knowledge of Being and 
especially with the "determination of the meaning of Being 
out of time". In the problematic of Temporali ty, as the 
determination of the mea-ning of Being out of time, time serves 
as the "transcendental horizon". But what does it mean with 
"transcendental horizon"? And why the meaning of Being is 
determined out of time? Heidegger formulated the problematic 
of Temporality with another word in Grundprobleme: 
We call temporality Temporality, insofar as it functions 
as condi tion of the possibili ty of the pre-ontological as well 
as of the ontological Being-understanding. 67 
_The temporality is the condition of the possibility of 
Being-understanding in general; Being is understood and 
concei ved out of Time. If temporali ty functions as such 
condi tion, we call it Temporali ty. 68 
This means that Temporality is temporality (Zei tlichkei t) 
when it serves as the condi tion of the possibili ty of 
Being-understanding. Hence, it is clear that Temporality 
actually is Zeitlichkeit. When Zeitlichkeit, as what makes 
66 GA24, S. 22 . 
67. GA24, S. 388 . 
68. GA24, S. 38 9 . 
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possible the Being-constitution of Dasein, serves as the 
condition of possibility of Being-understanding, which 
belongs to the Being-constitution of Dasein too, we give it 
a specified name "Temporality". Temporalitat is nothing other 
than a special function of Zeitlichkeit. Indeed the fact that 
Temporality is only a translation of the Zei tlichkei t already 
implies that they are closely related, though Heidegger 
persistently emphasized their difference. Heidegger says in 
Grundprobl eme: 
The term" Temporali ta t" does not wholly coincide wi th that 
of Zei tlichkei t, though the former is only the translation of 
the latter. Temporali tat means Zei tlichkei t, in so far as 
Zeitlichkeit itself is made into a theme as condition of the 
possibility of the Being-understanding and of the ontology as 
such. The term "Temporalitat" is supposed to indicate that 
Zei tlichkei t in the existential analytic presents the hori zon 
from which we understand Being. What we inquiry in the 
existential analytic, the Existence, turns out as Zei tlichkei t, 
which on its part constitutes the horizon for the Being-
understanding that essentially belongs to Dasein. 69 
Temporalitat is enlisted to thematize a special function 
of Zeitlichkeit. It is used to indicate that Zeitlichkeit, 
as the Being-consti tution of Dasein, presents the horizon of 
the Being-understanding of Dasein. And it therefore indicates 
the fact that Zei tlichkei t makes possible both Being-
understanding and, therefore, ontology as science of Being, 
so long as any knowledge of Being must presuppose an earlier 
understanding of Being. Temporality (Temporalitat) lS 
precisely the condition of possibility of ontology as such 
that is worked out from temporali ty (Zei tlichkei t) . Hence, 
the problematic of Temporali tat is precisely that which 
connects the two very philosophical motives, that is, science 
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and life, in Heidegger's early thinking. It is also the 
cardinal problematic for Heidegger's reformulation of 
philosophy in the SZ-period. If philosophy is the science of 
Being, then it is Temporality rather than temporality that 
would be the proper aim of Heidegger's reformulation of 
philosophy. Now it is going to see how Heidegger worked out 
the Temporality as the condition of possibility of ontology 
as such from the temporality as the unity of the Being of 
factical Dasein. Its working out depends on the unfolding of 
an Existentials of the Being of Dasein, that is, the 
understanding. 
§4.6 The structure of Understanding and the 
Horizonal Schema of the Ecstase of Zeit~ichkeit 
According to the existential analytic as carried out in 
SZ and Grundprobleme by Heidegger, understanding is a 
Existential rather than a category. That means that it is a 
determination of the Ex istence of Dasein (the Being of Dasein) 
rather than a determination of "Being-mere-ex istence" 
(Vorhandensein). And besides, Heidegger also claimed that 
understanding in general is not only a kind of knowing (as 
a knowing contrasted wi th e xplaining), but lS a basic 
determination of the Being of Dasein. Heidegger says: 
69 
7 0 
Understanding is an original determination of Existence 
of Dasein ... What is more, in the end, understanding in general 
is not primaril y a knowing, but rather - if otherwise e x isting 
is more than mere knowing in the usual sense of observation, 
and the latter presupposes the former - a basic determination 
of the Existence itself. 70 
GA2 4, 8. 32 4 . 
GA24, 8.390. 
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which is projected, there must be the upon-which (Woraufhin) 
of the projection. For projection is always the projection 
of something (the projected) upon something (the upon-which) . 
This upon-which 1S also called the "meaning" (Sinn) of 
understanding. "Sense means the upon-which of primary 
projection, out of which something can be conceived as what 
it is in its possibility", Heidegger says.74 When Heidegger 
asks about the meaning of Being, he is actually questioning 
the meaning of the Being-understanding, that is, that upon 
which something like Being is projected and understood. 
In the understanding of beings, it is Being that serves 
as the upon-which of the projection. That means that we 
understand beings only out of the projection upon Being. 
Therefore, understanding of beings must presuppose the 
proj ection upon Being. And insofar as understanding of Being 
is also a kind of understanding, there must also be a 
projection upon something in the Being-understanding. But 
that upon which Being is projected and understood still remain 
obscure at first. Heidegger says: 
If we say: in existentiell understanding of Dasein, Being 
is understood, and if w~ note that understanding is a projecting, 
therefore in the understanding of Being, there is again a 
projection: The Being is only understood, in so far as it is 
on its part proj ected upon something. The upon-which at first 
still remains obscure ... We understand beings only, in so far as 
we project it upon Being; the Being itself therefore must be 
in certain ways understood, i.e., Being on its part must be 
proj ected upon something. : s 
Heidegger at the same time claimed that the upon-which of 
the proj ection, or the meaning of understanding, is precisely 






lay bare the upon-which of a proj ection means to disclose that 
which makes possible the projected. ,,76 Therefore, in the case 
of the understanding of beings, Being as the upon-which of 
this projection is precisely that which makes possible such 
understandings. But in the case of the understanding of Being, 
which is the upon-which of its projection still remains 
obscure. 
However, as soon as Heidegger proved that Zeitlichkeit 
constitutes and makes possible the Being-constitution of 
Dasein, and therefore makes possible the Being-understanding, 
it becomes clear for him that Zeitlichkeit, as the original 
time, serves as the upon-which of the projection of Being. 
Understanding of Being is the projection of the Being upon 
time. "Being is understood and concei ved out of Time". ' This 
means that Being is understood in terms of time. Time is the 
limit within which time is understood. Therefore, Heidegger 
also called that time is the "horizon" (Horizont) of the 
understanding of Being. But from where arises time as the 
condition of the possibility of Being~understanding? 
According to Heidegger, time as the horizon of the 
Being-understanding arises out of the execution (Vollzug) of 
Zei tlichkei t. "Zeitlichkeit zei tigt" (temporality 
temporalizes), Heidegger says. 77 With this extraordinary 
expression, "Zei tlichkei t zei tigt", which, at least at first 
sight f seems to defy any attempt of reasonable understanding, 
Heidegger was tr y ing to stress that time is not something o f 
the being-kind of mere existence (vorhanden), that is, not 
something like a stone which is always there whether one hi ts 
it on its foot or not. Heidegger says: 
7 6 
77 
We purposely call the original time Zei tlichkei t in order 
to express that time is not additionally before-hand 
SZ, S.324 . 
SZ, S.3 2 8. 
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(vorhanden) , but rather that its essence is temporal 
(zeitlich) . That means: time "is" not, but rather temporalizes 
i tsel f (zei tigt sich). 78 
Time is not but temporalizes itself. By this expression, 
Heidegger tried to indicate that as an existential structure 
of human Dasein time serves as a verb rather than as a noun. 
Therefore, Heidegger said of the "execution" of time. From 
this execution of the "original time", 





Zeitlichkeit, these are, future (Zukunft), having-been-ness 
(Gewesenhei t) and present (Gegenwart). These three ecstases 
make possible the three basic determinations of the Existence 
of Dasein, i.e., the understanding, the facticity and the 
falling. These three ecstases, which, according to 
Heidegger's formulation in SZ, have the character of the 
"towards-oneself" (Auf-sich-zu), "back to" (Zuruck auf) and 
"letting-oneself-be-encountered by" (Begegn-enlassens von) 
respectively, 79 are the "original "outside-itself" (Auf3er-
sich) . 80 These ecstases, as the "moving-out to" (EntriJcking 
zu) , point towards something other than itself. Those towards 
which these ecstases point are the corresponding horizons of 
the ecstases of Zeitlichkeit. Heidegger also called these 
horizons the "horizonal schema". Heidegger says in SZ: 
The ecstases are not simply moving-out to __ _ Rather a 
"whi ther" (Wohin) of the moving-out belongs to the ecstases. 
These whither of the ecstases we call the horizonal schema. sl 




Then ... the ecstases of the Zei tlichkei t are not simply 
GA26, S. 26 4, 
SZ, S.3 28 f . 
SZ, S.329 . 
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moving-out to ... , not moving-out into the nothing. Ra ther, they, 
as moving-out to ... , according to their respecti ve ecstatic 
character, have a horizon that is prescribed by the mode of 
the moving-out, i.e., the mode of the future, having-been-
ness and present, and belongs to the ecstases themselves. Each 
ecstases, as moving-out to ... has at the same time by itself and 
belonging to it a pre-delineation of the formal structure of 
the whereto (Wozu) of the moving-out. We call this whither of 
the ecstase as the horizon or more exactly the horizonal schema 
of the ecstase. 82 
In the Marburg lecture course on logic in the summer 
semester of 1928, Heidegger further by means of analogy 
designated the horizon corresponding to the ecstasis of 
temporality "ecstema" (Ekstema). Heidegger says therein: 
The horizon show itself in and with the ecstasis, it is 
its ecstema (analogically formed as OVOTT)~O to OVOTOOlS or 
OVV8rll.lO to OVV8EOl$). And corresponding to the uni ty of the 
ecstases in their temporalization is the . unity of horizons a 
original one. 83 
It is precisel y this hori zonal schema of the ecstase that 
makes possible the Being-understanding. We understand Being 
out of this horizonal schema of the ecstases of the 
Zeitlichkeit. It is only-by virtue of the ecstatic horizons 
that Dasein is able to stretch out from oneself to understand 
something like Being and through his Being-understanding to 
understand the various kinds of beings, including the other 
Dasein and those beings in the world unlike Dasein. Hence, 
Heidegger stated that it is this horizonal schema that 
constitutes the proper content of Temporalitat, which was 
articulated by Heidegger as "condi tion of the possibili ty of 
81. SZ, S.365. 
82 GA24 IS. 428 f . 
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the Being-understanding" of human Dasein. Heidegger says in 
Grundprobl eme: 
Accordingly we understand Being out of the original 
horizonal schema of the ecstases of temporali ty. The schemata 
of the ecstases cannot be structurally detached from them, but 
the understanding orientation can be turned to the schema as 
such. The temporali ty that is primarily taken on the horizonal 
schemata of the temporality as condition of the possibility 
of the Being-understanding constitutes the content of the 
general concepts of the Temporality. Temporalitat is 
Zei tlichkei t wi th regard to the uni ty of the hori zonal schemata 
belonging to it ... 84 
The horizonal schema of the ecstases of the temporality 
provides the horizon out of which Being is understood and 
conceived. This is also called the "transcendental horizon" 
in so far as it makes possible Dasein's transcendence into 
the world. Heidegger says in SZ: 
Grounding on the horizonal unity of the ecstatic 
temporali ty, the world is transcendent. T0e world must already 
be ecstatically disclosed, so that out of it the beings 
wi thin-the-world can be encountered. Ecstatically temporali ty 
is already held in the hori zons of its ecstases and, in 
temporalizing itself, it comes back to the beings that is 
encountered in the there (Da). 85 
Heidegger says more explicitly in Grundprobleme: 
The ecstatic character of time makes possible the specific 
step-over-character (Vberschrittscharakter) of the Dasein, 
the transcendence and thus also the world .. . Just as the ecstases 
it i tsel f consti tutes the uni ty of temporali ty, so in each case 
8 3 GA26, S. 269. 
84. GA24, S. 436. 
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there corresponds to the ecstatic unity of temporality such 
a unity of its horizonal schema. The Transcendence of the 
Being-in-the-world grounds in its specific wholeness on the 
original ecstatic-horizonal unity of temporality.86 
Zei tlichkei t is in its ecstatic-horizonal uni ty the basic 
condition of the possibility of the ElTEKElVa, i. e., of the 
transcendence which constitutes the Dasein itself. 87 
In so far as the world containing beings other than the 
Dasein which is always mine, Dasein has to stretch out from 
itself in order to understand those other beings. This 
moving-out from itself or stepping into the world lS, 
according to Heidegger, made possible by the ecstatic 
structure of temporality. Heidegger in the Marburg lecture 
course of 1928 further specified the problematic of 
transcendence into the world as "world~entry". Heidegger 
says: 
This ecstematical unity of the horizon of the temporality 
is nothing other than the temporal condi tion of the possibili ty 
of the world and its essential belonging to the transcendence. 
For the transcendence has its possibili ty in the uni ty of the 
ecstatic swinging (Schwingen) . This swinging of the 
temporalizing ecstases is as such the upswing (Uberschwung) , 
regarded as towards all possible beings, which can there 
factically enter into a world. The ecstematic temporalizes 
itself swingingly as a worlding (Welten). World-entry 
(Wel teingang) happens only in so far as something like ecstatic 
swinging temporalizes itself as a particular temporality. s8 
Now, according to the above analysis, it becomes clear that 
85. S2, S.366. 
86. GA24, S. 428 f . 
8 7 GA24, S. 436. 
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time which serves to Being-understanding as the upon-which 
of the projecting of Being, arises from the execution of 
temporality. Zei tlichkei t is called by Heidegger as the 
"original time" that it is not but rather temporalizes itself. 
In so far as temporality makes possible Being-understanding, 
it is the condi tion of the possibili ty of the Being-
understanding. And when temporali ty (Zei tlichkei t) functions 
as such condition, we call it Temporality (Temporalitat). 
Nevertheless, as we have mentioned above, Heidegger in the 
SZ did not work out the content of the Temporality of Being 
in general. What is the content of those horizons which 
correspondingly belongs to the ecstases of temporali ty? How 
does the horizon of time determine the meaning of Being in 
general? These questions remain obscure. In SZ, Heidegger only 
pointed out the content of the horizonal schema as following': 
The schema, in which Dasein comes towards itself futurally, 
no matter ' authentically or inauthentically, is the for-
the-sake-of itself (Umwillen seiner). The schema, in which 
Dasein itself as thrown is disclosed In the situatedness 
(Befindlichleit) , we grasp as the wherefore (Wovor) of the 
throwness, or, the whereon (Woran) of the abandonment. It 
characterizes the horizonal structure of the having-been-
ness .. . The horizonal schema of the present is determined by the 
in -order- to (Um- zu) . 89 
Heidegger here elaborated the horizonal schema as the 
for-the-sake-of itself, the wherefore and the in-order-to. 
However, these three structures are by no means temporal 
determinations. They can not be regarded as the 
interpretations of Being in general in terms of time. It has 
been well known that the third division of the first part of 






fragmentary work. Indeed, in the § 21 of the Grundprobleme, 
Heidegger had tried to elaborate this problematic further. 
But, as can be seen from the publication of this lecture as 
the Band 24 of the Gesamtausgabe, there is only one section 
(§ 21) in this lengthy lecture course that is concerned with 
this problematic. And actually it is not dealt with this 
problematic as such, but just contains an exposition of one 
temporal horizon of Being, that is, praesens (Praesenz) , which 
proves to makes possible the understanding of the Being of 
Zuhanden. It was only limited to "the explication of the 
present (Gegenwart) and its ecstatic horizon, the praesens. ,,90 
Hence, this new working out of the problematic of Temporality 
is not quite successful and is of not much significance. 91 
Actually, throughout the SZ-period, i.e., from 1924-29, 
Heidegger was not able to successfully work out the content 
of Temporali ty anymore. And in fact the problematic of 
Temporality is not theoretically developed beyond the 
exposition in the Grundprobleme. 
The problematic of Temporality almost completely 
disappeared in the thinking of Heidegger since 1929. The 
transition from Zei tlichkei t to Temporali tat is never carried 
through and thus the program of SZ is never fulfilled. This 
means that the way of an exist~ntial analytic of Dasein can 
not lead to the destination of the meaning of Being in general. 
There must be problems laying on the way that brings about 
the "failure" (Scheitern) of this transition to "time and 
Being" . According to the testimony of Heidegger himself, there 
is an "misunderstanding (Verkennung) of the Being-question 
as posed in Sein und Zei t" ,92 so that "the proper way is 
obstructed". 93 And this misunderstanding, as pointed out above, 
90. GA24, S. 435 . 
91 Ref. Tze-wan Kwan, Die hermeneutische Phanomenologie und das 
ta u tologische Denken Heideggers, (Bonn: Bouvier, 1982), S. 78. 
92. Vide KPM, "Vorwort zur vierten Auflage", S.XIV. 
93. Ibid., S.XIII. 
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had already become clear to him in 1929. Hence, Heidegger 
himself said: "Sein und Zei t was a shipwreck. ,,94 
§4.7 The Failure of the Program of Sein und Zeit 
We are now going to give some explanations to Heidegger' s 
failure of the working out the content of the Temporality of 
Being in the 5Z-period. 
First, following the structure of understanding as 
projection, a problem would arise immediately, that is, if 
beings are understood when they are proj ected upon Being, and 
Being is understood when it is projected upon time, then upon 
which shall time be projected, so that time can be understood? 
According to the structure of understanding, as that is laid 
out by Heidegger, there is apparently a series of layers of 
projection. Hence, it is questionable that whether this series 
of layers of projection would turn -out to be a "progressus 
in infinitum". Indeed, Heidegger himself was aware of this 
problem. He contrived to escape this problem through the 
conception of the "self-projection" of the temporality. That 
means that time is understood by a projection on itself. Time 
is understood in terms of itself. Therefore the layers of 
projection will not extend further than time, and thus it would 
not turn out to be progressus in infinitum. Heidegger says 
in Grundprobleme: 
The temporality is in itself the original self-projection 
simply as such (Selbstentwurf schlechthin) , so that wherever 
and whenever there is understanding I ... I this understanding is 
only possible in the self-projection of the temporality. The 
temporality is as unveiled there (da) I because it makes 
94 "Sein und Zei t war eine Verungluckung", Heidegger wrote in a letter 
to Max Kormnerell, see Gunter Figal, Heidegger zur Einfi.ihrung, 2. Uberab. 
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possible the "Da" and its unveiledness in general. If the 
temporali ty, as the condi tion of possibili ty of all proj ecting, 
is the self-projection simply as such, then it implies that 
the temporality is in certain sense already co-veiled in all 
factical projecting - that somewhere and somehow time breaks 
through, no matter it would be only in vulgar understanding 
or misunderstanding. Where a there (Da) is unveiled in itself, 
the temporality manifests itself.95 
The temporality (Zeitlichkeit) is precisely what makes 
possible the understanding and the proj ecting in general. It 
makes possible them by offering the upon-which of the 
projection or the horizon of understanding. While it provides 
the horizon for understanding, temporality itself is at the 
same time understood in all understanding through the 
proj~ction upon itself. Time, as the horizon of the 
understanding of Being, lS understood whenever Being is 
understood. It is "co-unveiled" with all understanding by the 
projection upon itself. Time is understood in terms of itself, 
and it lS precisely this self-understanding or self-
proj ection which makes possible .all understanding. And so long 
as time is understood by itself, the problem of progressus 
~n infinitum will be solved. Heidegger says:" 
Because the ecstatic-horizonal unity of the temporality 
is in itself the self-projection simply as such, and as ecstatic 
makes possible the" projecting upon ... in general, and together 
with the horizon belonging to the ecstase presents the 
condi tion of the possibili ty of an upon-which, an out-
toward-which (Wozu-hinaus) in general, it can no more be asked 
upon which the schemata on its part would be projected, and 
so in infinitum. The aforementioned series of projections that 
were inserted one after another: Understanding of beings, 
proj ection upon Being, understanding of Being, proj ection upon 
A u f 1 ., ( H amb u r g: J un ius, 1 9 9 6), S. 4 9 . 
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time, has its end at the horizon of the ecstatic unity of the 
temporali ty. 96 
However, even if Heidegger can solve the problem of the 
progressus ~n infini tum that lies in the structure of 
understanding as projection, his conception of self-
projection of temporality has led himself into another problem. 
Although the self-projection of temporality can make the 
series of layers of projections come to an end, this end lS 
nevertheless a dead end. This makes Heidegger fall back to 
the tradition of the philosophy of subjectivity, which lS 
characterized by the attempt to determine Being out of the 
subject. 
The temporality, which provides the horizon within which 
Being is understood, is nothing but the constitution of the 
Existence of Dasein. Hence it means that Being is understood 
and is conceived only out of the horizon provided by the 
constitution of the Existence of Dasein. To put it in another 
way, it is the sUbjectivity as Zeitlichkeit that determines 
the content of the meaning of Being. Although Heidegger in 
his later period claimed that "in >Sein und Zei t<, the problem 
is set up outside the sphere of subjectiyity",97 he did, as 
pointed out above, In his early period emphasize that the 
Being-question is "subject-related" (subjektsbezogen). The 
temporali ty, as what provides the horizon of the Being-
understanding, is precisely regarded as what makes possible 
the subj ecti vi ty of a subj ect. 98 Therefore Heidegger pointed 
out that every philosophical problem, certainly including the 
Being-question as the basic question of philosophy, must be 
95. GA24, 3.436f. 
96. GA24, 3. 437 . 
9
7 BaR, p.XVIII. 
98 Zeitlichkeit is what makes possible the transcendence, and 
transcendence is the "original constitution of the subjectivity of a 
subject" (GA26, 3.211), so that Zeitlichkeit is what makes possible the 
subjectivity of the subject. 
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grounded on the illumination of the subject. Heidegger says 
in the Grundprobleme: 
The trend toward the "subject" - not always uniformly 
unequivocal and clear - is grounded on the fact that the 
philosophical questioning somehow understood that the basis 
for every substantial (sachlich) philosophical problem can and 
must be procured out of the sufficient illumination of the 
'subject'. For our part we have positively seen that the 
sufficient illumination of Dasein in regard on the temporali ty 
alone prepares the basis in order to pose the question of the 
possible understanding of Being in general with meaning. 99 
And in so far as Heidegger tried to ground the subjectivity 
of the subj ect on the temporalJ ty of Dasein, it is by no means 
accidental that he would turn to an investigation of Kant, 
especially on his schematism, as a refuge after the 
"shipwreck" of 5Z. For in the transcendental philosophy of 
Kant, time is precisely the condition of the possibility of 
all experience. The transcendental determination of time as 
the transcendental schemata determines the content of the 
categories, which serves as the pure form of understanding 
and thus are the a prlorl determination of all beings. This 
is in certain sense similar to the approach of Heidegger that 
Heidegger in 5Z attempted to work out the content of the 
meaning of Being, which makes possible the understanding of 
beings, out of . temporality as the constitution of the 
Existence of Dasein. Hence, Heidegger himself would say that 
he "sought in Kant an advocate for the Being-question" posed 
by him. 100 
Actually, when Heidegger tried to work out the Being-
question as the meaning of Being, and furthermore as the 
condition of possibility of the Being-understanding, he has 
99. GA24, S. 4 4 4 . 
- 181 -
achieved in a certain sense an "transcendental turn" and 
h f f 11 h . 1 h 101 t ere ore a en back to the transcendental p l osop y. 
Otto Pbggeler has aptly pointed out this: 
While Heidegger poses the Being-question out of the 
Being-understanding of man, he in a certain sense led into the 
transcendental philosophy... The transcendental ego for 
Heidegger is not the cogito of Descartes and is not the pure 
consciousness of Husserl, but rather the Existence as the 
essence of Dasein, as it is characterized by Being-in-the-
world, care, fini tude, temporali ty and historici ty. 102 
Heidegger in his early period of thinking cannot overcome 
this" subj ect-related" and even "transcendental" tendency in 
regard of the Being-question. This is the main reason for the 
fact that 5Z remains a fragment. And in so far as this 
"subject-related" tendency is formulated in term of "the Being 
of Dasein", or the "Being of factical life", and the analytic 
of Dasein is the continuation of the attempt to figure out 
a new science of life, it is said above that the failure of 
5Z to work out the meaning of Being as such is by large due 
to its obsession with the problematic of life. Actually, the 
Being-question as such was not even thematically posed in the 
5Z-period. No sooner after the posing of it, it is turned into 
the question on the Being-understanding, and the inquiry is 
turned into the analytic of Dasein. According to the words 
of Heidegger himself, the failure to work out the Being-
question is due to the fact that it could not be done so "wi th 
the help of the language of metaphysics" . 103 Since the lecture 
of Vom Wesen der Wahrhei t, Heidegger has concentrated himself 
on overcoming the language of metaphysics, and tried to "think 
100 KPM, S.XIV. 
101 Ref., for instance, Gadarner, Wahrheit und Methode, S.260ff. 
102. Otto Pbggeler, "Sein als Ereignis", in Heidegger und die hermeneutische 
Philosophie, (Freiburg/Breisgau: Alber, 1983), S.94f. 
103. Wrn, S.328. 
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Being without beings" (Sein ohne das Seiende zu denken) , 104 
including the human being as a kind of beings. I am not going 
to deal wi th this overcoming further in this essay. I am hereby 
only going to cite a passage from the period of the Kehre of 
Heidegger's thinking to show that Heidegger has tried to work 
out the Being-question in another way, in contrast with the 
"subjected-related" way of his early period. Heidegger says 
in a lecture course in the summer semester of 1935: 
If, accordingly, we carry out the question "Why is there 
at all being rather than nothing?" in its meaning suitably, 
we must refrain from singling out any particular, individual 
being, incl uding the reference to man. For what indeed is this 
being? Imagine the earth inside the obscure unmeasurability 
of space in the uni verse. Compared wi th the uni verse, the earth 
is a tiny grain of sand, between it and the next grain of sand 
of the. same magni tude there extends one kilometer and more 
emptiness; on the surface of this tiny grain of sand lives a 
confusedly creeping, stunned mass of supposedly intelligent 
animals, which have invented knowing for a moment. And what 
is the temporal extension of a human life in the time-line of 
millions of years. Hardly a move of the second hand, a breath. 
Inside the being as a whole there is no legitimate ground to 
be found for singling out precisely the being, which is called 
man and to which we oursel ves accidentally belongs. 105 
Hereby, the "fundamental-ontological way" to solve the 
Being-question was forsaken. The Being of Dasein was no longer 
regarded as the sole and privileged "access" to the meaning 
of Being as such. How could human Dasein still be regarded 
as the "ultimate foundation" of Being if one envisages that 
they live barely on a "tiny grain of sand" in the universe 
and their life-span is hardly "a move of the second hand", 
1 0 4 ZSD, S.2. 
105. EiM, S.3. 
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In so far as the "I-related" or "Dasein-related" approach for 
Heidegger has been forsaken, the privilege of the problematic 
of life in regard of the formulation of philosophy for 
Heidegger was also at the same time jettisoned. Certainly, 
from 1924 onward, Being had already been claimed to be the 
sole subject-matter. But only after the Kehre is Being no 
longer interrogated out of Dasein, or out of any other kind 
of beings and therefore can Being gain its appropriate 
thematic treatment in Heidegger' s thinking. Being is thought 
only out of Being itself. 
In so far as the destination posed at the very beginning 
is not arrived, it can well be said that SZ is not a successful 
work. Above all, SZ remains a fragment. But al though Heidegger 
could not finally provide the condition of possibility of 
Being-understanding and layout an new ontology, the attempt 
of SZ can also well be said to be hugely successful. For, its 
influence is far-reaching. If one says that the attempt of 
SZ has altered the whole philosophical orientation of the 
Westerns, it will not be an overestimation. Heidegger's 
attempt to reformulation in the SZ is actually the most 
impressing and stupendous since the system of Hegel. No wonder 
even the famous opponent of Heidegger, Habermas says: "From 
today.' s standpoint, Heidegger's new beginning still presents 
probably the most profound turning point in German philosophy 
since Hegel." Some of the significance of this attempt of 
Heidegger will be pointed out in the following remarks. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Following the outlining of the intellectual background out 
of which Heidegger was brought up, Heidegger's attempt of 
reformulation of philosophy in his pre-SZ-period and sz-
period, and the transition between these two periods, are 
already drawn out in -the above essays. Therefore, I think, 
Heidegger's route to reformulate philosophy in his early 
period as a whole has become qui te clear. It can be seen that 
the problematic of life had incessantly been the central 
motive for Heidegger' s reformulation. It was pointed out that 
this is also the case when the Being-question has finally 
replaced the factical life to become the proper subj ect-matter 
of philosophy for Heidegger, and when philosophy is regarded 
as "ontology in the broad sense". And in so far as the early 
Heidegger was still convinced wi th the idea of science as one 
of the noblest idea in the Western tradition, what he was 
unyieldingly trying to do was nothing other than to figure 
out a suitable science for the problematic of life. It seems 
that there is a balance in Heidegger's mind with the 
problematic of life situating in one of its pan and with the 
idea of science in another. It was also shown that the concept 
of life and that of science lS, according to the Western 
tradition of thinking, incompatible to each other. Therefore, 
the scales in Heidegger' s mind can never be balanced. At some 
times, the weight of the problematic of life outstrips that 
of the idea of science. At another times, the situation reveres. 
But throughout Heidegger's early period of thinking, no 
balance was obtained. His early thinking -was directed rather 
by the tension engendered by the unbalance. 
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According to the above treatment, it can be seen that in 
the pre-5Z-period, the problematic of life got the upper hand. 
It was considered to be the proper subject-matter of 
philosophy. Hence, Heidegger thought that it is his task to 
figure a proper science for this subject-matter. In so far 
as the problematic of life was considered to be "something 
utterly new". The science for it should also be something 
utterly new too. It was conceived as the "pre-theoretical 
science". 
But soon, Heidegger himself sensed the incompatibility of 
the idea of life and that of science. He found that the idea 
of a science of life might well be a contradictory idea. 
Heidegger then ventured into a series of historical 
investigations. From these investjgations, he should become 
clear that life as such was never a proper subject-matter in 
the Western tradition of philosophy as a whole. Rather, he 
found out another proper subj ect-matter for philosophy. This 
is Being. Being has remained the object of philosophy since 
the ancient Greek. 
Then, the concept of Being entered the thinking of 
Heidegger. And it was soon incorporated into the problematic 
of life to become a stunning topic, that is, the Being of 
factical life. The Being as such and the Being of factical 
life became two main themes of Heidegger's thinking. It was 
pointed out that after a short time of hesitation, Heidegger 
decided to cling to the tradition of Western thinking and to 
fix the Being-question to be his proper question in 
reformulating philosophy. But as soon as the problematic of 
life was still directing Heidegger' s thinking under the rubric 
of the Being of facticallife or the Being of Dasein, the 
traditional question of Being had already been reformed under 
its influence. 
In so far as the solution of the Being-question is supposed 
to depend on the analysis of Dasein in regard to its Being, 
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the Being-question posed by Heidegger is "Dasein-related". 
The Being-question is, as pointed out above, 
"fundamental-ontological way". According to 
posed in a 
the above 
treatment, Dasein is in certain sense nothing but another term 
of the factical life, and the analytic of Dasein is actually 
the continuation of the analysis of the factical life. Hence, 
under the fundamental-ontology, the Being-question, and 
therefore philosophy as ontology, was considered to rest on 
an analysis of the factical life of human being. As the young 
Heidegger said: "The departing point of the ways towards 
philosophy is the factical life-experience."l 
In the execution of such an · approach, the Being-question 
is actually from the outset transformed into another question. 
It is transformed to the "inner possibility of the Being-
understanding". In so far as the Being-understanding is an 
ability which solely belongs to the Being-constitution of 
Dasein, the precedence of Dasein is put into relief. According 
to the existential analysis of Dasein carried out in 5Z, the 
Being-constitution of Dasein consists in the temporality 
(Zeitlichkeit). The task of philosophy as ontology then 
becomes the working out of the condition of Being-
understanding out of the temporality. This was called by 
Heidegger the "problematic of Temporality (Temporalitat). 
The problematic of Temporality, as pointed out above, is 
never carried out. The program of 5Z is never completed. The 
program of 5Z can in certain sense be regarded as a failure 
in so far as it can not finally reach its destination set forth 
from the outset. And the failure of 5Z may well be regarded 
as the failure of the attempt of Heidegger to conflate the 
idea of life and science. For, 5Z, I suppose, is nothing less 
the climax of the attempts which Heidegger had worked out since 
the semester of 1919. It gathered up the essentials of the 
analysis of the factical life worked out from 1919 to 1926 
. GA60, S.10. 
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and posed it under the name of "an existential analytic of 
Dasein" as the prolegomena to newly form an ontology as science 
of Being. And, al though the Being-question was said to be the 
destination, it, compared with the substantial analysis of 
Dasein, appears only to be an empty heading. Actually, I 
suppose, except from the insistence of its importance over 
the Western tradition of philosophy, the Being-question was 
not touched on and analyzed in itself by Heidegger in the 
5Z-period. Only after discovering that an ontology can not 
be worked out from the analysis of the Being of Dasein, did 
Heidegger try to thematize Being itself by exposing its 
history. 
Some explanations of the failure of 5Z to work out the inner 
condition of Being-understanding and therefore to work out 
an ontology out of the Being-constitution of Dasein as 
temporali ty have already been pointed out in the above 
analysis. But despite its failure to fulfill its inner task, 
5Z can still well be regarded as a successful work. It not 
only made Heidegger to become, almost overnight, a thinker 
of the first rank, but it actually affects the whole 
development of the Western tradition of philosophy. In what 
follows, I will discuss its implications through three points, 
through the notion of existence, of understanding, and of the 
historization of philosophy. 
I. On Existence 
The term "Existence", as pointed out above, is supposed 
by Heidegger to indicate the very Being of human beings, as 
contrasted with the Being of beings unlike Dasein. Actually, 
the term "Existence", like the term "ontology", . had already 
become a voguey term before Heidegger took it into his 
terminology. The term "Existence" was in the nineteenth 
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century taken as a general watchword to oppose the speculati ve 
thinking of Hegel. 2 What is implied with this term is a position 
to direct against the pure theory, the pure inspection to the 
reality. Perhaps Kierkegaard is the most famous one who 
adopted this very term and the posi tion implied by this term 
before Heidegger. When Heidegger picked up this term in the 
early twenties, he was actually trying to do in the realm of 
philosophy nothing less than what Kierkegaard has achieved 
in the realm of religion. Admittedly, the influence of 
Kierkegaard on Heidegger is undeniable. 3 
What is insisted with the term "Existence", in Heidegger 
and Kierkegaard alike, is the peculiarity and individuality 
of every human being. This insistence can well be seen from 
the characteristics that Heidegger attributed to "Existence", 
or to the Being of factical life. Heidegger characterized it 
with such terms as "particular-whileness" (jeweiligkeit) or 
"always-mineness" (Jemeinigkeit) , both of which emphasized 
the peculiar and self-referential character of each 
individual. In SZ,- the individual who is aware of his 
"always-miness" is called "authentic Dasein",4 contrary to 
the "inauthentic Dasein", which is directed by the "other" 
and becomes "the they" (Das Man), i.e., the "'subject' of 
everydayness".5 This analysis of the authenticity of human 
Dasein is in itself actually a very poignant critique of the 
disposition of modern man that it may well be compared to Eric 
Fromm's well-known analysis of the tendency of man to "escape 
from freedom". 6 
This insistence of the peculiar and self-referential 
individuality became a very attractive and revolutionary 
2 Ref. Karl Lbwith, Der Mensch inmitten der Geschichte, hrsg. von Bernd 
Lutz, (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1990), S.l. 
3. Vide, for instance, John Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, (Bloornington: 
Indiana University Press, 1987), Part one. 
4. Vide, SZ, S.42f. 
5. SZ, S.113f. 
6. For the cri tique of Eric Frornm, see, Erich Frornm, Escape from Freedom, 
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philosophical doctrine in a time, when, on the one hand, the 
Hegelian system has buried all individuality under the big 
Reason, and, on the other hand, the highly divided and rapidly 
advancing theoretical sciences have left the everyday 
peculiar life-world behind in their meticulous construction 
of various theories. This trend was finally gathered up under 
the name of "existence-philosophy" (Existenzphilosophie) , or 
of "existentialism", to become a very influential movement 
in the twentieth century. Heidegger is coupled with Jaspers 
to be generally recognized as the "two most important authors,,7 
of the existenceo-pl)ilosophy in Germany, though nei ther 
Heidegger nor Jaspers attested to a self-affirmation as a 
participant of this movement. 8 Moreover, an assertion of 
Heidegger in 5Z, i.e., "the essence of Dasein lies in its 
Existence", 9 was, largely by virtue of Sartre's propagation 
and interpretation, taken as one of the major mottoes of 
existentialism. 
Although Heidegger's fame as a "thinker of first rank" 
amongst the intellectual minds or even the general public was 
established much more due to his invol vement wi th the 
existentialism than with the phenomenological movement, he 
did explicitly express his reservation for being put under 
this voguey movement. He found that the meaning of the term 
"Existence" used by the existentialists such as Sartre 
actually has little to do with the meaning of "Existence" as 
used by him ln the 5Z. Heidegger had made this point clearly 
in a letter to his French acquaintance, Jean Beaufret. This 
lett~r was then published with some refinements in 1947 under 
the ti tle "Brief uber Humanismus" (Letter on Humanism). 
However, the position expressed in this letter is already 
imbued with the thinking of Heidegger's late period and 
(New York: Owl Book, 1994). 
7 See Schnadelbach, op. cit., S.193. 
See Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke Bd 3, S.175. 
9. Vide SZ, S.42. 
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therefore it could not well be regarded as an appropriate 
account on his connection with the existentialism in the 
SZ-period. Admi ttedly, there are nuances between the meaning 
of Existence concei ved by Heidegger in his early thinking and 
that of Existence used by the Sartre. But the meaning of 
Existence in the early Heidegger, and the insistence of the 
peculiar individuality implied by it, I suppose, lS 
nevertheless in a great deal related with the thought of the 
existentialism, which had also taken the freedom of each 
individuals as.i ts main theme. Only this internal connection, 
but not the ' connection established completely on 
misunderstanding, I suppose, can explain the influence of 
Heidegger's early thinking on the existential movement. 
However, even though I suppose that the c 'oncept of Existenz 
in the early Heidegger is in a certain sense largely related 
to the trend of existentialism, there are still some traits 
of this concept peculiar to Heidegger's thinking of Being, 
the most noteworthy of which is his insistence on Dasein's 
structure of "stepping-beyond itself" (Uberschritt uber sich 
selbst) . ·This aspect of Existence is instrinically related 
to the concept of "Being-in-the-world". Heidegger says in GA24: 
"Dasein does not exist at first in some puzzling way then to 
accomplish the stepping beyond itself to others or to mere 
existence. Existing (Existieren) 
step-beyond ( Uberschrei ten) or, 
always already means to-
better, having-stepped-
beyond (Uber-schri ttenhaben) . ,,10 Therefore, in the early 
Heidegger, on the one hand, existence means the self-
referential character of the individual. On the other hand, 
it means the structure of stepping beyond itself to others 
or to the beings unlike Dasein. lt means at the same time the 
self and beyond-itself. And it is precisely the latter point 
that was insisted by the later Heidegger in his "thinking" 
of Being. Heidegger says: "I call the standing in the lighting 
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of Being "Ek-sistence" (Ek-sistenz). This kind of being is 
only proper to man."11 When Heidegger transformed the term 
"Existence" into "Ek-sistence", it is precisely the meaning 
of outside (Ek-) implicit in this expression that was 
underlined. Although the meaning of "outside itself" only 
became more and more prominent in the late thinking of 
Heidegger, it was already contained in the concept of 
Existence as "to-step-beyond" in the early Heidegger. 
II. On Understanding 
The concept of understanding, as already having been 
emphasized many times in the above essay, is one of the most 
important concepts in Heidegger's early thinking. It lS 
precisely by virtue of it that Heidegger achieved the 
hermeneutical turning to tl:e transcendental phenomenology of 
Husserl. The implication of this turning is double. On the 
one hand, it engenders a ~'transformation of phenomenology" .12 
On the other hand, it also brings about a "radicalization of 
hermeneutics",13 i.e., of a discipline which had just been 
elevated from the art of interpretation to the method of human 
sciences by Dil they' shortly before. 
It has already been pointed out that already from the 
semester of 1919, Heidegger had tried to refine the basic 
concept of phenomenology, intuition, to be "understanding 
intuition" or "hermeneutical intuition". And what Heidegger 
intended to do in such refinement is nothing other than 
removing the "primary of the theoretical" in Husserl' s 
phenomenological method, and trying to remold phenomenology 
10. GA24, S. 426. 
11. Wm, S.323f. 
12 Ref. Bubner, op. cit., p.21. 
13 See, for instance, Karl-Otto Apel, Transformation der Philosophie, 
Bd.l, · (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1994), S.282. 
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to be the method of a science of factical life. The impact 
of this remolding by the "little mag~cian from Messkirch" 14 
is striking and far-reaching. According to the testimony of 
a student at Freiburg in the early twenties, Karl Lowith, "the 
palpable intensity and impenetrable profundity of 
Heidegger's spiritual drive caused everything else to pale 
and made Husserl' s naive belief in an ultimate philosophical 
method seem irrelevant. "15 Actually, the "phenomenology of 
life" of Heidegger turns out to be more influential than the 
"transcendental phenomenology' of Husserl to the development 
of phenomenology in the twentieth century. Not only the Being 
and Nothing of Jean-Paul Sartre as "a phenomenological essay 
on ontology", but also the Phenomenology of Perception by 
Merleau-Ponty, can hardly be understood wi thout taking 
Heidegger's remolding of phenomenology into account. 
On the other hand, Heidegger's "radicalization" of the 
concept of understanding is no less significant for the 
development of hermeneutics than for that of phenomenology. 
Actually, while Heidegger had brought forth the concept of 
understanding to be the basic concept of the "original 
experience" instead of the concept of intuition, 
phenomenology and hermeneutics had become for Heidegger two 
methodical terms that are essentially related to each other. 
"Phenomenology of Dasein is hermeneutics in the original 
meaning of the word"16, Heidegger said. Hence, under the 
remolding of Heidegger, "phenomenology become hermeneutical 
h 17 P enomenology:"~ 
Understanding, as shown In the above analysis of its 
structure, is not regarded by Heidegger in SZ as merely a kind 
of knowing, but it is rather regarded as an "original 
14. The nickname of Heidegger given by his students, see Karl Lbwith, Martin 
Heidegger and European Nihilism, trans. Cary Steiner, (New York: Columbia 
University, 1995), p.4. 
15 Lbwith, Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism, p.4. 
16 SZ, S.37. 
17 Pbggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, S.70. 
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determination of the Existence of Dasein". It is the basic 
determination of the Being-constitution of Dasein. Therefore, 
the demarcation of Dilthey between explaining and 
understanding as two basic kinds of knowing is no longer 
applicable to Heidegger. On the contrary, for Heidegger, both 
explaining and understanding for Dilthey as two kinds of 
knowing are based on the understanding. For, according to 
Heidegger, knowing, no matter knowing of beings or of Being, 
is necessarily preceded by understanding as basic 
determination of the Being-co~stitution of human Dasein. 
Heidegger's emphasize of understanding, as s~mething in 
which human Dasein "lives", 18 helps to dissolve the conviction 
on the superiority of the theoretical reason, which has become 
more and more problematical in the philosophical reflections 
of the twentieth century. It not only inspires thOe reflections 
on the interpretative dimensions of the social or human 
-sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) , but also provides a 
provoking reference point for the reflections on the 
rationality of the physical sciences. 19 The "universality" of 
the problematic concerning understanding as initiated by 
Heidegger In SZ was then more elaborately developed by 
Heidegger's another student in the early twenties, Hans-Georg 
Gadamer. 2o Following the spreading of Gadamer's 
"philosophical hermeneutics" into the Anglo-American world, 
the concept of understanding as well as of interpretation has 
already become the central conception for various fields of 
18. Ref. David Farrell Krell, "The 'Factical Life' of Dasein: From the 
Early Freiburg Courses to Being and Time", in Reading Heidegger from the 
Start, ed. Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren, (New York: State Uni versi ty 
of New York Press, 1994), p.367. 
19. For instance, Richard J. Bernstein has found that Thomas Kuhn's 
reflections on the "theory-choice and paradigm switches" are closely 
related to Gadamer's hermeneutical analysis. See Berns~ein, Beyond 
Objectivism and Relativism, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1983), p. 40f. 
20. Vide, for instance, Gadamer, "Die Universalitat des hermeneutischen 
Problem", in Gesammelte Werke Bd 2, Wahrheit und Methode, Erganzungen 




Ill. On Historicality 
It was already pointed out in Chapter Three of the above 
essay that "destruction" is one of the basic components of 
Heidegger's conception of phenomenology. And the concept of 
"destruction" is closely related to that of "tradition" that 
the process of destruction is intended to loosen the "hardened 
tradition" which "blocks the access to the original source". 
The process of destruction is construed and augmented by 
Heidegger into the "phenomenological method" because 
Heidegger found that the understanding or "understanding 
intuition" of human Dasein cannot gain straighforward access 
into the "original source" · or the "things themselves" 
straightforwardly. Dasein is likely to fall into the "hardened 
tradition". 
The falling of Dasein into the tradition is ascribed by 
Heidegger to the "historicality" (Geschichtlichkeit) as one 
of the Existentials of the Being-consti tution of Dasein. The 
so-called "historicality" is not a character of the history 
as something written by mankind. But it means rather the 
character of the Being of Dasein that only on the ground of 
this character can Dasein achieve the activity of writing 
history. In so far as historicality is a determination of 
the Existence of Dasein, all understanding of Dasein, which 
is supposed to precede knowing, is regarded as historically 
determined. Hence, philosophy, as an achievement of human 
Dasein, which is supposed to be based on understanding, is 
therefore also historically determined. 
The implication of Heidegger's unfolding of the 
"historicali ty" of the human understanding is staggering. It 
not only provokes a new dimension of reflections on the 
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"method" of human sciences, but it even shakes the whole 
rationalism of the Western tradition which, as following the 
thinking of Plato, has insisted that real knowledge should 
be ahistorical, eternal and unchangeable. Actually, it, 
especially by virtue of the elaboration of Gadamer on the 
various dimensions of the historicali ty of understanding, has 
exerted considerable influence on the reflections not only 
on the rationality of human sciences but also of the physical 
sciences. Heidegger's reflection on the historicality of 
understanding serves simply as the staff leading to new 
dimensions of thinking besides the rationalist tradi tion for 
those who have felt suspect of the predominant positivist 
account to rationality. Therefore, no wonder a prominent 
contemporary defender of the Western rationalism, Habermas, 
would regard Heidegger' s thinking as "metaphysical-critical 
undermining of occidental rationalism".21 
In summary, it can be seen from the above analysis and brief 
remarks that Heidegger's formulation of philosophy is 
actually not only a re-formulation, but also a revolution 
concerning the tradi tional Western philosophy. Yet, the 
revolutionary character of Heidegger's thinking is actually 
not fully developed in his early thinking, in so far as he 
was at that time still haunted by the glory of the occidental 
idea of science. Only in the late thinking, when Heidegger 
recognizes the concept of science as growing out of the essence 
of metaphysics that he eventually forsook the idea of science, 
would the revolutionary dimension of it, esp~cially in regard 
of the Western tradition, be fully drawn out. However, even 
in the early thinking of Heidegger , I suppose, especially in 
his attempt to eradicate the "primary of the theoretical" in 
the Western tradition of science,. the revolutionary character 
of Heidegger can well be evaluated. Precisely in his analysis 
21. Vide Habermas, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne, S.158. 
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of the "de-living" character of the theoretical science and 
of its alienation with the factical life, as shown in the above 
essay, the advantage and the limi tation of the Western 
tradition of theoretical knowing is appropriately unlocked. 
This unlocking of the essence of occidental tradition of 
knowing, I think, is especially valuable at a time when the 
very idea of reason, on which this knowing is supposed to be 
based, has come into an enormous crisis. And besides, in so 
far as Heidegger's thinking could in a certain sense be 
regarded as an alien thought in regard of the Western rational 
tradition, it therefore is all the more valuable for the 
culture or tradition that is alien to the Western tradition. 
It can serve as a reference point to see that even inside the 
Western tradition, another possibility of knowing apart from 
the theoretical knowing, to which the modern physical sciences 
belong, is also called for. I do hope that this treatise will, 
by virtue of a treatment -of Heidegger, contribute to .reveal 
the shortcomings of the concept of knowing of the modern 
physical sciences as a division of the theoretical knowing, 
and to ·enhance the understanding of the justifications to seek 
for another kind of knowing beyond it. 
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